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1. Preface 
The history of Russia's war plans 1880-1914 has been told by 
A.M. ZaionckovskiI in 1926.' Since then the original plans have 
remained in the secrecy of the Soviet archives.2 Not even Soviet 
scholars have been able to publish anything on the war plans, 
although the military organization and material preparation 
have been dealt with many times.3 But in the French war 
archives in the Castle of Vincennes there is a little additional 
A.M. Zaion&kovskii, Plany voiny. Podgotovka Rossii k imperialistii<eskoi 
voine. O6erki voennoi podgotovki i pervonaal'nyh planov. Po arhivnym 
dokumentam. So vstupitel'noi statei M.N. Tuhaievskago. Stab RKKA, uprav-
lenie po issledovaniju opyta voin. Moskva 1926. 
A companion volume on Russia's preparations for naval war: M. Petrov, 
Podgotovka Rossii k mirovoi voine na more. S predisloviem M. Pavloviea. 
Stab RKKA, upravlenie po issledovaniju i ispol'zovaniju opyta voin. Mos-
kva—Leningrad 1926. 
2 The Central Administration of the USSR Archives answered that they had no 
such material when I requested to see documents concerning the defence of 
the Baltic coasts during these years. 
3 For instance, Istorija pervoi mirovoi voiny 1914-1918 I—II, AN SSSR i 
Ministerstva Oborona SSSR, Moskva 1975, pp. 195-200/I sketches the outline 
of Russian plans on the basis of Zaiordkovskil's and Petrov's books. 
Further essential studies: 
P.A. ZaionLkovskil, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii. Moskva 
1952. 
L.G. Beskrovnyl, Russkaja armija i fot v XIX veke. Voenno-ekonomideskaja 
potencial Rossii. Moskva 1973. 
P.A. Zalon&ovskil, Samoderzavie i russkaja armija na rubeie XIX—XX sto- 
letijah, 1881-1903. Moskva 1973. 
K.F. Sacillo. Rossija pered mirovoi voiny. Vooruzennye sily carizma v 1905- 
1914 gg. Akademija Nauk SSSR, nauenopopuljarnaja serija. Moskva 1974. 
A short introduction is given as a background for his study by 
Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army. The Old Army 
and the Soldiers' Revolt, March-April 1917. Princeton University Press 1980. 
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information.' The French military attachés succeeded rather 
well in their task of spying out the plans of the general staff in 
St. Petersburg, being representatives of the army that was amie 
et alliee. 
I have not avoided repeating the main points of the story told 
by Zaionckovskii, because his book has been out of print for 
half a century: originally it was written for service use in the 
Red Army. In addition, it is necessary to place the additional 
information brought out in this study within a general 
framework. 
In the following study the story has been presented from the 
viewpoint of the military attaché, because it is of interest to see 
what the French knew of the Russian plans and how they tried 
to influence them. The reports of the attachés tally rather well 
with Zaionckovski's text. Consequently, even the additional 
information recounted here can, if treated with due care, be 
taken as true. 
I have avoided retelling the diplomatic, economic or 
social background story because it has been dealt with in the 
numerous histories of the imperialist era.' Only a short sketch 
of the main turning points is given to paint the background 
for the military aspect of the story. 
The protocols of the meetings of the chiefs of general staffs 
have been published in the French collection of diplomatic 
documents,' as well as some of the politically important reports 
of the military attaché. I have tried to refer also to the 
publication in my footnotes when relevant. 
The development of the war plans is interesting history as 
4 Etat-Major de l'armee de terre, Service historique, Chateau de Vincennes. 
In footnote references: EMATSH + file number 
Service Historique de la Marine, Chateau de Vincennes. 
In footnote references: SHM + file number 
Copies of the politically most important documents as well as the diplomatic 
reports are kept in Archives, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (nowadays: 
Archives et Documentation, Ministere des relations exterieures), Quai 
d'Orsay, Paris. 
In footnote references: AMAE + series and volume number. 
5 No bibliography can be attempted within the space of this study. The reader 
must be referred to the available handbooks and bibliographies. 
6 Documents diplomatiques fransais, l.ser. 1871-1900, I—XVI, Paris 1929-
1959. 2. ser. 1901-1911, I—XIV, Paris 1930-1955. 3. ser. 1911-1914, I—XI, 
Paris 1929-1960. 
In footnote references: DDF + series and volume number. 
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such. The plans reflect the reality of life, the desperate search 
for security in a threatening world, and the elusive dreams of 
domination and grandeur in competition with other armies. 
This is part of the prehistory of the Great War. The years 
1880-1914 are often called the era of imperialism; imperialism 
in usually dealt with as an economic phenomenon, but it had a 
military side, too. This story of the military plans throws some 
additional light on the French influence on Russia's decisions, 
and on the influence of the Russian generals on the policy of 
their country. 
Reports concerning the Russian plans in or near Finland, in 
the Baltic area, are of special interest for a Finnish writer. I 
have, however, tried to avoid giving undue weight to this 
secondary theatre of operations, the problems of which have 
been dealt with in detail elsewhere.' Only the most salient 
features are described, with the necessary background 
information. Russia's war plans were one of the principal 
factors shaping the fate of all the Western provinces 
of the swollen empire. 
A grant by the Academy of Finland and the Centre Nationale 
de Recherche Scientifique made possible the study in the 
archives of Chateau de Vincennes and Quai d'Orsay, for which 
I am deeply grateful. Gratitude is due also to the Akademija 
Nauk SSSR, which enabled me to study in the Lenin Library 
in Moscow. The University Libraries in Helsinki and Tampere 
have been most helpful. Many people have helped me with 
advice, discussion, or patiently listening to complaints about the 
impossibility of writing history. Kalevan lukio (The Kaleva 
Senior High School), my employer, magnanimously consented 
to grant me a lengthy leave of absence from my teaching 
duties. Dr. George Maude of the University of Turku has taken 
great pains to correct my English. Rauno Enden of the Finnish 
Historical Association has carried out the task of editing the 
text for publication in the Series of the Association. I should be 
Tuomo Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den militärischen und politi-
schen Plänen Russlands vor dem ersten Weltkrieg. Helsinki 1962. 
Pertti Luntinen, Suomi Pietarin suojana ja uhkana venäläisten sotasuunnitel-
missa 1854-1914. With an English Summary: Finland, Shield and Threat for 
St. Petersburg. Historiallinen Arkisto 79, Helsinki 1983. 
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extremely happy if the finished product would in any way 
be worthy of the trouble so many people have taken to help me 
in my study. 
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2. The Franco-Russian Alliance 
Is Born 
2.1. The Diplomatic Background 
The alliance of Russia with France was born out of mutual 
isolation. Russia had been made to feel her lonelyness in 1878 
when her overblown appetites in the Near East had remained 
unsatiated in the Berlin Congress in spite of her previous 
victorious campaign. Then there had been the conflict with 
England in 1885 on the Afghan borders: a war with England 
would have involved also a naval threat against Russia's Baltic 
and/or Black Sea coasts. At the same time the Bulgarians had 
ungratefully emphasized their independence from Russia. 
Even though Prince Alexander was succesfully ousted, the 
Bulgarians elected another German, Ferdinand of Coburg, 
as their Prince. The consequent complications, especially the 
Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1886, brough about the danger of a 
further increase in Austrian influence in the Balkans. Russian 
frustration and jealousy was directed against Bismarck's 
Germany. The Dreikaiserbund crumbled. The Reinsurance Treaty 
of 1887 only papered over the cracks in the relations of Russia 
and Germany, especially as there was much bickering on 
financial and commercial questions. As a forerunner of the 
future political convergence, the Russian ministry of finance 
turned to the Paris market in its search for loans. 
The French, for their part, had been isolated by Bismarck's 
policy since 1871. They had also twice felt threatened with 
war, in 1875 and again in 1886-1887, although the danger 
11 
most probably existed only in their imagination. Nor were the 
French able to forget that they had lost their position as the 
principal great power to Germany; neither were they able to 
forgive the loss of the two provinces. 
In 1879-1882 a Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and 
Italy was formed. Neither Russia nor France alone was strong 
enough to wage war against the Triple Alliance. The French 
general staff estimated the military forces of these powers as 
follows: 
infantry 
divisions 
cavalry 
divisions cannons effectives 
Germany 	 73 9 3564 1550 000 
Italy 	 22 2 1092 360 000 
Austria 	 42 8 1776 900 000 
the Triple Alliance 2810 000 
France 	 75 7 3870 1550 000 
Russia 	 66 20 3290 1600 000 
the projected Dual Alliance 3150 0008 
Thus together, France and Russia seemed to be stronger than 
the Triple Alliance. 
It was not easy to reach an understanding, however. There was 
the ideological, political and psychological difference between 
the tsarist autocracy and the atheist republic. The political 
aims of the two states were also somewhat divergent. The French 
soldiers hoped for military co-operation against Germany, 
and the French chauvinists dreamed of Russian support for 
the revanche. Katkov and other influential Panslavists spurred 
Alexander III on to approach the French. But Katkov was a 
dangerous man, because 
"he has only one dream, to launch France against 
Germany at her own risk and peril, in order to be 
free to act in the Balkans. The high command of the 
Russian army is afraid of Germany but sees an 
eventual conflict with Austria under very seducing 
colours. That is why Ignat'ev, ernjaev, Skobelev, 
Aksakov and others incite the French to revanche".9 
The Emperor Alexander III was cautious enough to resist the 
8 "Note" s.d., AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30, p. 196— 
"Au sujet du role probable de la Russie en cas de conflit entre la France et 
l'Allemagne", Moulin to war minister 23.VI 1887. EMATHS 7 N 1471. 
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pressure of Russian as well as of French chauvinists, in spite of 
his own resentment against Germany. For instance, during the 
dangerous year of 1887 the French understood that they could 
not expect any other help from Russia except good offices in 
case of an unprovoked German attack.10  
Alexander decided to proceed only after William II's "new 
men" got the Kaiser to renounce the Reinsurance Treaty in 
1890. In the same year the naval might of England seemed to 
be added to the strength of the Triple Alliance. Already in 1887 
the treaty confirming the Mediterranean status quo had been 
signed between England, Italy, and Austria. This had been 
Bismarck's counterstroke to Russia's plans in the Near East. 
And now in 1890 the agreement on the exchange of Zanzibar 
and Heligoland had the appearance of sealing the Anglo-
German entente. Russia's traditional enemy was joining her new 
adversary. 
Discussions were started between French and Russian 
representatives. The result was an exchange of letters on 
22.VIII 1891 between Ribot, the French minister for foreign 
affairs, and Mohrenheim, the Russian ambassador. They 
declared their identical aim of preserving peace, and promised 
to help each other in case of an attack by the Triple Alliance. 
The French wanted to limit the agreemet to Europe, because 
they did not wish to be drawn into a war against England in 
consequence of an eventual Russo-English conflict somewhere 
in Afghanistan or China." The chiefs of the French and Russian 
general staffs were then authorized to continue their 
discussions on the details of the military co-operation in case of 
war.12 — The diplomatic and military discussions were kept 
secret, but the new orientation was demonstrated with a 
French naval visit to Kronstadt. And in 1893 admiral Avellan's 
squadron was received in Toulon with acclaim." 
10 = 9 
11 MAE to Russian Ambassador 27. VIII 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30 
Note secrete pour le ministre 1.X 1896. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 32. 
'-Z Freycinet, minister of war, to Ribot 9. VIII 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30 
13 A recent study of the diplomatic prehistory of the Dual Alliance is given by 
George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order. Franco-Rus- 
sian Relations, 1875-1890. Princeton University Press 1979 
A classic of undiminished value is Baron Boris Nolde, L'alliance franco-rus-
se. Les origines du systeme diplomatique d'avant-guerre. Institut d'etudes 
slaves de l'universite de Paris, Collection historique VII Paris 1936 
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2.2. The Military Convention 
The military discussions were started in 1890 parallel with the 
diplomatic talks which led to the exchange of letters forming 
the basis of the alliance. Generals Obrueev and Boisdeffre, the 
Russian and French chiefs of staff, had been in private contact 
for many years and had striven for the alliance. Now they 
informed each other of their respective plans for a war against 
Germany. 
Obrucev stated that if the Germans attacked France with the 
bulk of their army — at least 2/3 of their forces — Russia could 
attack Germany from Poland. If 2/3 of the Germans should 
turn to the east, Russia would be compelled to resort to defence 
with delaying tactics. Gurko, the commander-in-chief in 
Poland, would draw his forces to Brest(-Litovsk), leaving 
100 000 men to delay the German advance by destroying all 
railway lines, towns, and villages. Obrucev suggested that the 
French should retire behind their border fortifications and let 
the German attack break up against them. But whatever the 
Germans did and whatever the French suffered, Russia was 
going to throw her principal forces against Austria. It was an 
absolute necessity to finish off Austria as soon as possible. She 
would grow in strength if given time, but if Russia attacked her 
at the very beginning, she would collapse, because her Slav 
peoples would not fight against Russia. Then Germany would 
be left alone against Russia and France. 
This cannot have been very comforting to Boisdeffre, but he 
was not able to make Obrucev change these plans. But he 
"understood" that Alexander III would not repeat Alexander 
II's "mistake" in 1870. "The Emperor knew" that the 
consequences would be grave also to Russia if France were to 
be destroyed. The agreed basis of military co-operation was 
that a German attack against France would be answered with 
Russian mobilization.' 
Next summer the discussions were continued. The French 
general proposed that the convention be made against the 
Triple Alliance, not only against Germany, lest she should wait 
} Boisdeffre to Freycinet 15/20 VIII 1890: AMAE C.P. Russie N.S. 30. DDF 
VIII/1 n:o 165 
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until France was exhausted by a campaign against Italy and 
then intervene and dictate the peace. ObruLev agreed, of 
course, because Austria was for Russia of even more 
importance than Italy for France. We shall see later how 
France tried to get out of her obligations in respect of an 
Austro-Russian war. At this point, however, it was agreed that 
any act of aggression by the Triple Alliance was to be answered 
by an immediate mobilization in France and Russia, and the 
war was to be started on the first day of the mobilization. 
Obrueev said that he was planning for the launching of the 
Russian cavalry over the frontier to delay the mobilization and 
concentration of the enemy. 
Boisdeffre tried again to make Obr&ev change his mind 
about the primacy of Austria. The French general explained 
that the principal enemy, the most dangerous enemy, had to be 
defeated first. It would be dangerous if Russia attacked Austria 
or if France attacked Italy first. The secondary enemies could 
easily be defeated after Germany was beaten. 
But Obrueev could not admit this point of view. He saw no 
symmetry between Italy and Austria as enemies. It was of the 
utmost necessity for Russia to destroy Austria and dissolve her 
empire. 
This led the discussion to eventual war aims. Obrueev said 
that Russia wanted to liberate her brother Slays in Galicia. 
They were oppressed by the Austrian Poles, who also fomented 
discontent in the (Russian) Kingdom of Poland. Russia also 
needed the outlet of the Turkish Straits in order not to be left 
hemmed in the Black Sea, with all her seaports at the mercy of 
the English fleet. But Obrucev did not want Constantinople (in 
the 1915 treaty it was to be made an international city) nor any 
other conquests; Russia was already too extensive without 
them. For the Russian general it was "self-evident" that France 
wanted Alsace and Lorraine back. But it was better to defeat 
Germany before discussing advancing the French frontier to 
the Rhine, or the dismembering of the German empire. 
Boisdeffre did not say much about these questions, at least in 
his report. The French general staff was very much subordinate 
to the civilian government. Neither had Obrucev any authority 
to discuss grand political designs. But the Russian army and its 
leaders were subordinate only to the emperor, not to any 
government; and they were not known for any modesty in their 
15 
appetite for conquest. Of course, Obruäev aired his general 
ideas and had no definite plans of action. But his discussion 
reflected the main features of the war aims that Russia strove 
for in 1914-1917. 
The generals agreed that neither party wanted to start a war. 
If a convention was to be made, it must be a defensive 
convention. But both were ready to wage a war if compelled to 
do so.15 
It is idle to discuss whether the alliance was defensive or 
offensive; these generals were no pacifists, nor, for that matter, 
was the emperor. The alliance was defensive as far as both 
parties were afraid of a German attack and wanted reciprocal 
support against it. And neither was willing to be dragged into 
a war under unfavourable conditions, nor to bear the odium of 
declaring war. But if a war had to be waged, it was better to 
win it, and to get some advantage out of it: the satisfaction of 
grievances, conquests, power, the permanent weakening of the 
enemy. The problem of deciding whether a war is offensive or 
defensive is more of a political or propagandist question than a 
historical one. 
The preamble of the convention thus declared: 
"France and Russia, animated with a desire to 
conserve peace, have composed the present note 
exclusively with a view of a defensive war provoked 
by the forces of the Triple Alliance against one or 
other or both of these Powers". 
A principle of complete reciprocity was decided on: if one of 
the signatories was attacked, the other was to help with all 
available force. 
Then there was much discussion on fixing the amount of 
available force. France was to concentrate practically all her 
troops against Germany, leaving only 1/6 of them, or 10 
divisions, against Italy or in Africa. Thus she would be able to 
attack Germany with 65 divisions or 1300 000 men. Germany 
would not be able to transfer any troops from her western 
frontier to the east against Russia. 
The French hoped that Russia would adopt an identical 
is Boisdeffre to Freycinet 16.VII 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30. DDDF VIII/ 
1, n:o 424 
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policy vis-å-vis Austria and leave only an indispensable 
minimum of forces against that power. The French general staff 
estimated that 11 Russian army corps would be enough to fend 
off the 14 Austrian corps. Thus there would be left 11 corps or 
33 divisions or 700 000-800 000 men against Germany, which 
was enough to defeat the German army with the help of the 65 
French divisions. The French admitted the problems of Russian 
mobilization and concentration: the state of Russia's 
communications meant that her military measures were much 
slower than Germany's and slower even than Austria's. But if 
the Germans saw at the beginning of the war that Russia was 
going to march, they would be compelled to keep part of their 
troops on their eastern frontier.16  
Obrucev and Vannovskii — the minister of war — received 
the French proposition "with favour", but they had "a certain 
tendency to be preoccupied with Austria more than we should 
wish ...". Obruaev promised that he would organize 
demonstrations on the German border in order to worry the 
enemy and thereby prevent her from transferring her forces to 
the west. Obrueev estimated that the Triple Alliance would 
attack Russia with 13 Austrian, 3 Italian and 7 German army 
corps and with reserve troops, which would leave only 12 
German and 9 Italian corps against France. He believed it to be 
of the utmost importance to attack the Austrian troop 
concentrations in Galicia first. A prompt victory over the 
Austrians would engender a respectful attitude in the 
Rumanians; but an even more important aspect was the fact 
that such a victory would be the precondition for a march on 
Breslau. That was the only direction of attack which could 
constitute a vital threat to the German heartland. Any attack 
further to the north would run into the German fortifications 
at Königsberg, on the Vistula, or at Posen.11 
Boisdeffre admitted feeling assez triste because of Obrueev's 
tenacity. Now the French would have wanted the convention to 
be written against Germany only, not the Triple Alliance. The 
Austro-Russian rivalry was of no interest to them, and they did 
not like the eventuality of a Russo-Austrian war that might 
16 "Note" s.d. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30, p. 196— 
17 "Note" by Moulin 16. VII 1892. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 31 
2 — French information on ... 	 17 
involve them in a war against Germany. They dreamed of a 
convention where "we would remain free if Germany kept the 
peace". 
But of course Russia could not accept a convention of this 
kind. She was afraid lest Austria or Romania started a war, 
while Germany waited until Russia was exhausted — the 
argument was identical to the one the French put forward 
about the Italian danger. On the other hand, this was a rather 
theoretical view, because it was not very probable that 
Germany would keep out of an Austro-Russian conflict. Thus 
the accepted principle that the convention should be directed 
against the Triple Alliance was not changed. 
The French, however, had a further problem. They could not 
be too reassured about Obrucev's demonstrations on the 
German frontier. They were afraid that these troops might 
remain inactive observers, leaving the Germans free to 
concentrate all their troops against France. For a long time 
Obrucev withstood fixing the number of troops for the 
operation against Germany, but in the end he yielded to the 
French insistence and named the number. The French, on their 
part, promised to attack Germany with all their forces,'$ which 
was easy, of course, because they had no other choice (as they 
thought). 
The discussion was also concerned with innumerable matters 
of detail, and it was further delayed by the apprehensions of 
the Russian emperor. He deemed it vitally important to keep 
the convention secret, lest the Germans immediately attack on 
learning that they could no longer hope for Russian neutrality 
in the event of a Franco-German war. The Russians also 
insisted that any new Schnaebele-affair, questions, in short, of 
mere amour-propre, would not be provocation enough to be 
regarded as a casus foederis. Alexander III was also afraid that, 
far from protecting Russia, the alliance would be an instrument 
of French revanchism that would drag Russia into war. The 
instability of French governments also caused much worry to 
18 Ribot to Montebello 22.VII 1892. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 31 
Boisdeffre to war minister 10.VIII 1892. AMAE C.P. Russie N.S. 31. DDF IX/ 
1 n:o 447 
MAE to war ministry 12.VIII 1892. AMAE C.P. Russie N.S. 31 
18 
the emperor.19  
The convention was signed by the chiefs of staff in August 
1892, but it took more than a year for it to be ratified. 
Alexander's doubts on French reliability were allayed 
somewhat by the warm reception of the Russian fleet at Toulon 
in 1893. But of course the sheer necessity of the convention was 
the decisive factor. Germany was reported to be increasing her 
military forces. Thus the military convention was ratified by an 
exchange of notes between the Russian and French ministers 
for foreign affairs on 24.XII 1893/4.I.1894. 
In the convention the participants promised that if France or 
Russia were attacked by Germany, or by Italy or Austria with 
German support, Russia/France was to employ all available 
forces to attack Germany. In the event of the Triple Alliance or 
one of the powers thereto mobilizing, France and Russia, 
on receiving the first information of it, and without any 
further communication, were to mobilize immediately and 
simultaneously the totality of their forces and to concentrate 
them as near their borders as possible. France was to attack 
Germany with 1300 000 men, and Russia with 700 000 or 
800 000 men. These troops were to engage the Germans in full 
force in order to compel them to fight simultaneously in the 
east and in the west. 
It was further agreed that the general staffs of the 
contracting powers were to concert their efforts to prepare for 
the execution of the agreed measures. They were to exchange 
with each other all available information on the armies of 
the Triple Alliance. The ways and means of war-time 
communication were to be studied. 
It was agreed to keep the convention secret, as the emperor 
had insisted. It was to remain in operation as long as the Triple 
Alliance lasted. If the war broke out, neither party to the 
convention was to sign a separate peace. 
If the Austro-German Alliance of 1879 had been the first 
definite act in the formation of the alliances of the great war, 
the Franco-Russian agreement was the second step in the 
19 Boisdeffre to war minister 18.VIII 1892. AMAE C.P. Russie N.S. 31. DDF IX/ 
1, n:o 461 
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polarization of European powers. It remained one of the basic 
factors of European politics for twenty years. But it influenced 
international and internal politics in many different ways, and 
it was only after many twists and turns that the articles put on 
paper in 1894 were transformed into the bloody reality of 1914. 
At the moment of the signing of the military convention, 
Matton, a young French officer of the general staff, was on a 
mission to Russia. His report is of considerable interest, 
because it throws light on some of the ideas behind the 
convention. He estimated that the defensive alliance with 
Russia was useful, but an offensive alliance would have been a 
mistake. Russia was too slow and too much inclined to the 
defensive, and it would not have been advantageous for France 
to declare war on the Triple Alliance or to let Russia drag her 
into an unequal battle. But the international situation 
remained intolerable. The incessant formidable armaments race 
was inevitably leading to war. There was no sense for France to 
remain waiting for a war which might break out while 
conditions were unfavourable for her, with an ally who might 
endanger only a few provinces while France's very existence 
was in question. It was better to provoke events than to submit 
to them. France had better work for the disintegration of the 
Triple Alliance, profiting from its numerous elements of 
discord. Then, without hesitation, Russia was to be pushed to 
declare war on Germany, which would be easy because of their 
tense relations. A war between Russia and Germany was all to 
the advantage of France. Diplomacy, the art of deceiving 
dexterously, could serve here by making Russia beautiful 
promises of effective support, and at the same time promising 
Germany France's neutrality at the price of some 
compensation. Then, her troops mobilized and concentrated, 
France could intervene at a propitious moment and dictate her 
conditions both to Gernfany and to Russia. It was an 
undeniable fact that Russia, France's present ally, would be her 
enemy one day in the future, when Germany was beaten. 
Russia was presently the enemy of Germany, but would always 
be the enemy of any power that prevented her from acquiring 
supremacy in Europe.20 
20 Mission en Russie du Cm. Matton, "Memoire sur la Russie" 29.XII 1892. 
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Matton's refreshingly Macchiavellian report reflects his 
personal way of thinking, of course, and it is no evidence of 
official French planning. It is, however, a useful reminder that 
nations alliees are not always so very amies. Allied powers do 
not become one power; they pursue their own aims and they 
are in concert only as far as it suits them. The report shows 
how raison d'état was cheerfully accepted as the moral 
yardstick in international relations, and how war was held to 
be both inevitable and acceptable. Of course, in itself the report 
did not have any practical, immediate importance. 
2.3. The Russian Army by the End of 
the Eighties 
Up to and during Alexander II's time the Russian army was 
recruited from serfs who served for 25 years. There was a 
motley of establishments, units and high commands, united 
often only through the sovereign as the supreme warlord. D.A. 
Miljutin, however, reformed the army during his tenure of 
office as war minister from 1861 to 1881. The various military 
services and installations were combined into military districts, 
with an over-all peacetime command centred in the war 
ministry. Some commanders of military districts were also 
charged with civil administration as governor-generals. In the 
frontier districts (Vilna, Warsaw, Kiev, Caucasia) these 
commanders were designated wartime army commanders. 
Miljutin tried, in addition, to improve the educational and 
professional level of his army, and military discipline was made 
more reasonable. 
Compulsory national service was introduced in 1874, with a 
service period of six years, gradually shortened to three years 
in the infantry and four years in other branches of the army, 
with five years in the navy. After active service the men were 
transferred to the reserve for 13-15 years, and then up to the 
age of 43 they were enrolled in the militia, which also included 
the numerous men freed from active service. Men with 
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education could serve for a couple of years and become reserve 
officers. 
The annual contingent of conscripts 
1870 140,000 
1880 235,000 
1890 250,000 
Thus, by 1889, the peacetime army consisted of nearly a million 
men, with three million trained reservists and a few million 
untrained militia. The number of men in the age classes of 
military service was 13,160,000 or 11,65 % of a population of 
113 million.'' 
Active troops were organized into army corps, of which there 
existed eighteen by 1887, with two further added in 1888. Their 
distribution in the military districts can be seen in map 1. 
The Guards, Grenadier and Caucasian corps consisted 
of three infantry divisions each, the army corps I 
— XVII of two divisions each. Two cavalry divisions 
were attached to the Guards and Caucasian corps, 
14 of the rest had one cavalry division each. In 
addition there were three detached infantry divisions 
(of which one in Finland) and four of cavalry; in all 
48 infantry divisions and 22 cavalry divisions. There 
was a brigade of artillery for each infantry division, 
and a battalion of engineers for each corps. Four 
rifle brigades formed a light infantry." 
Then there were the cadre formations for reserve, militia and 
fortress troops, various local detachments, military schools, 
installations, services, administrations. Frontier guards were 
under the ministry of finance, and a corps of gendarmes was 
under the ministry of the interior. 
The Asiatic nomads were freed from military service. 
The Caucasian Mohammedans were subject to 
21 "Mobilisation 1892". EMATSH 7 N 1508 (a collection of numerical informa-
tion on the Russian army. Tallies sufferably well with Beskrovnyi's and 
Zaion&kovskii's statistics). All statistics in these reports must be taken with 
a great deal of scepticism. From report to report there is much variation, 
which may be due either to the unreliability of the informants or the diffi-
culties in compiling the basic data. 
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military service in principle, but in practice they 
paid a temporary military tax instead. There were a 
few voluntary national units. The Crimean Tartars 
formed six squadrons, the Dagestani had a cavalry 
regiment and three militia sotnias, the Ossets two 
sotnias. The Turkmen irregular cavalry consisted of 
three squadrons. The protectorate of Bukhara had a 
small army of its own." 
The Finns were freed from military service in 
1809, but the autonomous Finnish government 
formed a few enlisted battalions in the years 1812-
1830. After that only one rifle battalion, part of the 
Guards corps, remained. The ancient Swedish 
territorial military system, the indelta, was replaced 
by modern national service in 1878. Miljutin had 
hoped that Finns would serve on an equal footing 
with other Imperial subjects, in the interest of 
military uniformity and Russification. But Finland 
succeeded in organizing a tiny army of nine 
battalions and one dragoon regiment of its own, 
charged with the defence of Finland and only in 
this way participating in the military effort of the 
empire. 
The Cossacks continued their lifelong service. 
Each cavalry division consisted of one Cossack 
regiment in addition to the three regular cavalry 
regiments. Further Cossack detachments served 
along the wild Asian frontiers. 
Starting a war in the good old days before universal military 
conscription was a leisurely affair and did not cause much 
prior staff work. But for the modern war millions of reservists 
had to be called up and armed, the detachments had to be 
mobilized and transported to the frontier; and everything had 
to be done faster than the enemy was doing it. Therefore 
general staffs had to be established to undertake the task of 
planning mobilization and troop concentration, and sketching 
out the first battle as a basis for the planning work. Moltke's 
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planning was given credit for the Prussian victories in 1864, 
1866 and 1870-71. Other armies organized their brain-power 
on the model of the Prussian Great General Staff. 
Miljutin made his general staff a department of the war 
ministry. There was much to do: it had taken six months to 
mobilize four army corps in 1859 to guard the Austrian border 
during the Franco-Austrian war in Italy. A bigger army had 
been mobilized in two and a half months against the Polish 
rebels in 1863 — not rapidly enough, notwithstanding the 
increased speed if compared with 1859. In the seventies 
planning for war was interrupted by a war which had been 
neither expected nor planned for, but Miljutin succeeded in 
sending a bigger army — and sending it faster than before — to 
the Balkan frontier in 1877. But it was not until the eighties 
that detailed plans were completed." 
The powers with whom Russia expected to have to fight were 
Austria and Germany. The French military attaché reported 
that in 1882 the Russians calculated that they would be ready 
to fight in about two months, on the 50-70th day after 
mobilization. This was much slower than the potential enemies. 
That was why so many corps were positioned close to the 
frontier. Supported by numerous fortresses they had to wage a 
defensive war until the whole of the army was concentrated 
and ready to operate. Maps 2-3 give the positions of the 
armies as reported by the military attaché in 1882 and 1884, 
with map 4 by Zaionckovskii for comparison. The details of the 
plan were adjusted annually. 
The crisis of 1887 caused the military attaché to send further 
reports to Paris. A host of 1300 000 men was to be ready to 
fight on the 13-14th day, and the strength was to be increased 
to 2000 000 men by the 25-27th day. The principal or central 
army was to be commanded by General Gurko, the governor-
general of Poland. Grand Duke Vladimir, with Bobrikov as his 
chief of staff, commanded in Vilna the Northern army, with the 
task of guarding Gurko's flank. A German landing was 
expected on Courland, and that was why Vladimir's army was 
comparatively strong, with one corps at Riga. The capital and 
the coast of the Gulf of Finland were guarded by one corps. 
The commander of the Southern army was not designated, but 
24 P. ZalondkOVSkil, Voennye reformy p. 79—, 280- 
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General Dragomirov was subsequently appointed commander 
of the Kiev Military district. This army had the task of securing 
Gurko's left flank against the Austrians. One army corps was 
to defend the Black Sea coast. 
The several armies consisted of the following corps: 
Northern army 
Principal army 
Southern army 
Reserve at Orel 
Gulf of Finland 
Black Sea 
II, III, IV, IX, X 
V, VI, XIII, XIV, Guards 
VIII, XI, XII, Grenadiers 
XV 
I 
VII 
The first army corps consisted of three divisions: 
23rd in Estonia, 37th in St. Petersburg and 
Kronstadt, 24th with the Finnish rifle battalions on 
the northern coast of the Gulf.25 
Two further army corps were added to the strength of the 
Russian army in 1888. Consequently, the field armies were 
strengthened, with their centre of gravity moved northwards or 
southwards, according to whether the war was to be waged 
against Austria, or Germany, or both. The reserves were 
positioned behind the most important frontiers in White Russia 
or the Ukraine. 
Potential 
enemies 
Germany and 
Austria 
Germany Austria 
Russian 
armies 
Russian army 
corps 
Northern II, III, IV, XVI II, III, IV, XV, XVI II, III, IV, XVI 
Grenadiers 
Central V, VI, XIV, XV V, VI, XI, XIV V, VI, XIV, XV 
Guards Guards 
Southern VIII, IX, XI, XII VIII, IX, XII VIII, IX, XI, XII 
Grenadiers Guards 
Reserve X, XIII, XVII X, XIII, XVII X, XIII, XVII, 
Grenadiers 
Baltic coast I I 
Black Sea VII VII VII 
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In this plan the Finnish rifle battalions formed part 
of the reserve at Kursk, Minsk or Gomel, according 
to whether both Germany and Austria, or only 
Germany or Austria were the enemy. — Taking the 
Finnish conscripted battalions outside the Grand 
Duchy would have been against the 1878 Finnish 
law of military service. Had the Finns known of 
these Russian plans the constitutional crisis of 1899 
might have broken out ten years earlier. The French 
military attaché did not notice this question. It is not 
known whether the Russian general staff was aware 
of the constitutional aspect of this detail of their 
plans. It was a couple of years later, in 1891, that 
the emperor ordered the revision of the Finnish 
military organization, which took place in 1901. 
The wartime strength of a division was about 20 000 men in the 
infantry and 8000 in the cavalry. Thus an army corps consisted 
of 40 000-70 000 men. Nearly two million reservists were to be 
called up in the first round to fill up the active units and to 
form the reserve divisions. After that there remained the 
second call-up of the elderly reservists, about half a million 
men, and the first call-up of the militia, circa two million men. 
The untrained militia was to be conscripted only in extreme 
danger to defend the country.' 
There seemed to be no lack of men. The problem was to get 
them to the battle area in time. That was difficult because of 
the size of the empire and her sparse net of communications. 
There were only a few railway lines leading to the western 
frontier from the interior of the country. The main lines and 
the army corps to be transported are indicated on map 5. 
The French military attaché Moulin also studied the reason 
for leaving comparatively strong units out of the main armies 
to guard the Baltic region. The Russian Baltic fleet was clearly 
inferior to the German fleet. It was not able seriously to 
menace the German coasts, nor was it able to defend Russia's 
27 "Au sujet du nouveau plan de mobilisation 14". Moulin 29.V 1890. EMATSH 
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own coasts, neither against a small violation nor against a 
serious disembarkation. There was no promise of improvement 
for some years to come. The German coasts were well fortified 
and thus Germany needed only a small number of second-rank 
troops for coastal defence. The Russian coasts, on the contrary, 
were open from Memel to Narva and exposed to violations, as 
was the Finnish coast outside the fortress of Sveaborg. 
Kronstadt was well armed, and its approaches were narrow 
and well protected with mine barrages and small torpedo 
boats. This fortress protected St. Petersburg and the bottom of 
the Gulf. The nearest point to the capital open for an 
disembarkation was Krasnye Gorki between Oranienbaum and 
Narva. However, the coast was unapproachable for part of the 
year because of ice. The only area where the sea never froze 
was between Memel and Vindava; in the Gulf of Riga the sea 
froze only for a short time. Therefore the Germans had their 
best chance on the Courland coasts. In addition there were 
railway lines available there, and the local population was well 
disposed towards the Germans. 
The defence works were nothing to speak of. Dünamünde 
was a dilapidated fort. Until Libau was completed — started in 
1890, "it will take ten years at the pace the Russians construct 
their forts" — the Russian general staff had reason to be 
apprehensive of a German landing on Courland. A landing 
force of 30 000-40 000 men was to be expected. Therefore it 
was necessary to have an equal number of Russian troops in 
these regions. The rest of the coast could be protected by a 
strong mobile division supported by the Sveaborg and 
Kronstadt garrisons, depot troops, second-line reserve 
detachments, and the militia. 
There was an additional explanation for retaining so many 
troops behind the frontier. A number of army corps had to be 
left out of the original troop concentration because of the 
inadequacy of the railway network. Afterwards they could be 
sent to one or another theatre of war according to the 
circumstances. This reserve army could also be said to include 
the corps left on the coast, "if a position so dispersed can be so 
called".28 
Later Moulin had further detailed information on the 24th 
division in Finland and the 23rd division in Reval being sent to 
the frontier: "The state of the railways doesn't allow the 
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transport of these divisions to the army of Vilna or Warsaw 
until a latish date, towards the 50th day".79 
i 
The 24th division was later taken out of Finland to 
form part of the new XVIII army corps in Estonia. A 
new rifle brigade was created to replace it, because 
it was deemed too dangerous for Russian prestige in 
Finland to leave only reserve formations and the 
Finnish battalions in the Grand Duchy. 
2.4. The Russian Ally Evalued in 1892 
Matton, whom we met above, was, among other tasks, charged 
with making an evaluation of the military importance of 
France's new ally. He reported that as a rule the Russians liked 
France and detested Austria and Germany, who were 
interfering with Russian interests in every way. — This was 
obvious enough since it was the reason why Russia had 
concluded the alliance, in the first place. 
The Russian soldier Matton regarded as generally well-built, 
but of limited intelligence; absolutely obedient, but without 
initiative and individuality. The Russian officer had often only 
an indifferent education and rarely liked working, 
"carelessness being a trait of the Slav character". The Guards 
officer had plenty of wealth but little knowledge; he was 
brilliant in salons and bars, but dissipated and a gambler; his 
bravery could not be doubted but his skill could not be trusted. 
The studies in the general staff academy were better 
organized than in France. The three arms were able to act in 
liaison and had a common tactical doctrine. Otherwise 
everything else was retarded in the Russian army; the wheels 
28 Moulin to war minister 5.VII 1890. EMATSH 7 N 1472 
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were badly greased. Promotion was rarely decided on merit, 
nearly always on favour. The Russians were a people who did 
not wish anything better than to wage war, but their natural 
nonchalance prevented them from taking pains in the 
preparations for it. The materiel of the first line seemed to be 
complete and well maintained. But the infantry rifle was still 
in the course of being replaced with a new model; and Russia 
was surely to be one of the last great powers to adopt the 
modern cannon." 
At this time several other French officers visited Russia to 
get acquainted with the new ally. Their reports are often 
stereotyped, but nevertheless they include plenty of 
information. Several studies on the Russian army were made 
on the basis of these reports and other available information. A 
typical example, and one commended by his superior officers, 
was compiled by Captain Paul Dreyfus.31 He stated that the 
Russian soldier had been distinguished for his endurance 
during the painful expedition in the Balkans, and his heroism 
at Plevna was well remembered. He was not the automaton the 
German soldier was, forged by the Prussian dressage. On the 
contrary the Russian soldier was treated by his officers with a 
certain benevolence, which contrasted well with the sharpness 
of the Prussian officers. 
Recruiting non-commissioned officers, Dreyfus went on, was 
difficult, because there were no middle classes in Russia. 
The cream of officers was educated in the Corps of Pages, in 
the cadet schools, and in the military schools. The great 
majority of officers were produced in the junker schools. After 
serving six years in the ranks even a private could be sent to a 
junker school and then promoted officer; but such officers were 
never appointed to vacancies in the west. The instruction in the 
Nicholaean Academy of the General Staff was brilliant and up 
to date, but the officers were kept under a pedantic discipline, 
30 Mission en Russie du Cm. Matton. "Memoire sur la Russie". 29.XII 1892. 
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31 Travail d'etude du capitaine Paul Dreyfus de 1'Etat-Major de la 32e Division 
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Paul Dreyfus was not THE Dreyfus, who was Alfred, nor his brother, who 
was Mathieu 
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and they remained strangers to the troops. The general level of 
education of officers was inferior to the corresponding French 
level. Seniority was the principal ground for promoting 
officers. 
The author noted with special interest the teaching of tactics 
by General Dragomirov, commander of the Kiev military 
district. He was designated commander-in-chief of the 
Southern or South-Western army, which had to attack the 
Austrians at the very beginning of the war. This general 
stressed the virtues of assault over firing: "pula dura, styk 
molodec" (bullet is stupid, bayonet is plucky; Suvorov seems to 
have taught this doctrine). Only the cold weapon was able to 
give decisive results, while firing from a distance corresponded 
too well with the instinct of personal safety. — This was to be a 
costly way of thinking in 1914. 
Dreyfus believed that the Russian army might have been very 
powerful if it had been organized in the German fashion, 
utilizing to the maximum effect the total male population. 
Perhaps this would be done later, thought Dreyfus, when the 
alliance with France had encouraged Russia decide to wrench 
from Germany the European hegemony, which the latter had 
won twenty years earlier with her victories. — The passage 
indicates a lack of understanding of the importance of social, 
economic and industrial factors in war and military 
organization. It was customary then to take into account only 
the standing peacetime military strength of a country, because 
only a short, decisive campaign was expected. — However, 
even at that the current Russian army was stronger than its 
German opponent: 
Russian and German mi itary power compared, 1892 
Russia Germany 
population, million 119 49 
regiments 193 173 
squadrons 346 465 
batteries 435 494 
fortress companies 229 149 
sapper companies 97 128 
officers 33 829 28 853 
men 858 948 569 764 
horses 143 964 96 844 
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Of reserve troops there were 28 regiments in European Russia, 
8 regiments in Caucasia and nine battalions in Asia. The fifth 
company in each reserve battalion was intended to form the 
cadre of a second call-up reserve regiment. 
The difficulties in Russian troop mobilization and 
concentration were due to the size of the empire. European 
Russia was ten times the size of France, and Asiatic Russia 
extended to 16 million square kilometres. This made 
simultaneous action with France nearly impossible. It was true 
that a great part of Russia's forces were garrisoned near her 
western frontier: 25 infantry divisions and 13 cavalry divisions 
in the military districts of Warsaw. Vilna an Kiev, plus 17 
infantry and 5 cavalry division in the St. Petersburg, Moscow 
and Odessa districts. But even this area was six times bigger 
than France. Troop concentration was slow because of the 
defects of the railway network: the small number of strategic 
lines, the lack of double track, the sparse network. Germany 
would be ready to attack on the eight day, while twelve 
Austrian corps would be mobilized and ready to march on the 
twenty-fourth day. Thus Russia could not help adopting a 
defensive attitude during the first weeks of the war. Strong 
fortifications were being constructed near the border, and the 
army corps of the Warsaw, Vilna, and Kiev districts constituted 
solid covering forces. 
Dreyfus had the same idea that the Russians toyed with 
later: perhaps it was preferable for Russia to evacuate Poland 
and withdraw her troops to the interior of the empire so as to 
have complete security during mobilization. 
The captain concluded that the situation was a gloomy one 
for France. Germany was free to leave only a small number of 
army corps on her eastern frontier, and France would have to 
fight the total might of the enemy alone at the beginning of the 
war. Russia would not be saved, either: after beating France 
the Germans would be free to transfer their army to the east to 
make an end of Russia. 
Therefore it was of stringent necessity for Russia to perfect 
her means of troop mobilization and concentration and arming 
so as to compel Germany to dispose at least a half of her army 
corps on the eastern frontier at the beginning of the war. 
This was to be the recurring theme in the general staff 
discussions for two decades. 
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A third officer, Commandant (Major) Chirlonchon, visited the 
Warsaw military district. He received a favourable impression 
of the Russian army there. It possessed the essential qualities of 
a good army: discipline, sobriety, tenacity, and courage. 
But great problems existed in the frontier areas. Chirlonchon 
believed that the Polish hatred of Russia could not perhaps be 
sparked off as easily as in 1863, but nevertheless it was deeply 
felt. The government had done nothing to rally the population; 
it only tried to subjugate the Poles through a hard system of 
oppression. The army did not trust the Poles. A maximum of 
4-5 Polish officers was admitted to any regiment, and no 
Poles at all were accepted in the Guards or on the general 
staff. Polish recruits were dispersed in far-away regiments. 
Consequently, the regiments posted in Poland had to be filled 
up with reservists from the interior of the empire when a 
mobilization occurred. 
Also the Jews, of whom there were a great number in Poland, 
felt a disguised but profound antipathy to Russia.32 
The Polish railways were ordered to replace all Polish 
personnel with Russians by 189333 in spite of protests by Gurko 
and his railway officer Palicyn. The government explained in 
an official journal that the great number of Poles employed by 
the railways constituted a permanent danger because of the 
strategic importance of the lines traversing the country. 
"It must not be concluded that the government 
suspects all Poles, of whom a great number, we 
willingly acknowledge, have served dutifully for long 
years; but the government is convinced of the 
necessity of ensuring the complete security of the 
lines linking the interior of the empire with its 
frontiers"." 
The ability of the Russian government to win over nationalities 
like Poles was somewhat limited. There were similar problems 
in Finland and Caucasia, too. 
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2.5. Troop Mobilization and 
Concentration in 1890-1897 
Matton had also pondered the problems of Russian 
mobilization. He reckoned that there were about 600 000 men 
on the western frontier. Active troops from the Moscow and St. 
Petersburg districts were able to arrive on the fifteenth day, 
and all mobilized reserves from European Russia would be 
concentrated by the thirtieth day. Thus Russia would be 
adopting a defensive attitude in the beginning of the war, 
wrote Matton, at a time when France would have to fight alone 
against three powers, or four if England were to join the Triple 
Alliance, for a month. Germany would certainly concentrate all 
her might in Lorraine and Alsace, and perhaps she would buy 
Russia off by compensating her in the Orient.35 This was an 
additional reason for Matton to propose that Russia should be 
pushed to start the war. 
Moulin, the French military attaché, had very good sources 
of information in the Russian military establishment. He 
reported that the mobilized strength of the Russian army 
amounted to nearly three and a half million, with 1 284 000 
men in the active troops and 770 000 men in the reserve 
detachments. The first-line troops amounted to 48 infantry 
divisions and 28 reserve divisions in Europe.36 
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 "L'effectif normal 
active troops 
1,284,000 men 
reserve troops 
770,000 men 
depot troops 
255,000 men 
de l'arme russe", by Moulin. 
898 infantry battalions 
356 cavalry squadrons 
340 artillery batteries 
17 sapper battalions 
8 pontoon battalions 
6 railway battalions 
18 fortress artillery battalions 
6 gendarme squadrons 
28 frontier guard brigades 
430 infantry battalions, I call-up 
248 infantry battalions, II call-up 
152 artillery batteries 
20 engineer companies 
3 railway battalions 
200 battalions 
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How these forces were to be deployed was explained by 
Obrucev to Boisdeffre during their discussion in 1891. Obrucev 
expected an attack by four German active corps and two 
reserve corps from East Prussia towards the Niemen and Vilna 
with the objective of confusing the Russian mobilization and 
preventing the Petersburg troops from arriving in Poland. 
Three more corps were expected to come from Posen to engage 
Gurko in Poland. The Austrians were at this time probably 
directing five corps from Cracow towards Warsaw, five corps 
from Przemysl and three or four corps from Lemberg to the 
north-east. Thus there would be 900 000 men attacking Poland, 
but Obrucev expected Gurko to be able to stem them with his 
300 000 men supported by the Vistula fortresses until he was 
strengthened by the Moscow and Petersburg garrisons. The 
Niemen or northern army would confuse the German 
mobilization by cavalry attacks and defend the Niemen line, 
thus enabling the transport of the Petersburg troops towards 
Poland to take place. Dragomirov with his southern army 
would attack the Austrian communications in order to check 
their offensive. After collecting all his forces and stopping the 
enemy advances on his flanks Gurko could start his offensive 
against Breslau and Berlin." 
By the end of 1891 the right flank, the Niemen army, had 
been somewhat strengthened. It had the task of invading East 
Prussia in order to align with Gurko's front and threby to 
eliminate the threat against his right flank. This direction was 
36 
 Continued 
local troops 
	
30 fortress infantry regiments 
	
235,000 men 	 53 fortress artillery batteries 
10 fortress artillery companies 
16 sortie batteries 
Cossack troops 	 877 sotnias 
included in active 	 40 batteries 
and reserve 
	
20.5 battalions 
effectives 
militia troops 	 320 battalions, I call-up 
	
660,000 men 	 320 battalions, II call-up 
Troops in Caucasia 
70,000 men 
Troops in Asia 
65,000 men 
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deemed the most dangerous for the main army, and 
consequently it was felt to be the most probable direction of 
German attack. 
But in spite of the acknowledged need to reinforce the 
northern flank, the Russian general staff did not renounce their 
plan of an offensive against Austria. They considered that until 
the Austrian army had been chased behind the Carpathians, it 
was impossible to expose Gurko's left flank to them by an 
attack towards Posen, or to leave them behind the Russian 
back if Gurko's front was turned northwards to the Narew. 
Southern Poland had no natural barriers, and no first-class 
fortresses excepting Ivangorod, and therefore it was impossible 
to leave the Austrians the chance of a victory which would let 
them to the communications of the Russian army. The Russian 
general staff also calculated that defensive action against the 
Austrians needed as many troops as offensive action, and 
offered less advantage. The defeat of the Austrian army and the 
evacuation by them of Galicia remained the inevitable prelude 
to any invasion of Germany.38 
The following year the plan of an offensive against Austria 
emerged even more clearly when the main army was divided 
into two groups. The army of the Vistula stood against the 
Germans with six army corps. The southern army of the Bug 
faced south-west, i.e. faced the Austrians, with three corps.39 
The French were somewhat doubtful of the chances of a 
Russian success. They calculated that the southern offensive 
against the Austrians could not start before the thirty-fifth day, 
when the Austrians advancing from Przemysl would have 
already thrown the Russians back towards Brest.40 But they 
were not able to make Obru6ev change his plans. 
The four armies can be marked out on the map (map 6) given 
to General Boisdeffre during the discussions on the military 
convention. This compares rather well with the map (map 7) 
drawn by Zaionekovski. 
The Numerical Strength of Russian Armies in 1891 
1. Warsaw military district 	 Army of the Vistula 
Army of the Bug 
249 000 
160 000 
   
38 Moulin to war minister 28.X 1891. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30 
39 Moulin to war minister 8.I11 1892. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 30 
40 "Historique de la concentration russe 1882-1902". EMATSH 7 N 1509 
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698 000 men 	 reserve 	 123 000 
garrisons 
	
156 000 
2. Vilna military district 
	
	 Army of the Niemen 	 268 000 
Detachment of 
458 000 men 	 Belostok 	 98 000 
reserve 	 60 000 
garrisons 	 32 000 
3. Kiev military district 	 South-W. army 	 409 000 
467 000 men 	 reserve 	 58 000 
4. Odessa military district 	 Bessarabian corps 	 54 000 
Crimean corps 	 28 000 
100 000 men 	 Chersonesian corps 	 18 000 
1723 000 men in all 
The Baltic coast detachment 	 60 000 
Amur military district 	 27 395 
Omsk military district 	 4 222 
Irkutsk military district 	 3 390 
Turkestan detachments 	 28 582 
Transcaspian detachments 	 11 029 
Caucasian detachments 	 85 880 
Instead of the earlier general reserve, each army now had a 
reserve of its own. The detachments in Asia could not be 
transferred to the west because the Asian borders and recent 
areas conquered were not entirely pacified.41  
A new army corps, the 18th, was organized in Estonia in 
1893,42 
 and the 19th in 1895 in Poland.43 
 Two more had been 
planned44 
 but their formation was adjourned to 1898 (the 20th 
in the Vilna district) and ad calendas graecas45 (but the latter, 
the 21st in the Kiev district, was organized by the time the 
Japanese war broke out). The attached map (map 8) shows the 
distribution of the army corps in the empire at this time. 
The general idea of the troop concentration plan remained 
constant, but there seem to have been notable changes of detail 
in the annual revisions of the plan. Plan n:o 16 in 1896 
mentioned the following points for the concentration of the 
several army corps: 
41 "Effectifs des armees russes' en cas de guerre avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche", 
Moulin 17.III 1892. EMATSH 7 N 1472 
"Effectifs de 1'armee russe au Caucase et en Asie". Moulin 2.V 1891. 
EMATSH 7 N 1472 
42 
 Moulin to war minister 5.III 1893. EMATSH 7 N 1473 
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"Formation d'un XIX corps'd'armee russe". Moulin 12.XII 1894. EMATSH 7 
N 1480 
44 Moulin to war minister 20.VI 1894. EMATSH 7 N 1473 
45 Moulin to war minister 12.V 1896. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
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III army corps 
II 
XVIII 
Vilkovitki 
Suvalki 
Olita 
Grodno 
46 
IV 
XVI 
V 
VI 
Guards 
XI 
X 
IX 
XII 
VII 
VIII 
Belostok 
Belostok 
Novo-Aleksandrovsk — Sedlec 
Lomia 
Sedlec — Belsk 
Luck 
Dubno 
Proskurov 
Kamenno-Polock 
Sevastopol 
Odessa — Kitinev 
Next year the distribution of army corps in the various armies 
was given as follows: 
The Niemen army 
The Vistula army 
The Bug army 
South-W. army 
expeditionary corps 
Bessarabian corps 
II, III, IV, I 
V, XV, XVI, VI, XVIII 
XIV, XIX, Grenadiers 
VI, XVII, XII, IX, X 
VII 
47 
The thirteenth army corps and the Guards corps are not 
mentioned in the second list, while the Grenadiers are left out 
of the first one. The Bessarabian corps must be the eighth from 
Odessa. Moulin writes: "The document covers only the military 
districts of Vilna, Warsaw, and Kiev and does not contain any 
information on the defence of the Baltic coast either in Finland 
or in the military district of St. Petersburg, but I trust that the 
deuxieme bureau is able to make an approximate 
reconstruction of those measures".48 For us the reconstruction 
is a bit problematic, because not many active troops were left 
in the district of the capital if the first, eighteenth and the 
Guards corps were transported to the frontier. There remained 
the eight Finnish and eight Russian rifle battalions in Finland. 
76 "Points de concentration du corps d'armee actifs". Moulin 2.VII 1896. 
EMATSH 7 N 1474 
47 Moulin to war minister 29.III 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
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But of course reserve, local, and fortress troops were available. 
Maps 9 and 10 give the concentration areas of the armies in 
1896 and 1897. And here the lost corps are found, the Guards 
near Warsaw and the thirteenth in the Bug army. The other St. 
Petersburg corps, first and eighteenth, can be seen forming a 
centre of gravity on the right flank or behind the main army. — 
In the 1897 plan the cavalry was grouped together in two 
cavalry corps, but it seems that no such corps were organized 
in practice. 
As far as the French agents knew, the troops in Poland were 
to defend their positions at the beginning of the war against 
the Triple Alliance. Only the forces of the Kiev military 
district, the South-Western army, were to take the offensive. 
The plan was to have them mobilized on the sixth day and in 
position on the seventeenth day.49 
Thus there was no improvement from the French point of 
view: 
"It is from the day when the Russian general staff 
disposes on the left bank of the Vistula of sufficient 
force to menace the valley of the Oder that Russia 
will be able to play a serious part against the Triple 
Alliance. All other combinations are but half 
measures and leave her ally in a situation that is full 
of dangers. If the general staff has not understood 
this simple concept, it is to be attributed to their 
policy of extreme appeasement towards Germany, a 
policy which seems odd in the light of the energy 
with which Germany reinforces garrisons in Alsace-
Lorraine and East Prussia"." 
There had been, in short, no improvement since the military 
convention had been signed. On the contrary, Russia was 
approaching Germany because the Kaiser supported Russia's 
eastern policy. For a moment, in the years 1895-1897, Russia 
had her attention turned to the Near East. After that she 
became even more absorbed in the Far Eastern schemes. 
:9 "Notes sur la mobilisation de l'armee Russe". Rapport sur les travaux au 2e 
bureau de Petat-major de l'armee, par le capitaine Niessel, stagiaire a l'etat-
major de 1'armee 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1484 
50 Moulin to war minister 12.VI 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
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3. Distractions 
3.1. The Near East 1895-1897 
Russia had aspired to the possession of the Turkish Straits 
since the days of Peter and Catherine. She had also learned 
that the way to the Straits went through the Balkans, where 
the Orthodox and Slav population demanded Russian 
protection — at least so the Russians imagined. But experience 
had also taught the Russians that other powers did not very 
much care for the idea of Russian Straits. France, England, and 
Austria had schemes of their own regarding the division of the 
inheritance of the sick man of Europe. That was why Russia 
preferred maintaining Turkey as the guardian of the Straits. 
She was weak enough to respond to a certain degree of Russian 
influence. And later on might dawn the day when Russia would 
be strong enough to fulfil her historic mission, the conquest of 
Constantinople, the Tsargrad. The conquest had been in 
Russia's programme, but nothing had been done so far to 
disturb the precarious status quo (since 1878). 
But then an Armenian mob rebelled in Constantinople in 
1895, probably in a futile attempt to provoke the great powers 
to favour an autonomous or independent Armenia. The 
Bulgarian massacres of 1875 served as a model. There was the 
possibility of a British fleet arriving in Constantinople to keep 
order for the Sultan. The Russian ambassador was afraid of 
England settling in the Straits and thus making an end of the 
Russian dreams once and for all. He asked the St. Petersburg 
government for authority to call up the Black Sea fleet at the 
first sign of the British approach. 
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Preparations were started, troops mobilized and 
concentrated in Odessa and Sevastopol. The military attaché 
did not identify the troops, but there were enough of them to 
form an army corps. A landing beach was chosen near the 
Bosphorus, on the European side. (map 11) 
But the mobilization of the Black Sea fleet at Odessa and 
Sevastopol was an arduous affair. The navy was found to be in 
a bad condition for serious action, which was aggravated by 
the inexperience of the additional officers and sailors sent over 
from the Baltic fleet to the Black Sea. There were also fewer 
transport ships than expected. Only four of the ships of the 
volunteer fleet were equipped for transporting horses and 
heavy material; the rest were not very useful. Only one division 
could be carried at one time. 
The passage was calculated to take ten days if there was no 
fog or tempest. But by the end of December 1895, when the call 
for action was expected daily, the time for good weather had 
already passed.J1 
The Caucasian troops were put in a state of readiness. The 
thirty-ninth division on the Armenian border was mobilized.52 
Moulin calculated that because of the eventual opposition of 
England, Italy, and some other powers, the Russian operation 
was possible only with Turkish consent. He supposed that a 
naval Russo-Turkish convention might exist for a joint defence 
of the Tshadaldsha line; he assumed the Turks would keep 
Constantinople under control, while the Russians closed the 
Bosphorus.53 — As far as is known, no such convention existed. 
But a Russian general, Cicaev, inspected the Turkish defences 
at the Dardanelles. He had to conclude that they were good for 
nothing. The works were in a bad condition, there were not 
enough cannons to cover the passages, and there was a 
complete lack of organization. The officers charged with the 
defence were incapable, in particular the personnel of the mine 
defences was totally incompetent. He estimated that a 
British fleet would be able to force the passages, probably with 
losses, but not big enough to deter it.54 
5' Moulin to war minister 23.XII 1895. EMATSH 7 N 1473 
52 
"Preparatifs militaires de Russie". Moulin 26.XI 1895. EMATSH 7 N 1480 
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54 "L'expedition des Russes sur mer Noire". Moulin 2.XI 1896. EMATSH 7 N 
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The Dual Alliance did not work well in this instance. France 
was asked for support and help, being the nation amie et alliee. 
Paris answered that Russia could trust France if the problem 
was to maintain the status quo in the Straits, as had been 
agreed in 1856. In case of a peaceful partition of Turkey mutual 
support was promised: France was interested in Egypt, Suez 
and Syria. But war must be avoided. 
"Only a grand national question, like a revision of 
the peace of Frankfurt, could justify a war in the 
eyes of the French people".55 
Thus France gave no encouragement to the planned coup, in 
spite of a Russian hint of support for an eventual reconquest of 
the lost provinces.56 
There was also opposition to the expedition in the higher 
echelons of the Russian army, who saw it as a harmful 
diversion. Dragomirov, the commander in Kiev, and 
Puzerevskii, the chief of staff in Warsaw, were among those 
known to oppose the coup. They considered the idea of an 
invasion of Turkey most regrettable, because it presented great 
difficulties in execution, and would probably lead to a general 
war, under unfavourable conditions for Russia.57 
Then in 1897 the Cretan question led to a war between 
Greece and Turkey. Once more the dissolution of the Sultan's 
empire seemed to be nigh. Again Russia had to prepare for an 
intervention, "a great activity reigns at present in Sevastopol".58 
British influence was suspected of being behind the Cretan 
disorders. England was thought to be scheming for a naval base 
in Suda bay, whence a fleet could easily close the approaches 
to the Straits. 
These suspicions gave a renewed impetus to the Russian 
preparations. A landing force was prepared for the invasion of 
the Bosphorus. This time the seventh corps in Sevastopol was 
earmarked for the operation. (Plan n:o 16, mentioned on page 
55 
 "Pourparlers secrets decembre 1895—fevrier 1896. Note secrete pour le mi-
nistre". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 32 
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 "Note secrete pour le ministre" 2.X 1896. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 32 
57 "Au sujet de l'opinion de deux generaux russes sur le projet de descente au 
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38. Map 11 gives a detailed picture of the corps.). The few 
Russian ships in the Mediterranean were supposed to support 
the break-through from Saros Island.59 — The report does not 
explain how they would have eliminated the British 
Mediterranean fleet. The most effective weapon against 
England was supposed to be pressure from the Russian Central 
Asian possessions against the Afghan and Indian borders. 
These plans will be explained later. 
Italy was also known to be scheming for influence in the 
western Balkans, in Montenegro and Serbia. They might have 
supported the British in the attempt to take Gallipoli.6° An 
especially keen rival was Austria, of course. She was known to 
have ambitions on Salonica. But it was hoped that Sofia, 
Athens, and Belgrade would be able to check these ambitions, 
if not engaged by the Balkan Muslims and the Turks. The 
conciliation with Bulgaria since 1894 had been a great step 
forward for Russia. The general staff was able to count on 
Bulgarian support for the realization of its plans; and the 
Bulgarian army was developing promisingly.61  
These views of the situation seem somewhat rosy — Italian 
and Austrian opposition was played down on the strength of 
Balkan help against them. It causes no surprise to learn that in 
St. Petersburg Witte was reported to be very much against the 
projected adventure. On the other hand, influential Pan-
Slavists ardently desired the Straits and they were rumoured 
to be working up the Bulgarians and the Macedonians to force 
the Russian government to act.62 
Happily, for the Russian government, Turkey showed a 
surprising vitality. The Sultan's troops beat the Greek 
regiments. Thus the Straits problem could be adjourned. 
Turkish vitality was also reflected in the attitude of the Balkan 
populations: 
"The attitude of Bulgaria and Serbia is resolutely 
pacific. The military vigour of which Turkey has 
recently given proof is an important factor in this 
resolution".63 
59 Moulin to navy minister 29.I 1897. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 32 
6° Moulin to war minister 23.I 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
61 Moulin to war minister 5.II 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
62 Moulin to war minister 5.III 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
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Austria, too, had her reasons for wishing to preserve the status 
quo in the Balkans. The Dual Monarchy was preoccupied with 
the difficulties caused by the quarrelling nationalities of the 
empire. If there was no immediate danger of the Turkish 
empire dissolving, Austria and Russia would be able to agree 
on leaving it alone for the present, in spite of their fundamental 
rivalry. It was hoped that the Sultan would carry out some 
reforms in Macedonia to mollify the population, whose 
dissatisfaction was endangering the peace there. 
No more military or naval preparations were needed: 
"For the moment the Russian general staff has no 
intention of taking any precautionary measures 
which might arouse Austrian susceptibilites ..."64 
When the notorious Pan-Slavist Ignat'ev was appointed 
ambassador in Constantinople, he explained that the question 
of the Turkish Straits must always remain a prime one for 
Russia. But for the moment she had too many interests to 
safeguard, too much new territory to reorganize, too many 
internal problems to solve, too many projects in Central Asia 
and on the frontiers of China, to have any other aim but to 
maintain the status quo in the Near East.6" 
Thus the Near Eastern question was not abandoned, but it 
was frozen for the duration of Russia's grand adventure on the 
distant Asian frontiers. 
The Turkish victory over the Greeks called forth an Islamic 
revival in the Asian regions that were inhabited by the 
Mussulmans, in the Turkish as well as in the Russian or 
English possessions. 
"In the Asian bazaars they talk only of the splendid 
triumphs of the Turks"." 
This was ominous for the colonial empires, but the pan-Islamic 
or pan-Turkish menace took its time to materialize. The 
general staffs of the European nations had to bear in mind, 
64 Moulin to war minister 29.IV 1897. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
65 Rouvier, envoy in Stockholm, to MAE 15.VII 1897. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 
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however, that their Musulman subjects were not to be trusted 
completely. 
In 1900 the fleet and army in Sevastopol were again mobilized 
with the aim of preparing an expedition to the Bosphorus. 
Probably this was not intended to issue in an actual departure 
to the Straits. The preparations already undertaken in 1896 
had been kept up and incorporated in the military organization 
of the Black Sea region. Now the general staff wanted to see 
whether they functioned well. Moulin, when reporting on this, 
also supposed that the intention was to remind the Turks of the 
respect due to their Russian neighbour.6i 
But three years later the Sevastopol and Odessa troops were 
again made ready for the expedition. The volunteer fleet was 
also assembled and trained for the ferrying of the expeditionary 
corps. "The preparations are not concealed, but there is no 
indication of a general mobilization".68 This time there was a 
material reason for the preparations. In the spring of 1903 the 
peace of the Balkans was again disturbed by the Macedonian 
quarrels. European opinion demanded reforms; to avoid 
England meddling in their sphere of interest Austria and 
Russia drew up a programme for the Sultan. As previously, 
they both wished to preserve the status quo. Happily for them, 
the Sultan accepted the program. But there still remained the 
danger of him delaying the execution of his promises and 
consequently of a Bulgarian or other intervention. 
Therefore Russia had to prepare for an intervention of her 
own, on the previous model. This time more detail was given 
on the action planned in Caucasia. Two army corps had been 
organized there. They were to be mobilized in twelve days and 
concentrated in Kars in sixteen days. They would consist of 
110 000 infantrymen and 25 000 cavalry. The Turks needed 
more than a month to collect their army on the Caucasian 
border. Thus the Russians would be able to advance into 
Armenia. But there a Turkish army of equal strength —
125 000 men — would be waiting for them. Thus no decisive 
6' "Exercice de mobilisation a Sebastopol". Moulin 10.III 1900. EMATSH 7 N 
1476 
68 Moulin to war minister 6.III 1903. EMATSH 7 N 1476 
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results could be expected from the Caucasian theatre. 
The Black Sea fleet consisted of 8 battleships, 2 coastal 
armoured ships, 3 protected cruisers, 6 gunboats, 3 torpedo 
cruisers and 32 torpedo boats. There were 5 naval transports 
and 17 ships of the volunteer fleet. The Russian Navigation 
Company had 20 ships, but at any time half of its ships were in 
service in Palestine, Alexandria, and the Far East. Thus there 
were 32 ships available, capable of transporting 30 000 men 
with 4-5 artillery batteries at one time. 
Odessa military district had prepared the seventh and eighth 
army corps for transshipment. But only one corps could be 
embarked at one time, on the eleventh day. The rest of the 
troops could follow later, or march through Romania. 
For the expected action there were a few alternative plans. 
Russia might try to break through the Bosphorus and to 
occupy Constantinople. The breakthrough was possible because 
of the state of the defence works on the Bosphorus. But there 
were 25 000 men of the Sultan's guard in the capital, and 
90 000 more men could mobilized by the tenth day in Asia 
Minor. And the English fleet could cause serious difficulties for 
the expedition. 
A landing between Burgas and Constantinople was also 
possible. The seventh corps would be able to execute it on the 
twelfth day. Turkey would be able to mobilize 35 000-100 000 
men in Thrace between twelve to sixty days, and thus the 
Turkish corps in front of the seventh corps would be a superior 
force, constituting 38 000 men by the twelfth day. But a 
Russian landing could be massively supported by the Bulgarian 
army. The latter would have 120 battalions or 120 000 men 
mobilized and concentrated on the Thracian frontier, in 
addition to the 24 battalions helping the rebellion in 
Macedonia. These 120 battalions would advance from the 
valley of Maritza against the Turkish flank. 
A landing further to the north, between Burgas and Varna, 
would be easy, on the eleventh day. But there the Russians 
would be only an additional corps to the Bulgarian army facing 
the Turkish border. The eighth army corps of 80 000 men 
would need three transports of four days each. Thus it would 
not be until the twenty-third day that the Russians would have 
their 110 000 men concentrated. Then, with the Bulgarians 
they would add up to an army of 250 000 men. By the twenty- 
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third day the Turks would be able to have only 50 000 men 
concentrated. 
A march through Romania would bring the eighth corps to 
the theatre of war on the thirty-seventh day, on condition that 
Romania and Europe consented to it. 
The problematic breakthrough at the Bosphorus and the 
landing of the seventh corps might lead to some results if the 
action was supported by the eighth corps in Thrace. (Evidently, 
the eighth corps was to prevent the Turks from concentrating 
against the landing corps). 
In Macedonia Turkey had 110 000 men. They could be 
mobilized between ten to twelve days. They would then be 
engaged in fighting the Macedonian rebels and the 24 
Bulgarian battalions, starting from the twelfth day. The 
rebellion would be supported also by Montenegro, who was 
able to mobilize 20 000 men instantaneously and to concentrate 
them on the Albanian border by the fifth or sixth day. Serbian 
and Greek action could be ignored. Serbia was able to mobilize 
and concentrate 80 000 men in three weeks, but preparations 
for an offensive would take another three weeks. Greece had 
2-3 divisions, i.e. 20 000-25 000 men, but their mobilization 
had not been prepared. Consequently a great confusion would 
follow from a declaration of a war. Thus the Greeks were not 
able effectively to help any of the belligerents.B9 
Then, after all, there was no great revolt in Macedonia, and 
consequently no Russian intervention. The calculations 
outlined above remained only as an example of staff paper 
work. In the French report it was not indicated how much of 
the projected plan was based on actual Russian information, 
and how much was conjecture by the military attaché and the 
general staff in Paris. But the plan illustrates the general 
tendency of the general staffs to expect the decision of a 
campaing in one great battle at the very beginning and the 
consequent importance of speed in troop mobilization and 
concentration. — No thought was given to an intervention by 
any other great power, excepting the possible action of the 
British fleet. 
69 "Note au sujet d'une intervention armee eventuelle de la Russie et des Etats 
balkaniques dans les affaires macedonniennes". Etat-major de l'armee, avril 
1903. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 36, p. 197- 
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Russia and Austria succeeded in renewing their agreement 
on the Balkan status quo in 1903. Thus Russia was able to 
pursue her distractions elsewhere, for a while. 
3.2. New Commanders 
There was no age limit for Russian generals. One of the 
cardinal weak points of the Russian army was the high age of 
the commanders. For instance, the minister of war Vannovskii 
was enfeebled and was deemed to be "only a machine for 
signing papers". (But he was not too old to be appointed 
minister of education after he left the war ministry). General 
Obrucev was also very feeble and his faculties were badly 
diminished. In Poland the successor of the late Gurko, count 
Suvalov, was not satisfactory either in health or ability. In 
Kiev Dragomirov had begun to sink visibly. Mussin-Pus"kin in 
Odessa was a drunkard whose character had softened. 
eremetev in Caucasia was in deplorable health and incapable 
of war-time command.70 — This unadorned list was drawn up 
by Moulin in 1896, probably inspired by younger generals who 
aspired to replace the old crew. 
One of the measures which the Soviet historians call counter-
reforms was the planned remodelling of the army command 
after the German model. The war minister was to answer only 
for administration, while a general inspector of the army —
Dragomirov's name was mentioned — was to take care of 
training. Operational questions were to be dealt with by the 
chief of the general staff — Obrucev, Kuropatkin, Puzerevskii, 
and Bobrikov were among the candidates — immediately 
subordinate to the emperor. This system would have 
emphasized the position of the emperor as the supreme war-
lord, if he had been the man for such a task, which Nicholas II 
evidently was not. The system had worked to some extent 
under an amateur military emperor like Alexander I, but the 
70 Moulin to war minister 15.I 1896. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
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confusion it caused was one of the reasons for the disaster of 
1853-1856. The system did not work very well in Germany, 
either, where William II was unable to direct the various 
conflicting chancelleries, ministries, and staffs. One of 
Miljutin's principal reforms had been to unite all command in 
the war ministry. Now a supreme committee was appointed to 
ponder a counter-reform," but its execution was postponed 
until after the Russo-Japanese war. 
Now, in 1898, Kuropatkin was appointed Vannovskii's 
successor with full authority over the military establishment 
(excepting the unofficial military cabinet led by the minister of 
court, who was influential in questions of appointment and 
promotion). Out of a curious sense of consideration the post 
had been first offered to Obrucev. But the old man, although 
flattered, had been too modest (and sensible) to accept it." The 
French were happy about the nomination of Kuropatkin. He 
was received with enthusiasm by the Russian army, press, and 
political opinion. He was a convinced Russian patriot of the 
Pan-Slavist coloration, happy about the Franco-Russian 
alliance, and, after his long service in Central Asia, was a 
definite Anglophobe. His chief of general staff Saharov was also 
deemed industrious and of great intelligence." 
There was much to do for the new men in the war ministry. 
There was the problem of re-equipping the artillery, there was 
the menace of a conflict in Central Asia and in the Far East, 
and the danger of complications in Central Europe. 
"General Kuropatkin continues working with a 
Napoleonic activity. Every day he gives audiences 
until late in the night. The ministry has completely 
been awakened from its previous torpor".74 
One man whose name had been mentioned in connection with 
several vacancies was Bobrikov of the Petersburg military 
district, 
11 Moulin to war minister 30.I 1896. EMATSH 7 N 1474 
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"the most capable chief of staff of the whole army; it 
is regrettable that his health is undermined by 
excessive work".76 
The vacancy of governor-general of the Amur military district 
had arisen, and Bobrikov's name had been mentioned. But he 
would also have been a good man in Mussin-Puskin's stead in 
Odessa.76 Then there had been talk of his remaining in St. 
Petersburg with the title of adjunct to Grand Duke Vladimir, 
i.e. de facto commander of the military district.77 He had also 
been proposed for the vacant appointment of chief of the 
general staff.78 
Bobrikov's ultimate appointment as governor-general of 
Finland indicates the importance which was accorded to the 
military and constitutional reform in Finland. Bobrikov was 
to integrate the military establishment of Finland into the 
Russian army and to eliminate Finnish separatism and 
constitutionalism, which was seen to be a danger to the 
security and uniformity of the empire. 
3.3. Rearmament and Disarmament 
A Polish economist, the president of the chamber of commerce 
in Warsaw, I.M. Bloch, saw the future in dismal colours. His 
home city was in the middle of the future battlefield and was 
certainly to suffer the fate of Paris in 1870-1871. Therefore he 
caused a committee to be established to ensure supplies for the 
Polish capital in case of a siege. 
This led Bloch to study further the economic problems of 
modern war. It was obvious to him that in the event of a great 
conflict all people would hide their gold, and nobody would be 
able to recover their outstanding debts; the lack of money 
7' Moulin to war minister 9.W 1887. EMATSH 7 N 1471 
76 "Au sujet de nominations divers". Moulin 16.I 1898. EMATSH 7 N 1475 
77 
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would create financial chaos. But there was no indication of 
the existence of a plan for a war economy in any European 
country. 
An even more menacing danger was the interruption of 
maritime commerce. International law did not secure such 
commerce from plunder and destruction; the naval war would 
be waged mercilessly by the privateers. The consuming nations 
would be left starving, while Russia and Austria would be 
unable to export. America, Australia, and India could export 
only at prohibitive insurance costs. No stores could be stocked 
in peacetime because of the excessive costs of such measures. 
Consequently there would arise a threat of famine for the 
labouring classes. Socialism was already rampant in Germany, 
and if the war was prolonged, occurrences like the Paris 
Commune were to be expected. And these occurrences would 
threaten victors as well as vanquished. Hence Bloch hoped that 
the danger of popular movements would make war impossible.i9 
Bloch's subsequent detailed study on "The Future War"80 was 
an important and famous milestone in the progress of the 
antiwar movement. But these ideas of "socialists, Jews, and 
hysterical women" were not taken seriously by general staffs 
and others responsible for the preparation for war. They 
foresaw only a short war with one decisive battle during the 
first weeks. Consequently no planning or preparation for a long 
war was deemed necessary, nor were its consequences to be 
apprehended. 
But it is well known that the Emperor Nicholas, who was a 
good man, even if a bad emperor, was impressed by Bloch's 
book. He endorsed the author's ideas and, surprisingly, made 
his ministers adopt them. Murav'ev, the minister for foreign 
affairs, sent a circular to the principal powers and proposed a 
conference for disarmament. 
Moulin hastened to save the honour of the Russian 
statesmen. Of course they were not taken in by the idealism of 
their sovereign. But Kuropatkin had started planning the 
rearming of his artillery with modern cannons; and Witte had 
79 A report on Bloch's lecture, war ministry to MAE 24.IV 1893. EMATSH 7 N 
1480 
80 I.S. Blioh. Buduseaja voina v tehni6eskom, ekonomieeskom i diplomati6es-
kom otnosenijah I—VI, S. Petersburg 1898 
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been horrified at the costs, especially of heavy artillery. 
Therefore Witte and other ministers had greeted the emperor's 
proposal with enthusiasm. Russia would be spared immense 
costs if other powers could be made to give up their lead in 
military technology. Saharov, the chief of the general staff, also 
calculated that if part of the credits used for maintaining large 
numbers of men under arms could be redirected for building 
strategic railway lines, Russia's offensive power would 
essentially grow.81 Thus there was no reason for France to 
suspect that her ally had forsaken her. 
The suspicion had been virulent. France had not received any 
advance information about Murav'ev's circular. The move 
seemed to be a scheme against France, and one suggested by 
the German emperor" who was known for his attempts to 
influence his cousin Nicholas. Publicly the initiative of the ally 
was lauded: "the grand conception cannot help making a 
profound impression on the whole world".83 But private 
reservations were voiced by the French press: "the new proof of 
the emperor's chivalrous character"" was only a "beautiful 
dream"85 which, if realized, would endanger France's vital 
interests. The alliance had made possible the hope of some day 
regaining the lost provinces, but the proposed disarmament 
implied giving up revanche. The proposal was thus a piece of 
Russian perfidy, if not a blind acceptance of a suggestion by 
William II.S6 The Germans were seen rejoicing because the cool 
reception of Russia's proposal in Paris was causing a chasm 
between the two allies.87 Also The Times wrote with malice: 
"Until the question (of Alsace and Lorraine) is settled she 
(France) cannot even consent to diminish her military burden. 
So she will stand alone in her inability to adhere to the plans 
81 
"Au sujet de la circulaire du Comte Mouravieff". Moulin 8.IX 1898. 
EMATSH 7 N 1475 
8' Delcasse to the ambassador in St. Petersburg 27.VIII 1898. AMAE, C.P. Rus-
sie N.S. 16 
83 Montebello, ambassor in St. Petersburg to Delcasse 24.VIII 1898. AMAE, 
C.P. Russie N.S. 16 
84 Le Petit Journal 29.VIII 1898 (a collection of newspaper cuttings in AMAE, 
C.P. Russie N.S. 16, p. 126—) 
85 Le Matin 29.VIII 1898 
86 Le petit bleu 29.VIII 1898 
8' Ambassador in Berlin to MAE 31.VIII 1898. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 16, p. 
239 
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of ally and friend .."88 
In fact, France was not alone. Denmark did not wish for 
disarmament, because she did not want to give up her 
revanche, the lost provinces of Slesvig and Holstein.89 Serbia 
promised to be the foremost advocate of peace and 
disarmament "if only the tribune of Europe will give us what 
belongs to us ... Long live the unity of the Serb nation! "90 The 
Italians declared that a nation was able to live free only on the 
condition of having a strong army prepared for any eventuality. 
Some papers named names without any adornment: they 
wanted Trieste and Trentino as a precondition for any 
disarmament.91 The Americans remarked that the army was no 
burden for them, while their navy could not, "of course", be 
diminished.92 For many Germans disarmament was the very 
negation of their empire. The officer corps especially was 
worried lest the proposal was accepted because they had 
obtained substancial privileges since 1871. And who would 
teach the workers discipline and orderliness if not the army? 
Where could the Poles be made learn the German language if 
not in military service?93 
Thus, everybody wanted peace, but only on the condition 
that it secured their rightful aspirations and vital interests. 
Because the vital interests of the several nations were 
diametrically contradictory, and because they as sovereign 
powers were the sole arbiters of their interests, the 
precondition of a lasting peace was a great war. The vital 
interests were held to be national security, power, greatness, 
and honour. There was no attempt to redefine them. 
Out of respect for its august sponsor the conference was held. 
It convened at the Hague in 1899, after if was ensured that the 
programme would not diminish national sovereignty, would 
not mean any giving up of interests, or any disarmament. 
Of course, the Hague peace conference was not useless even 
88 The Times 31.VIII 1898 
89 French envoy in Copenhagen to MAE 1.IX 1898. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 16 
p. 239 
9° Male novine 1.IX 1898 
91 Ambassador in Rome to MAE 15.IX 1898. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 16 p. 320 
92 Ambassador in Washington to MAE 12.IX 1898. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 16 
p. 309 
93 Ambassador in Berlin to MAE 3.IX 1898. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 16 
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if there were no immediate results. The difficulties on the road 
to international understanding had to be mapped out as a 
necessary precondition for further attempts to overcome them. 
The Franco-Russian alliance was able to live through this 
trial, because no arms were discarded. Hence the rejoicing of 
the German and English press proved premature. But this was 
not the sole trial for Franco-Russian relations. 
3.4. A Central Asian Diversion against 
England 
During the Near East crisis of 1897 British influence was 
suspected of being behind the Cretan disorders. There was 
nothing much that Russia could do against England in the 
Mediterranean. The only effective means of making the English 
hesitate was to menace their Indian frontiers. But at that time 
Russia had only about 15 000 men in Transcaspia and 30 000 
men in Turkestan, half of whom only were free for action. The 
Transcaspian railway was able to carry only four trains a day. 
Thus the minimum army of 200 000 men needed against India 
was beyond Russia's capacity to assemble. The Russian general 
staff thus saw their Central Asian position not as a launching 
point for a serious attack on India, but only as a means of 
threatening the English any time they caused mischief in 
Constantinople or at the Straits. "That has been the policy of 
Skobelev, Cernjaev, Kuropatkin, Komarov ..." said Moulin's 
informant.94 
In 1898 the march of Major Marchand into an untenable 
military position in Fashoda involved France in a conflict with 
England. Delcasse had the greatest difficulties in disentangling 
his country from the embarrassing situation that arose because 
of Fashoda. He had a fleeting hope of being able to use the 
Shimonoseki coalition of 1895, France-Russia-Germany, to 
94 Moulin to war minister 3.IV 1897. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 33. DDF XIII/1, 
n:o 177 
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counter the unyielding English and save the untenable French 
position on the upper Nile. But Russia now paid back the 
French refusal to support her in Constantinople in 1895-97. 
Delcasse had to find a solution without Russian support. 
Afterwards Kuropatkin tried to explain that Russia had done 
everything she could to help France and that she would have 
joined her ally if the incident had really ended in open conflict. 
As proof he pointed out the fact that Russia had mobilized her 
ports: Libau, Dünamünde, Kronstadt, the Black Sea ports, and, 
in the first instance, the Far Eastern ports. Two hundred guns 
had been placed in Vladivostok, and Port Arthur had received 
279 guns. Ten million roubles had been spent and 12 000 men 
had been detached to Port Arthur, "excellent troops who 
would put up a defence comparable to that of Sevastopol". But 
naturally Russia had been cautious and guarded, not eager to 
sacrify thousands of lives and millions of roubles, in her dire 
financial straits, only in order to save Fashoda for France.95 
Russian armaments in the Far Eastern ports were a cold 
comfort for France. Kuropatkin's statement is more important 
as an indication of the fact that Russia's interest was turning 
strongly to the East. 
Russian pressure on the borders of British India might have 
been of more importance for France in her dilemma. 
Kuropatkin told Moulin that during the crisis of 1885 
Vannovskii had made him study the problem. He had then 
concluded that Russia was in no position to wage war with any 
chance of success in the direction of the Afghan-Indian 
frontiers. Of course Russia would have fought if compelled to, 
but it would have been at an enormous cost of money and men, 
with not much result from the laborious efforts involved. 
During the twelve years of Kuropatkin's governorship of 
Turkestan, the situation had nevertheless somewhat improved. 
The railway from the Caspian had reached Tashkent, the army 
in Turkestan had been reinforced, and more attention had been 
paid to the details of organization. But the British had more 
than compensated for this Russian progress. Thus Russia had 
been unable to undertake any serious demonstration of force 
during the Fashoda crisis; she had had to content herself with 
95 Moulin to war minister 30.I 1899. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 34. DDF XV/1, 
n:o 52 
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a strictly defensive attitude. At that moment (1899) measures 
were being accelerated and a plan of mobilization and troop 
concentration for Central Asia was being prepared. The railway 
which was being build from Mery to Kushka would make 
possible an attack in the direction of Herat. (Map 12.) But for a 
war against Afghanistan an army of 100 000 men would be 
needed, while an expedition towards India needed an army of 
250 000 men. In the beginning of 1899, said Kuropatkin, the 
general staff had revised the number of troops in Asia. 
Russian troops in Asia in 1899 
Caucasian military district 320 000 
Kazan military district 220 000 
Siberian military districts 40 000 
Turkestan and Transcaspia 75 000 
Amur and Port Arthur 80 000 
in all 735 000 
Kuropatkin estimated that about 120 000 men could be used for 
operations after leaving about 200 000 men to guard against 
surprise moves by the Amir and the Sultan. 
A serious defect was the absence of great units. Therefore he 
was going to organize,new staffs for army corps: Transcaspian, 
Turkestan, and Southern Ussuri corps in addition to the second 
Caucasian corps.96 
In case of a war in Asia Kuropatkin planned to mobilize the 
following troops against the British: 
Ist line 
Transcaspian army corps 	 2 infantry regiments 
Kushka 	 1 reserve regiment 
Turkestan army corps 
	
1 Cossack brigade 
Samarkand 	 3 infantry brigades 
1 artillery brigade 
Ilnd line 
Caucasian army corps 
XIII army corps 
Vladikavkas 
1 Caucasian brigade 
1 native brigade 
1 reserve regiment 
1 cavalry brigade 
1 Caucasian grenadier division 
1st division 
21st division 
36th division 97 
    
96 Moulin to war minister 30.I 1899. = 9s 
97 
"Plan de concentration contre les Anglo-Afghan en Asie". Moulin 16.IV 
1899. EMATSH 7 N 1475 
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But the key problem was to get these men to the theatre of 
war. In three weeks 30 000-40 000 men could be concentrated 
on the Afghan border, and 75 000-80 000 men in forty days. A 
considerable time would be needed to assemble 200 000-
250 000 men there. Therefore everything must be done to 
postpone a conflict with England. Only after the Transcaspian 
railway was connected with the railway network of the empire 
could an army of 300 000-400 000 men be concentrated on the 
Anglo-Russian frontiers in Asia. Then it would take two 
months.98 
From other sources Moulin knew that the Russian general 
staff planned to build a connecting link from Orenburg to 
Tashkent, and additional lines towards the frontier between 
Bukhara and Afghanistan. Financing the lines was problem, 
especially because of the quarrel with Witte, who wanted to 
connect the Transcaspian railway to his Siberian trunk line 
with a Tashkent-Tomsk railway.99 This connection could be 
completed at the earliest in 1904. 
Kuropatkin himself was interested in explaining the Russian 
weakness in Central Asia because the French were demanding 
action against the English there. Lieutenant Grilliers, an officer 
on a mission to Persia and the Russian empire, saw the Russian 
position in a more positive light. He thought that the conquest 
of the Middle East was for the Russians a question of only a 
few days. The local Russians had told him that the march to 
Khorasan in the east and Erzerum in the west was a manifest 
destiny for Russia. The first objective was Herat, from where 
the Persian Gulf could be reached in the south and Kandahar 
in the south-east. 
"The realization of this programme in the near 
future is not doubted by the Russians ... I have seen 
numerous reinforcements being sent to the Afghan 
frontier as well as evident preparations for the 
march on Herat ..." 
Secret preparation in Persia were also rumoured of. Russia 
98 "Conversation avec le General Kouropatkine sur les conditions d'une guerre 
sur les confins Anglo-Russes en Asie". Moulin 19.I 1901. EMATSH 7 N 1476 
99 "Sur un projet de voie ferree tres-importante en Asie Centrale". Moulin 25.I 
1899 
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could thus find an outlet to the sea through Merv-Herat-
Bander Abbas, open the door to the riches of South-East Asia 
through Herat-Hindukush, take the keys of Euro-Asian 
commerce between the Caspian Sean and the Persian Gulf. The 
Central Asian markets would be opened for her and denied to 
others. In this way Russia would grow into an all-powerful 
industrial, commercial, and military empire.100  
Another officer on a mission, Captain de la Taillie, reported 
that enormous efforts were being made and considerable troops 
were being concentrated and camps fortified a few kilometres 
from the border so that they could avail themselves of the first 
occasion to proceed at a lightning speed. This officer concluded 
that Russia was not going to attack India or Afghanistan, she 
was going to occupy the coasts of the Persian Gulf. 
"It seems certain that the Caucasus and Turkestan 
will be the theatres of important events in the more 
or less near future"."' 
These are impressions gained from interviews with the local 
Russians who, as colonialists, were as eager as ever to push 
forward and to dream of carving up new empires. They are no 
proof of concrete plans for action. Kuropatkin in St. Petersburg 
judged the situation much more soberly; and of course the 
military alone were not able to decide the direction of Russian 
politics. 
But the interviews are proof of the dreams that the Russians 
would have liked to realize had they been able to do so. They 
are also examples of the fashionable arguments of commercial 
and industrial advantage to be gained by imperialism. Novoe 
Vremja declared that if Persia was only a market for Russia, 
the invasion of British commercial and political influence in 
the southern parts of that country need not be very alarming. 
But Persia, in fact, played a more important role because of her 
geographical position. It was through her that Russia was 
going to penetrate to the Indian Ocean.'°' Also the threat of 
100 "Rapport du Lieutenant Grilliers sur son voyage en Russie et Perse fait en 
1899-1900". EMATSH 7 N 1484 
101 "Rapport sur un voyage fait en Russie par le capitaine de la Taillie en No-
vembre et Decembre 1899". EMATSH 7 N 1484 
102 Novoe Vremja 14.IV 1899. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 17 
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eventual German influence from the Baghdad railway worried 
the Russians.103 
The essential reason why these dreams were left unrealized 
and why Russia was content with the status quo in Central 
Asia — after her great conquests of the years 1860-1895 — 
was that her attention was turning to the Far East. She 
deemed herself unable to conquer Persia, either militarily or 
commercially. To prevent others from doing that, to preserve 
Persia for her own future use, she used her influence at the 
court of the Shah and compelled Persia to undertake an 
obligation not to build or to give concession to build railways 
in the country for two decades, 1890-1910. It was deemed that 
this prohibition would prevent the British from building 
railways from India to Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia. 
"The Russian general staff has no intention of 
occupying the Persian Gulf or of pushing railways to 
the coast, because it is impossible to face so many 
expenses at the same time ... The Trans-Siberian 
and Manchurian railways are devouring enough 
money, as well as the building and fortifying of Port 
Arthur".104  
At the beginning of 1900 Kuropatkin explained that Russia had 
no reason to take advantage of England's difficulties (in South 
Africa). Afghanistan and India were too far away to be 
conquered. The Transcaspian railway made possible the 
defence of Central Asia, but for an offensive the connecting line 
with the Russian railways was necessary. But for a while 
Russia had enough to do in building her railways in Manchuria 
and in developing her Far Eastern possessions. He had studied 
the question of Constantinople, too, and hoped one day to see 
the realization of Russian hopes there. Sooner or later Russia 
had to obtain the keys of the Black Sea; but not yet.105 
Persia continued to be an irritant between England and 
Russia, in addition to more actual causes of dispute, until the 
entente of 1907, and even after that. In 1902 Moulin reported 
103 Moulin to war minister 25.IV 1898. EMATSH 7 N 1475 
104 "Au sujet de la concession de chemins de fer en Perse". Moulin 8.I 1900. 
EMATSH 7 N 1476 
105 Ambassador on St. Petersburg to MAE 30.I 1900. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 
17. DDF XVI/1, n:o 62 
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that the Russians were irritated by English attempts to 
infiltrate to the Persian Gulf and Persia itself, which the 
Russians considered a domaine of their old Asian policy. Russia 
needed an outlet on a warm sea, and a railway from Russia to 
the Gulf would make her the dominating influence in Persia, 
"to the benefit not only of Russia but also and above 
all of Persia herself, considering the deplorable 
situation in this state, which is led by an incapable 
government".106 
But Russia never had the leisure to attempt a definite 
domination of Persia. 
3.5. Russian Strength at the Turn of 
the Century 
By the turn of the century the peacetime strength of the 
Russian army was given by Moulin in his reports as 34 000 
officers and 860 000 men, with 150 000 horses. There are 
differences between the reports, which may be due to the 
inclusion or exclusion of reserve and militia cadres and Asian 
units. Some variation must also be due to defects in compiling 
the statistics. Thus the numbers must be taken as giving only a 
general impression. The mobilization strength with 2.85 million 
reservists was 3700 000 men in 1899, and the total amount of 
trained soldiers, militia included, was 4.55 million men.107 The 
106 "1'Angleterre et la Russie en Perse". Moulin 1902. EMATSH 7 N 1506. 
A useful study of great power imperialism in Persia is Firuz Kazemzadeh, 
Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914. A Study in Imperialism. Yale Rus-
sian and East European Studies 6, Yale University Press 1968 
107 Effectives in Europe in November 1901 
officers 34,000 
men 860,000 
horses 150,000 
"Note sur les forces militaires de la Russie d'Europe, novembre 1901". 
EMATSH 7 N 1506 
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army consisted of 959 battalions and 603 squadrons and sotnias 
with 357 field batteries and numerous mortar, depot, fortress 
and siege detachments, as well as various engineer formations.l°8 
The detachments were organized in 23 army corps of 2-3 
divisions consisting of four regiments of four battalions each. 
There were twenty cavalry divisions of four regiments of six 
107 Continued 
Effectives in October 1898 
men 	 967,655 
horses 	 160,414 
"Effectifs au mois d'octobre dernier". Moulin 21.III 1899. EMATSH 7 N 
1475 
Trained reserves 
1.I 1896 2,703,000 men 
1.I 1897 2,753,072 
1.I 1898 2,800,000 
1.I 1899 2,850,000 
"Sur les effectives de la reserve de recrutement". Moulin 21.111 1899. 
EMATSH 7 N 1475 
Cossack troops 
Cossacks of 19-41 years 426,453 
fit for service 	 363,457 
in active service 	 183,328 
in active reserve 	 219,089 
"Sur les troupes cosaques en 1897". Moulin 26.III 1899. EMATSH 7 N 1475 
Total manpower 
5 active classes, 21-25 years of age 	 1.3 million 
13 reserve classes 	 2.85 
militia, 39-43 years, trained 	 0.5 
militia, 21-25 years, untrained 	 1.3 
militia, II class, untrained 	 6 
trained soldiers 	 4.55 
mobilization strength 	 3.7 
"Note sur les forces militaires ..." 
108 Detachments in the peacetime army in 1901 
Infantry 	 832 active battalions 
959 	 45 fortress battalions 
battalions 	 82 reserve battalions 
Cavalry 	 542 squadrons and sotnias 
603 	 61 depot squadrons 
Artillery 	 357 field batteries 
40 horse batteries 
22 mortar batteries 
34 reserve batteries 
14 depot batteries 
195 fortress companies 
9 siege companies 
5 sortie batteries 
60 
squadrons each. There was one brigade of six batteries of field 
artillery for each division, and one sapper battalion for each 
army corps.109  
The peacetime effectives of the active troops were 100 % of 
the mobilization strength in the cavalry, 50 % in the infantry, 
and 80 % in the artillery. The mobilized strength of the 
active detachments was 30 000 officers and 1118 000 men. 
There were 183 328 Cossacks in the active service and more 
than 200 000 in the active reserve. They formed 53 active 
regiments and 148 regiments in all. 
In addition to the Cossack Regiments the reserve consisted of 
28 infantry divisions and 27 artillery brigades. Their peacetime 
cadres amounted to 13 % of the mobilization strength in the 
infantry and 20 % in the artillery."° The fortress troops 
consisted of 15 % of wartime effectives in the infantry and 33 
% in the artillery.111 
The mobilized strength of the Russian army in 1900 
officers men horses guns 
active troops 30 000 1 118 000 320 000 3258 
reserve 22 000 585 000 143 000 166 
fortress 3 800 213 000 2 000 
Turkestan 1 800 90 000 17 000 128 
Siberia 850 51 000 4 500 64 
Amur 1 600 80 000 20 000 148 
Kwanctuna 300 15 500 20 000 
112 
Kovno, Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw, and Brest-Litovsk were 
first-class fortresses. Kronstadt, Sveaborg, Ivangorod, 
"Note sur les forces 
EMATSH 7 N 1506 
23 sapper battalions 
8 pontoon battalions 
4 railway battalions 
2 reserve cadre battalions 
9 fortress sapper battalions 
7 mine companies 
2 river mine companies 
6 telegraph sections 
6 balloon sections 
7 pigeon sections 
militaires de la Russie d'Europe, novembre 1901". 
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Vladivostok, Libau, Ossovec, and Sevastopol were given 
second-class status. There were numerous third-class fortresses 
and fortresses without class."3 European fortresses, if 
112 The Russian army in Asia in 1901 
Turkestan 2 army corps 
8 rifle brigades 
2 reserve infantry brigades 	 72 battalions 
1 Cossack division 
2 Cossack brigades 	 94 sotnias 
2 artillery brigades 
2 fortress artillery battalions 
7 engineer companies 
Siberian garrisons 
1 rifle battalion 
8 reserve battalions 
2 sotnias 
2 reserve batteries 
40 reserve battalions to be formed when mobilization occurred 
8 depot battalions —"— 
The military district of the Amur 
5 rifle brigades 
3 Cossack regiments 
2 artillery brigades 
1 artillery group 
2 artillery batteries 	 124 guns in all 
2 sapper battalions 
1 railway battalion 
4 reserve battalions 
7 fortress battalions 
9 fortress artillery companies 
4 fortress engineer companies 
60 battalions to be formed when mobilization occurred 
4 squadrons 
20 batteries 
The peninsula of Kwangtung 
1 rifle brigade 
1 Cossack regiment 
1 group of 3 batteries 
1 fortress infantry regiment 
2 fortress artillery battalions 
"Note sur l'armee Russe II" s.d. EMATSH 7 N 1506 
113 Classification of fortresses 
1st class 
	 Kovno, Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk 
2nd 
	 Kronstadt, Sveaborg, Ivangorod, Vladivostok, Libau, 
Sevastopol, Ossovec 
3rd 	 Vyborg, Ust-Dvinsk (= Dünamünde), Zegrze, Kerb, 
Oeakov, Mihailovsk, Kushka 
no class 	 Grodno, Dubno, Odessa, Bendery, Alexandrovo, Gerenig 
Caucasia 	 Hunza, Georgievsk, Ahalcyh, Zakataly 
Transcaspia Krasnovodsk, Merv, Alexandrovsk 
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identified, are given on map 13. 
The infantry was in the course of being equipped with the 7.62 
mm magazine rifle. The cavalry had a carabine of identical 
calibre. The field artillery had guns of 86.8 or 106.7 mm, with 
eight cannons in each battery. The horse batteries had six guns 
of 86.8 mm. There were six mortars of 152.4 mm in each mortar 
battery. A quick-firing cannong of 76.2 mm was adopted in 
1900, but the new guns were arriving very slowly in the 
batteries." 
3.6. The Military and Constitutional 
Reform in Finland 
The Finnish troops consisted of 5009 infantrymen and 818 
dragoons in active service. The permanent cadre of reserve 
consisted of 40 officers and 192 non-commissioned officers. 
There were 32 857 men in the reserve, who had served their 
time in the active battalions. In the militia there were 25 
officers, 2329 non-commissioned officers and 75 074 men, 
trained in the reserve companies for three months. Thus the 
Grand Duchy was able to call to arms about 100 000 men in 
case of war. This was the situation at the moment of 
introducing the compulsory military service, said Moulin.115 
Of course, Moulin meant the Russian law of military service, 
which came into force in 1901 to replace the Finnish law of 
1878. The Finns were to serve on equal terms with other 
Russian subjects. 
The Russian generals had not liked the separate Finnish 
army. For the Russian chauvinists it had been a repugnant 
113 Continued 
Turkestan 	 Taskent, Hodzkent, Dzarkent, Samarkand, Margelan, 
Kerki, Cimkent, Perovski, Zaizanski 
Far East 	 Nikolaevsk, Poret, Port Arthur 
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attribute of Finland's pretended autonomy. Pan-Slavist soldiers 
saw in it a potential danger, an armed ally of Germany or 
Sweden. 
As early as 1886, inspecting the fortress of Vyborg and seeing 
its bad condition, Bobrikov had concluded that the essential 
military danger was the fact that the Finns had succeeded in 
expanding a provincial self-government into full political 
autonomy, with an army of their own under a separate 
command. This prevented the unified defence of the Baltic 
coast under the command of the St. Petersburg military 
district. 
When appointed governor-general of Finland in 1898, 
Bobrikov, with Kuropatkin, Pobedonoscev, Plehwe, and other 
centralizers of the Russian state, sketched out the February 
Manifesto (15.II 1899) by Nicholas II. Military and other "all-
imperial" questions were to be transferred from the Finnish 
Diet to the imperial instances. 
The Russians thought that a provincial Diet had no call to 
decide questions of imperial defence. For the Finns this was a 
grave crime against the constitutional rights confirmed by the 
imperial oath of Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II, 
Alexander III, and Nicholas II himself. The Finns had been the 
most stupidly loyal subjects in the whole empire, but this coup 
made an end of their loyalty. Then Russia really had reason to 
be worried about the security of her north-western confines. 
Moulin continued his report concerning the precautions 
taken in case of disorder in Finland: 
"Even though Finland is only a fly compared with 
the immense empire, and though the population is 
composed of heterogeneous elements — the town 
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy are Swedish, the 
people in the countryside are Finnish — which do 
not have identical tendencies, the Russian 
government believes it necessary to take 
precautionary measures in case the discontent 
provoked by the obligatory service should lead to 
local trouble. In order to be able immediately to 
suppress them with the greatest vigour and to 
prevent them from degenerating into disorder of a 
general character, the war ministry has made ready 
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a mixed division in St. Petersburg to assist the 
Russian troops positioned in the military district of 
Finland. 
The division consisted of four Guards regiments, Moskovskii, 
Semenovskii, Pavlovskii, Finljandskii; one artillery brigade or 
24 cannons and one battery of Guards horse artillery; and one 
calvary brigade»6 
No mutiny compelled the Russian army to reconquer Finland, 
after all. But 60-40 % of the Finnish conscripts refused to 
enter the army (1902-1904) — many preferred emigrating to 
the USA. For the generals this was a clear proof of the 
unreliability of the Finns. They were temporarily freed from 
military service, like the wild Asiatic subjects of the empire, 
and made to pay an annual tax of ten million marks instead. 
All Finnish troops and military installations were abolished, 
even the Russian military district of Finland. Instead a new 
army corps, the twenty-second, was created. It consisted of two 
rifle brigades — the second brigade had been formed to replace 
the abolished Finnish battalions — and a dragoon regiment, an 
artillery brigade, and two Cossack sotnias policing Helsinki, 
the Finnish capital. 
Bobrikov then concentrated on Russifying the Finnish 
administration until he was murdered in 1904 by Eugen 
Schauman, whose loyalty to Nicholas II could not suppress his 
aversion to Bobrikov's policy. 
3.7. Kuropatkin's Plans for War in the 
West 
Kuropatkin was a new man in the command of the Russian 
army. The French were at first a bit apprehensive regarding his 
ideas for the war plans against the Triple Alliance. 
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The Russian general staff supposed that the Germans would 
have a strong concentration of troops in East Prussia. 
Consequently they kept their Narew army comparatively 
strong. Moulin had hoped that the Narew army would 
undertake an attack towards Thorn-Allenstein (as Samsonov 
later did in 1914) to ease the pressure on the French frontier, in 
spite of the menace of a flanking movement by the Germans in 
East Prussia. But the Russians seemed to be adopting a 
waiting, defensive attitude, until they had ascertained where 
the German troop concentration was in fact.117 They could not 
think about a direct attack from Warsaw towards Berlin. A 
strong peace-time concentration on the left bank of the Vistula 
in the western salient of Poland, in preparation for the attack, 
would certainly have provoked the Germans to counter-
measures. And fortifying the bridgeheads, building barracks for 
the attack troops, and collecting all the necessary material 
would have given rise to prohibitive costs. Thus the upshot was 
that the French were not able to count on immediate and direct 
help from the east. 
But there seemed to be emerging two schools of thought in 
the Russian general staff. Some officers thought that although 
Austria was numerically the stronger enemy (because the 
French would engage part of the German strength), a Russian 
victory over Germany would be morally decisive, because she 
was the core of the Triple Alliance and the foremost military 
power in the world. Even though part of the German forces 
would be fighting the French, a substantial part of them might 
be concentrated on the Narew front, whence they might try a 
breakthrough in the rear of the Russian troops operating 
against the Austrians. These officers wanted to have a strong 
defence on the Narew and on the Niemen. The troops of the 
Warsaw and Vilna districts were to be concentrated against 
East Prussia, with the St. Petersburg and Moscow troops in 
reserve. Only the troops of the Kiev district with a few Moscow 
units would be concentrated against the Austrians, whose 
operations had no decisive importance. Russia was to reduce 
East Prussia first, then beat the Austrians, and then attack 
towards Berlin. 
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The French would probably have preferred this alternative. 
But another school of thought demanded against Austria the 
use of all troops that were not absolutely necessary for the 
defence against a German offensive. They thought that the 
result of their plan would be a victory over the Austrians. The 
enemy would be chased over the Carpathians, where the 
Russians would have an easy line of defence. Then the Russian 
offensive could be directed towards the Oder, and over the 
Oder towards Berlin. This school of thought calculated that the 
Russian army would be ready to start fighting on the twenty-
fifth day, the victory over the Austrians would be secured by 
the thirtieth to thirty-fifth day, and the follow-up on the Oder 
could begin on the fortieth to forty-fifth day.118 
It seems that the latter school of thought won. Kuropatkin 
and Saharov planned to concentrate 900 000 men on the 
German front and 785 000 men on the Austrian front, with 
102 000 men keeping an eye on the Rumanians and 83 000 men 
preparing for the Bosphorus expedition. The 255 000 men on 
the Caucasian front would be available in the west if Turkey 
remained neutral.119  
Even in this plan there seemed to be more troops 
118 "Au sujet du double courant d'opinion de l'etat-major Russe a propos du 
plan de concentration en cas de guerre avec la Triple Alliance". Moulin 
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119 Assignment of forces according to the plans of 1899-1901 
German front 
Austrian front 
cavalry 	 14 divisions, 5 regiments 
infantry 	 11 army corps, 3 rifle brigades 
artillery 	 3 mortar regiments 
reserve 	 10 divisions 
militia 	 5 divisions 
officers 
	
19,000 
men 	 900,000 
horses 	 205,000 
cannons 	 1,900 
cavalry 	 13 divisions, 10 regiments 
infantry 	 10 army corps, 2 rifle brigades 
artillery 	 1 mortar regiment 
reserve 	 8 divisions 
militia 	 5 divisions 
officers 	 17,000 
men 	 758,000 
horses 	 185,000 
cannons 	 1,800 
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concentrated against Germany than against Austria. But in 
fact the Russians had planned their concentration in such a 
way that the troops in strength on the Prussian border were 
only a precaution against a German attack on the rear of the 
main Russian offensive to the south-west. All this existed with 
the mental reservation that the army corps could be 
transported from the Narew front to the south against the 
Austrians, taking advantage of the internal Polish railway 
system, if the Germans did not attack. The essential idea was 
that no useful attack against Germany was possible before the 
Austrians were beaten. Everything was aimed at this initial 
victory.120  
Thus the Russian plan was useless from the French point of 
view. Moulin was rather sarcastic: 
119 Continued 
Rumanian front 	 cavalry 	 9 regiments 
infantry 	 1 army corps, 1 rifle brigade 
artillery 	 1 mortar regiment 
reserve 	 3 divisions 
officers 
	
2,100 
men 	 102,000 
horses 	 23,000 
cannons 	 300 
Odessa and Crimea 
(the expeditionary 
corps) 	 cavalry 	 4 regiments 
infantry 	 1 army corps 
reserve 	 1 division 
militia 
	
1 division 
officers 
	
1,600 
men 	 83,000 
horses 	 14,000 
cannons 	 300 
Caucasian front 
(available in the 
west if Turkey 
remained neutral) 	 Cossacks 	 3 divisions 
infantry 	 2 army corps, 3 rifle brigades 
artillery 	 1 mortar regiment 
reserve 	 6 divisions, 4 regiments 
officers 	 5,500 
men 	 255.000 
horses 	 82,000 
cannons 	 532 
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"The Russian general staff officers are without doubt 
very brilliant, but endowed with an excess of 
imagination. This defect is unhappily felt very 
distinctly in the committees which revise annually 
the plan of troop concentration. It leads to ideas like 
the shuttling movement between the northern and 
southern frontier in Poland ..."121 
The sketches (maps 14 and 16) where Moulin has featured the 
Russian concentrations tally with ZaionÖkovskii's (map 15) in 
their general lines, in spite of several differences and 
inaccuracies in detail. There is no longer any central or main 
army, it has definitely been divided into two, the Narew army 
and the Bug army. Rather strong flank armies are in position 
on the Niemen and in the South-west. 
3.8. If Francis Joseph Should Die 
In 1898 there had emerged an additional reason for the strong 
Russian troop concentration on the Austrian border. The old 
emperor Francis Joseph was known to be suffering from bad 
health and his death was expected in the near future. It was 
felt that the Danubian empire was rent by national strife, and 
it was expected to dissolve once the venerated sovereign passed 
away. Moulin informed Paris that Russia and Germany might 
connive at dividing the spoils. Germany would thus gain eight 
million Austrian Germans. William II might try to buy Russian 
consent with Galicia as a compensation for the addition to 
German strength. Moulin supposed that the Russian general 
staff and the Pan-Slavists would not be content with the 
Carpathian frontier only but would demand also a blank 
cheque on the Bosphorus.122  
Neither the war ministry nor the general staff in Paris were 
127 "Au sujet du nouveau plan de concentration". Moulin 10.III 1899. EMATSH 
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interested in these hypotheses. But the minister for foreign 
affairs, Delcasse, was a statesman who saw the danger of a 
new combination of European powers. He encouraged Moulin 
to study the Russian intentions further in the light of an 
eventual Austrian complication. 
Moulin reported that the Russian soldiers and patriots 
believed that an immediate dismemberment of the Austrian 
empire would occur in the event of Francis Joseph's death. 
Then the German provinces would immediately and 
spontaneously join the German empire. Russia would not 
oppose these developments provided she could foresee 
legitimate compensation. Moulin had heard this opinion 
uttered by Saharov, Dragomirov, and the Russian military 
attaché in Vienna, Voronin. 
The changes in the European balance of power would be 
enormous. Germany would gain strength through the addition 
of eight million Austrian Germans. Istria would become a 
German port open on the Mediterranean. In compensation 
Germany would give Trieste and the Trentino to Italy. Hungary 
would become independent. Bohemia's fate might cause 
difficulties, if Russia should demand independence for her in 
order to maintain a Slav vanguard on the flank of the German 
empire. 
France and Russia could not allow Germany to grow without 
compensation. If she wanted to avoid a war on two fronts 
against these powers, she had to give compensation to at least 
one of them. She might, for example, offer Galicia and 
Bukovina to Russia. This would be a mediocre acquisition for 
Russia, because of the 7,5 million inhabitants only four million 
were Ruthenians or orthodox Russians, while the rest were 
Poles. But the splendid frontier of the Carpathians would be a 
consolation. Transylvania could be given to Romania without 
difficulties. (It seems that Hungarian opinion was ignored by 
the Russian patriots). 
The Russian generals were inclined to leave France without 
any compensation. They calculated that she could not wish for 
Belgium or Switzerland. The only compensation that could be 
thought of was the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. But 
Germany certainly was not going to give them up without a 
war. Therefore France had better submit to renouncing this 
compensation. Nicholas II was a pacific ruler and would not 
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accept an offensive war. To Russia Germany would offer 
compensation without a threat of war, even eagerly; she might 
even consent to discussing the question of Bohemia. 
From this it appeared that the only hope of a war for France 
was a previous engagement with Russia, or the improbable case 
of Russian diplomatists being dissatisfied with the 
compensation obtained by the soldiers. This was not very 
probable because generally Russian diplomacy was much more 
moderate in its desires than the general staff. It was true that 
the Russian patriots and publicists were more exacting. They 
held an eventual German Istria to be a danger for the Balkan 
Slays. They saw the annexation of Austria by Germany as a 
step on the road to Salonika and Constantinople, or at least 
towards a stronger German influence on the Sultan. The result 
might be that German commerce would force its way from 
Hamburg via Constantinople and Angora to Baghdad. Thus all 
Russia's hopes in the Orient would be in vain. That was why 
the patriots demanded Constantinople as a compensation for 
the annexation of Austria, in addition to and before Galicia 
and Bukovina. 
If these people had been able to make their programme 
official, the result would surely have been war. Then France 
would have had the chance of reconquering Alsace and 
Lorraine. But unfortunately there was not much hope of such a 
turn. 
On the contrary, a great danger menaced France. If the 
Austrian empire dissolved and the Triple Alliance disappeared, 
the military convention between France and Russia would be 
nullified. It had been stipulated that the convention should last 
as long as the enemy alliance. With the convention nullified, 
France would have to face alone a Germany of sixty million 
inhabitants, growing fast, and with a new triple alliance with 
Italy and Hungary. It was true that the Hungarians were not 
very friendly towards the Germans, but they disliked the 
Russians even more. 
By this reasoning it was of the utmost importance that a new 
arrangement be made between France and Russia, while the 
men who were favourably disposed towards France were in 
influential positions in the army and in the court.123 
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Of course, this recommendation was given more urgency by 
the continuous stream of information concerning the German 
support for Russia's Far Eastern policy. Clearly it was in the 
German interest to see the Russian army disappear from the 
western frontier towards the Pacific. 
By the summer of 1899 the Russian general staff was 
seriously occupied with the Austrian problem. It was true that 
German schemes in Turkey, the Kaiser's flirtation with the 
Sultan and expressions of pan-Islamic feelings, caused 
dissatisfaction in St. Petersburg. But the possibility of the 
Austrian complication arising on Francis Joseph's death 
worried the Russian general staff much more.''} 
Four armies were planned for the operation that aimed at 
securing the compensation for Germany's booty. One army was 
to occupy Galicia and Bukovina, eventually to advance to help 
the Rumanians in Transylvania. Another army was to cross the 
Carpathians in order to help the southern Slays, whom Russia 
was going to declare independent, in Croatia, in Slovenia, and 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The third army was to advance via 
Upper Silesia to help the Bohemians, whom Russia would also 
proclaim independent. The fourth army was to occupy the 
coasts of the Bosphorus. 
The general staff tried to reassure Moulin: all these 
operations would not absorb as many Russian troops as were 
required against Austria at present, in case of a war with the 
Triple Alliance. Consequently, there would remain at least as 
many troops as before on the frontier against Germany. 
All the above-mentioned viewpoints only add up to 
preliminary plans or sketches for the foreseen operation. No 
exact information was given on the composition of the four 
armies, or on their concentration or planned action. The nature 
of enemy resistance seems to have been totally ignored, for 
instance, in crossing Upper Silesia, i.e. a German province. 
These plans are a good illustration of the Russian "system" 
of government. At this time no cabinet existed. The soldiers 
compiled in all earnest plans for redrawing the map of half 
Europe without consulting the foreign ministry. It is not clear 
lite du partage de 1'Autriche". Moulin 24.VIII 1899. EMATSH 7 N 1475 
124 
"Eventualite du demembrement de 1'Autriche". Moulin 10.IV 1900. 
EMATSH 7 N 1476 
72 
how much even Nicholas II was told. 
Thus it is futile to ask whether Russia wanted to dominate 
the eventually independent Slav states, or to open her way to 
the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean. It is not at all clear 
who was Russia. There existed different currents of opinion in 
Russia, and something was always wanted by somebody. The 
decision-making was unorganized and influenced by the 
strength of the currents of opinion on the command posts of the 
empire. The viewpoints described above had impregnated the 
general staff, but it was not until 1914-1916 that they were 
being received sympathetically at the Foreign Office. The 
civilian leaders were much more concerned with the reactions 
of other powers to extravagant Russian appetites. The moment 
to make actual plans or to act on them never came. 
The urgency of these worries abated when the Emperor 
Francis Joseph did not die — until 1916, of course — and other 
problems grew more burning. Nevertheless, as late as 1901 
Voronin reported from Vienna that Germany was continually 
scheming for the annexation of the German provinces as well 
as of Trieste and Pola. William's agents were busily preparing 
the ground for annexation. The general staff in St. Petersburg 
was very much inclined to believe these reports, Moulin was 
told.16 
3.9. The Dual Alliance Strengthened 
Delcasse, the statesman who very nearly made France a great 
power again, had much reason to be worried over the state of 
the Dual Alliance by the turn of the century. 12  It was true that 
France and Russia had acted together in 1895 in some minor 
126 
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questions outside Europe, e.g. they had protested against the 
British administration in Egypt. They had also chased Japan 
out of her conquests in 1895, where Germany had been a 
partner, too. But then in 1896 France had not supported 
Russia's schemes for the Straits. Nor had Russia helped France 
at the time of the Fashoda crisis in 1898. There were even 
personal reasons for this mutual coldshouldering: the ministers 
for foreign affairs of the respective countries, Hanotaux and 
Murav'ev, did not like each other. 
Then there was always the danger of a Russo-German 
entente, for which William II was eagerly working. It is true 
that he masked his proposals in the garment of a continental 
coalition, modelling it on the Shimonoseki combination of 
France, Russia, and Germany working together. But it all 
implied that Russia and Germany would compel France to give 
up her revanche, and thus submit Europe to German 
hegemony. 
There remained the Austro-Russian rivalry, but it seemed to 
have been losing its force since 1897. Influential Russian circles 
supported the idea of a continental coalition. For instance, 
Novoe Vremja considered England as Russia's traditional 
enemy, whose designs in Africa and in the Near, Middle, and 
Far East could be fought only by the combined efforts of the 
continental powers of Europe.128 The Russian conservatives 
would have dearly loved to have Imperial Germany as their 
ally against internal enemies as well as against England.129 The 
support of the Emperor William for the Emperor Nicholas 
("Willy to Nicky" in their correspondence,) against the Yellow 
Peril was very much welcome to the latter, who was thus able 
to wallow in his personal imperialism in the Far East. 
Delcasse seems to have taken very seriously also the 
possibility of the Austrian empire dissolving, a situation in 
which Germany might buy Russia out of her French alliance 
with a large compensation from the Austrian heritage, as 
Moulin had written. That situation would be extremely 
dangerous, because the military convention would be dissolved 
ipso facto by the dissolving of the Triple Alliance. 
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Delcasse travelled to Russia and discussed the situation with 
Nicholas and Murav'ev. There it turned out that the latter had 
not adopted the treacherous plans of the general staff. They 
agreed that the military convention was to last as long as the 
entente of 1891, i.e. as long as Russia's and France's interests 
were identical, independently of the existence of the Triple 
Alliance. The aim of the convention had been to maintain the 
general peace in Europe. Now Delcasse succeeded in including 
a paragraph where the aim was stated to be that of 
maintaining the balance of power in Europe. This was "a 
means of realizing France's wishes and hopes".130  
Of course, leaving France without compensation if Germany 
got Austria and Russia got Galicia and the Straits would not 
have been "maintaining the balance of power". There was no 
other imaginable compensation for France but Alsace and 
Lorraine, "France's wishes and hopes". 
Another contingency discussed on Delcasse's visit was a war 
against England. She was not so dangerous as earlier, because 
of her entanglement in South Africa. But it was agreed that the 
Dual Alliance would also act in the event of a war against 
England. Thus the convention covered all possible 
combinations in Europe. A war against England implied action 
on the Russo-Indian border, too. 
Delcasse also discussed the principal military weakness of 
the convention. This was the fact that the first and decisive (as 
it was supposed to be) battle against 18 German and 2-4 
Italian army corps was to be fought on the fourteenth day by 
the French, while the Russian contingent of 700 000 men would 
be ready to act at the earliest on the twenty-eighth day, when 
the decision in the west would already be past history. 
Delcasse urged the emperor to speed up the building of 
strategic railways from the interior of the empire to her 
western border in order to enable an earlier attack against 
Germany to be mounted.=31 
130 Delcasse to the President of the Republic 12.VIII 1899. AMAE, C.P. Russie 
N.S. 34 
'31 "Note secrete sur les entretiens qui ont lieu entre l'Empereur de Russie et 
M.Delcasse 6.VIII 1899 et 25.IV 1901". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 35 
75 
3.10. Military Co-operation Promised 
Reviewing the technical details of the military convention were 
left to the chiefs of the allied general staffs, Delanne and 
Saharov, in the summer of 1900.132  
Now Saharov gave up a point which Obru6ev had defended 
tenaciously in 1892. The generals agreed that Italy and Austria 
were not as dangerous as had been thought in 1892. Austria 
had been weakened in consequence of her internal problems. 
Italy had to keep part of her army on her Austrian border, 
because of their mutual enmity. Thus the simultaneous 
mobilization by France and Russia was necessary only in case 
of a German mobilization or that of the whole of the Triple 
Alliance. But a partial or even a total mobilization by a lesser 
partner in the Triple Alliance, i.e. Italy or Austria, would now 
imply Franco-Russian mobilization only after further previous 
communications and agreement by the two signatories. 
Of course, this signified that France was not automatically 
going to support Russia against Austria in a Balkan conflict. 
The danger of a Franco-Italian conflict was receding as Italy's 
relations with her allies got cooler. 
It was difficult to integrate the military action of the allies. 
Delanne calculated that Germany would attack France with 18 
army corps on the twelfth day supported by 2-4 Italian army 
corps on the eighteenth-twentieth days. Thus only five German 
corps with a few reserve divisions would be left against Russia. 
France was able to mobilize as fast as Germany. Thus the great 
decisive battle would be fought on the fifteenth-eighteenth day 
on the Franco-German frontier. If Russia remained passive, 
Germany would be free to leave only 2-3 army corps on her 
eastern border. In any case she was going to beat first France, 
and then transfer her forces to the east. Delanne asked Saharov 
to do his utmost to engage at least 5-6 German corps on the 
Russian frontier. In case of a German attack against Russia 
first, France on her part could promise to attack Germany with 
132 
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all vigour and all might, without thinking about the Italian 
danger. 
Saharov was satisfied with this promise, of course. But he 
was not able in his turn to give satisfaction to the French 
general. He admitted the probability of a German attack in the 
west, because France could be beaten decisively in one battle, 
while Russia was so large that Germany had no hope of a 
speedy decision on her eastern front. But the western attack 
was by no means a certainty. Germany had numerous strategic 
railways running towards her eastern border, and there was 
the necessity of helping Austria against Russia. Therefore 
Russia had to be prepared for an attack of 14 army corps from 
East Prussia, and two army corps from Silesia, in addition to 
the 14 Austrian army corps. — This hypothesis left only seven 
German corps against France. — Russia had to maintain a 
strictly defensive attitude until she saw that the Germans had 
adopted the first hypothesis, the attack against France. Then, 
on the twenty-eighth day, she would have the promised 700 000 
men mobilized and concentrated for an attack. 
Delanne remarked that the Germans, after having beaten the 
French, would thus have ten days to transfer their troops to the 
east. On the twenty-eighth day the Russians were not to have 
five or six corps against them but four, six, or eight additional 
corps from the west. Russia had better attack at once after 
ascertaining that the German attack was directed towards the 
west and destroy the German troops on the frontier with the 
forces she might have available, without waiting for the 
concentration of her whole army. 
Delanne also said that France would be "completely 
satisfied" if Russia could improve her railways in order to 
speed up her troop concentrations. 
A new aspect, which had not been discussed in 1892, was the 
eventual enmity of England. It was agreed that Russia was to 
put pressure against Afghanistan or India. She was not able to 
reinforce her troops in Central Asia enough for serious action, 
but the pressure would be enough to prevent England from 
transporting her Indian army to fight against France. After the 
Russian railway network was connected to the Transcaspian 
railway, Russia would be able to concentrate 300 000-350 000 
men against India in six weeks. France, on her part, could 
exert pressure by concentrating 100 000-150 000 men on the 
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Channel coast, which would prevent England from sending her 
home troops to India. 
If the Triple Alliance should join England in a war against 
the Dual Alliance, these pressures were to remain, but in a 
weakened form, of course. Only the local Russian troops on 
the Afghan border would be available for pressure on India. 
France would be able to concentrate an equal number, but of 
colonial troops, on her Channel coast. The principal enemy 
would be Germany, as in a war against the Triple Alliance 
alone. 
Next year, 1901, Saharov discussed the identical problems 
with a new partner, General Pendezec — French politics and 
the Dreyfus affair consumed military chiefs in a rapid 
succession. The French general, as always, asked Russia to help 
France by drawing enough of the German army corps from the 
western frontier to give France a chance of success in the 
decisive battle which was to be fought starting on the 
fourteenth day. The Russian vanguard should attack on the 
fourteenth day and engage at least 6-7 German corps. It was 
of key importance for the French to receive good news from the 
east on the fourteenth day, news of a Russian attack even if not 
of a Russian victory. That would be important for French 
morale, especially if France were to lose the first battle. 
Pendezec also remarked how desirable it would be if the 
great Russian attack discussed in 1892 could be advanced ten 
days. 
Saharov answered that he would take notice of the French 
wishes in his planning work. Perhaps the Russian vanguard 
would be able to start its action on the eighteenth day, and the 
mass of 700 000 men promised in 1892 might be concentrated 
on the twenty-eighth day to take the offensive against 
Germany. But beginning the action on the fourteenth day and 
advancing the principal offensive ten days was possible only if 
the Russian railways were to be improved. The work would 
take two years and would impose a great strain on Russian 
finances. 
Pendezec answered that the matter was of such importance 
for France's future that the French minister for foreign affairs 
was prepared to discuss with his Russian colleague the 
financial combinations to enable Russia to build the necessary 
railways in the near future. 
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France on her part was to fulfil everything promised in the 
previous discussion. The action taken by the French forces 
would be even more vigorous than previously supposed because 
of the progress in the development of her armed forces. 
The generals agreed once more that the defeat of Germany 
was the primary objective even if the war was made necessary 
by German ambitions on some Austro-Hungarian provinces. 
There was not much new to be added to the discussion 
regarding an eventual war against England. Saharov only 
emphasized that it was only after the completion of the 
Orenburg-Tashkent line that Russia would be able to 
concentrate 300 000 men to menace British India. Until that 
time the pressure on the Afghan borders would be much less 
imposing. Pendezec answered that France, too, held the 
completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent line to be important. 
Saharov promised that the work would start next spring, that 
part of the rolling stock had already been ordered and that the 
trace of the line had already been measured out.'33 
Delcasse did not leave the revitalised military convention 
resting only on the discussions between the chiefs of staff. He 
revisited Nicholas II and extracted from the emperor a promise 
that Russia would build the railway lines which Saharov held 
essential for the simultaneous attack of Russia and France.'3} 
The military convention was also ratified by an exchange of 
letters between Delcasse and Lamsdorff, Nicholas's new 
minister for foreign affairs.'33 
Next year, 1902, Saharov promised to Pendezec that Russia 
would construct the line Orenburg-Tashkent (1881 kilometres) 
and Bologoe-Sedlec (1100 kilometres) by 1905 and 1906. (map 
17) 136  
Pendezec visited Russia again in 1903 and was told by 
Nicholas II that his first troops would be ready on the tenth 
day. It was probable that three-quarters or four-fifths of the 
German corps would attack France, but Nicholas stressed that 
'33 
"Proces-verbal de l'entretien du 8/21 fevrier 1901 entre les chefs d'état-
major generaux des armees russe et fransaise". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 35. 
DDF I/2 n:o 112 
134 Delcasse to Lamsdorff 16/3.V 1901. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 35 
135 Lamsdorff to Delcasse 16/3.V 1901. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 35 
136 Saharov to Pendezec 31.II 1902. EMATSH 7 N 1507 
79 
there was no certainty of it. Russia would be able to undertake 
the promised offensive only after it was definitely known that 
the mass of the German forces was turned towards the west. 
Saharov explained that the first Russian troops would be 
detrained on the tenth day and ready to fight on the twelfth 
day. The first echelon was to consist of 350 000 men. Thus 
considerable progress had been realized since the chiefs of staff 
had started their annual conferences. And when the railway 
from Bologoe to Sedlec were completed, the echelons would 
consist of 100 000 additional men. 
Pendezec composed a report on these talks that was quite 
optimistic. Little by little the desired objective was being 
attained: cannon would be heard simultaneously from the west 
and from the east. He supposed that the Russians were going to 
attack the Germans at once, but he had refrained from asking 
any details: "they were to be dealt with by the eventual 
commanders in chief". — This was a bit odd, because the 
conferences of the chiefs of staff had been organized in order to 
concert measures and preparations in order to enable 
immediate and simultaneous action in case of Germany's 
attack, when no further conferring by the commanders in chief 
would be possible, nor was indeed foreseen in the convention. 
Further on we shall see that subsequent Russian chiefs of staff 
thought that Saharov had promised more than Russia was able 
to perform and thus Pendezec seems to have been overly 
optimistic. 
Pendezec was given the general lines of Saharov's plans, 
which had not been much changed since previous years (as 
described in the chapter above). It was supposed that the 
Germans would concentrate 6-7 corps in East Prussia, while 
the Austrians would attack with 5-6 corps from Przemysl to 
Volynia and with 7-8 corps from Galicia to Poland. The 
Russians had their first or Niemen army facing the Prussian 
frontier and the second army on the Narew and the Vistula. 
(map 18). Their reserve was between the Narew and the Bug 
armies. There was an army facing the Austrians in the Bug-
Lublin region and another army in the south-west. One army 
was to watch the Rumanians. The expeditionary corps was 
preparing for the invasion of Turkey over the Black Sea. 
Pendezec thought that it was easy for the Russians to attack 
in the north if they had their 350 000 men concentrated on the 
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tenth day, while the Germans were to have their 250 000 men 
ready on the fourteenth day. The Niemen army was to crush 
the German left flank, while the Narew army was to attack 
Allenstein. Thus the Germans would be compelled to evacuate 
East Prussia and to retreat to the Vistula. But by then the 
Russians would have their full force available, which meant a 
triple superiority over the Germans. Thus they would be able to 
take the route to Berlin, having only the decrepit fortress of 
Custrin in front of them. 
This operation could not be disturbed by what happened in 
the south. The Austrians would not be ready for action until 
the twenty-second day, and by then Dragomirov would have 
attacked them. Nor would the Germans be able to help the 
Austrians, being in battle since twelfth day. 
These plans presupposed that the principal German armies 
were concentrated in the west. If Germany left only 6-7 corps 
in Alsace-Lorraine, she could attack Russia with 32 (Austrian 
and German) corps. Then Russia could only defend herself in 
Poland. t31  
Therefore it was of vital importance to know at the very 
moment of the declaration of war whether the Germans were 
going to attack in the east or in the west. It was urgently 
necessary to have reliable means of communication between the 
two general staffs. But there the difficulties were so great that 
the problem took several years to be solved. — This will be 
dealt with in a chapter of its own. 
Thus Pendezec's report would have been quite cloudless but 
for his discussions with Kuropatkin, which already cast a small 
shadow of the troubles that were in fact waiting in the very 
near future. The minister of war had visited Japan. He told 
Pendezec that his visit had convinced him that a war with 
Japan would be costly, inglorious, and futile. His pessimistic 
report had not pleased the emperor and his position was shaky. 
Far East policy had been transferred to the charge of Admiral 
Alexeev. It was rumoured that Saharov had been designated 
Kuropatkin's successor.'38 
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4. Adventure and Defeat 
4.1. Far Eastern Schemes 
Russia's attention had begun to turn towards the Far East 
seriously after 1895 when her advance in Central Asia had been 
stopped. The realization of the dreams of Russia's manifest 
destiny in Asia was being made possible in direct relation to 
the progress made in the building of Witte's Siberian railway 
(started in 1891). Russia stepped into the Far East political 
arena together with France and Germany in 1895, chasing 
Japan back from her Chinese conquests. Witte had thought of a 
peaceful economic infiltration of the Far East in harmony with 
China. A treaty of friendship had been concluded in 1896, 
allowing Witte to build the Siberian railway through 
Manchuria towards Vladivostok. But the temptation for an 
imperialism of the older military model was too strong. The 
peninsula of Liaotung was occupied in 1898 and Port Arthur 
was established as the Russian port at warm sea that the 
landlocked empire had sought for since the days of Peter the 
Great. 
Then the Boxer rebellion gave Russia a new challenge. The 
French ambassador reported: 
"The Russian press rejoices over the disorder in 
China. They see the anarchy as harming the interests 
of other powers, which is advantageous to Russia. 
Because Russia has provinces on the Chinese border, 
she will able to occupy Chinese territory and then, 
under the protection of her troops, she will be able 
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to develop these areas when the Siberian railway is 
completed. Of all the Christian nations Russia has 
the best chance of creating cordial relations with the 
Asiatics, because of her gentleness with these 
peoples, who are treated with little ceremony by 
other civilized nations".i39 
The Amur and Siberian military districts were mobilized in the 
summer of 1900 because of the Chinese disorders.140 These 
troops consisted of the first Siberian corps in Pecili and Port 
Arthur, the second corps in Harbin, and the third corps at 
Sretensk. At Vladivostok a landing force was being prepared. 
These troops numbered 172 000 men; in addition there were 
62 500 men not included in the army corps.'°' Moulin reported 
that this number was double that of the pre-crisis effectives.'42 
A strong Russian detachment took part in the relief of 
Peking, and after that the Russians remained in the 
Manchurian areas through which they had marched. 
"The military situation in Manchuria is seen only as 
a pretext for the Russian occupation (by outsiders), 
but in fact the occupation is necessary because the 
population is terrorized by the Hunhuzes in bands of 
up to one thousand, armed with cannons". 
Also Chinese troops were reported on the Manchurian border.1S3 
Of course it would have been inadmissible to let the Chinese 
pacify their provinces: and very probably they would not have 
been able to do it. Thus, apparently, it was all right for the 
Russians to show their consideration towards the local 
population. 
It is well known that Witte opposed this policy of violence, 
nor did Kuropatkin like turning Russia's forces away from the 
menaced western frontier. As far as he was able to do so, the 
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minister for foreign affairs, Count Lamsdorff, supported Witte's 
opposition. Moulin reported how Witte was overthrown by the 
united efforts of Plehwe, state secretaty Bezobrazov, and 
Admiral Alexeev, backed by Grand Duke Alexander 
Mihailovic. 
Plehwe is supposed to have supported the Far Eastern 
adventure out of opportunism, i.e. because he knew that it 
pleased the emperor, but also because he wanted to distract the 
malcontents "with a little victorious war", or because of his 
rivalry with Witte. Bezobrazov, Alexeev, and Alexander 
Mihailovic were members of the notorious court clique which 
Nicholas II had collected around him and which was forming 
an alternative government. 
Moulin continued that the Grand Duke would probably soon be 
called to direct the projected ministry of commerce and 
industry. Not being able, as a grand duke, to be appointed 
minister, he would lead the ministry through a combination 
resembling that with which the Grand Duke Aleksei (Grand 
Admiral of the Fleet) actually directed the navy, i.e. through an 
acting Navy minister. There had also been a proposal for the 
creation of a ministry of colonies for Bezobrazov.144 Of these 
possible combinations the only one that materialized was the 
appointment of Admiral Alexeev as viceroy. In this way Far 
Eastern policy was detached from the competence of the 
responsible ministries in St. Petersburg. 
But Moulin knew also that the Far Eastern adventure was 
not caused solely by the nefarious influence of the court clique. 
It was the result of the personal policy of the emperor. He had 
always been interested in Asian schemes of aggrandizment. As 
a young man, Nicholas had visited Japan and had been 
president of the committee for the Siberian railway. His policy 
was not the result of Bezobrazov's influence. The state 
secretary had simply been able to make himself an advocate of 
a policy that was in reality the synthesis of the sovereign's 
144 "Le remaniement ministeriel en Russie". Moulin 5.XI 1903. EMATSH 7 N 
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secret desires.145 
Japan saw Russia threatening her schemes in the 
neighbouring countries. She tried to protest against Russia's 
permanent occupation of Manchuria and her encroachment on 
Korea, but in vain. Then Japan found a friend in England, who 
viewed the naval situation on the Pacific with concern: the 
growing Russian squadron there was threatening England's 
naval supremacy, while Russia's Manchurian policy seemed a 
menace to England's commercial preponderance in China. Thus 
England gave up her "splendid isolation" and concluded with 
Japan a treaty of neutrality (in the event of either party getting 
involved in a war with a third power) or mutual help (in the 
event of there being more than one enemy, i.e. if France joined 
Russia). This was irritating for Russia, but it did not make her 
renounce her Far Eastern schemes. The end of the South 
African War also caused a painful feeling and a sentiment of 
irritation in Russia. In St. Petersburg people had got into the 
habit of thinking that the war would go on for ever, swallowing 
up endless thousands of soldiers and millions of pounds, thus 
exhausting England. The Russians were angry with the Boers 
for giving up their fight, because then the English were free to 
paralyze Russia's freedom of action in Suez, in Persia, in 
China, in Afghanistan, etc.146 But this was only an irritation, 
and it caused no voluntary abandonment of the forward 
movement in the Far East. 
As mentioned earlier, Kuropatkin visited Japan in 1903 and 
returned from there with the idea that the country was 
powerfully armed and that a war was inevitable if some 
concessions were not made. But Bezobrazov persuaded the 
Tsar that Russia had no need to be afraid of Japan. Nicholas 
answered that there would be no war because he did not want 
— Such an attitude undoubtedly rested on the 
assumption that because the Japanese were a coloured people, 
it was unthinkable that they would dare to oppose Russia, a 
great power and a white, "Christian" colonial power. 
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Japan was reported to be mobilizing at the end of 1903, but 
Manchuria was not evacuated by the Russians. Nicholas told 
his ministers that this would not happen, and ordered them to 
find a modus vivendi with other powers to avoid the 
"continuous complaints" of these powers'4e — an impossible 
task because nothing was to be given up. On the contrary, the 
forward policy was pressed on in Korea. Grand Duke 
Alexander and Bezobrazov did not consent to giving up their 
planned settlement of 200 000 people at the mouth of the Yalu 
river. This was seen as a commercially advantageous enterprise 
but also as an advantageous bridgehead for Russia on the 
Korean frontier. Bezobrazov demanded troops from Kuropatkin 
for this imperialistic enterprise. 
This Kuropatkin refused for fear of the Japanese reaction. 
Kuropatkin was very pessimistic because his warnings were 
not heeded.'}9 As mentioned earlier, the emperor was displeased 
with Kuropatkin, and also with Lamsdorf whom he reproached 
for the failure of all negotiations with the Japanese. 
By the beginning of 1904 the ominous fact was known that 
Japan had got her finances in order with loans on the home 
and American market — the American Jewish bankers detested 
Russia's anti-semitic policy.'" 
4.2. Russias's Strength Disappears to 
the Far East 
The situation had seemed comparatively tranquil in 1902. Only 
a little over 100 000 men had stood under arms then in the Far 
East.'" But as the tension grew, reinforcements were sent to 
the Far East, 127 000 men by October 1903, and an additional 
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150 000 were to be sent during the next two to three months. 
Both General Saharov on the general staff and Admiral 
Avellan on the naval staff affirmed to Moulin that all necessary 
precautions had been taken and that Russia was well prepared 
for any attack by Japan.152  
The preparations were not as effective and energetic as the 
officers declared. In their view, the Japanese would not, of 
course, dare to attack Russia. 
"Admiral Alexeev in an official report declared 
categorically that the Pacific squadron was too 
powerful to fear defeat in a battle against the 
Japanese, which confirmed the government in their 
naive (this report was given in 1906 and by then it 
was seen to have been naive) confidence that there 
would be no war".153 
Alexeev was reported to be convinced of the futility of 
concessions, which in his view would only encourage Japan to 
increase her demands. She would not be content with Korea 
only; she would demand Manchuria if Russia did not stand up 
to her. In any case humouring Japan only was of no use, since 
Japanese intransigance was caused by English intrigue. The 
best way of easing the Far Eastern situation was to threaten 
the Afghan borders. 
Colonel Vannovskii, the military attaché in Japan, was also 
disposed to judge the Japanese army severely. The success of 
the expeditionary corps to China (in 1900, when the Japanese 
had killed Chinese as effectively as the European soldiers did) 
was deceptive. The cream of the Japanese army had been 
skimmed to form the corps. He considered the Japanese very 
15' Effectives in the Asian military districts 
1902 spring 1903 
Caucasian military district 102,250 
Turkestan military district 53,309 
Siberian military district 13,217 
Amur military district 65,710 66,500 
Province of Kwang-Tung 15,207 17,000 
Railway guard in Manchuria 25,000 26,000 
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obtuse and capable of conceiving rather odd ideas. Moulin 
gathered from Vannovskil's comments that in the event of a 
war the Russians intended to invade Korea.155 
By this time the Russian general staff seems to have become 
rather eager for a Far Eastern war — which might explain why 
Nicholas II favoured Saharov. The general staff thought that 
the Manchurian railway or the lines connecting it with China 
proper could not be allowed to fall under Japanese or English 
domination. Neither could the Japanese be allowed to have the 
southern tip of Korea, because in Japanese or other enemy 
hands it would be a new Gibraltar closing the approaches to 
Vladivostok. Thus no new Japanese troops could be admitted to 
Korea. Japan might be given economic concessions there, but 
even so the forests and mines of northern Korea were to be 
exploited by Russia. 
The general staff was planning the transport of the tenth and 
eighteenth army corps to the Far East.156 The reinforcement 
mentioned above seem to have been the thirty-first and thirty-
fifth divisions of the eighteenth corps. These corps had been 
part of the armies which were intended to fight the Austrians, 
but since the agreement of 1903 on the Balkan status quo there 
was "no reason" to keep these troops in the west.157 
Thus it seems that even if the Tsar was pacific and his 
minister for war apprehensive, his general staff was not. On the 
contrary, it welcomed a war which to it seemed easy and gave 
promise of new areas falling under Russian domination. (The 
grandeur of its appetites should be clear enough now bearing in 
mind its earlier plans for carving up the Emperor Francis 
Joseph's heritage). 
Moulin does not seem to have known of the plans made in 
1898 and revised in 1901 for a war against Japan. After a 
defensive phase, while a sufficient number of troops were being 
concentrated, Korea was to be invaded and after that a landing 
to be made in Japan — for which a landing corps was being 
prepared in Vladivostok — and in Japan the decisive victory 
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was to be won.1 J8 
There was no reason for the French to rejoice. Moulin 
reminded General Saharov of his promise to have the 
Orenburg-Tashkent and Sedlec-Bologoe railways built, and 
calculated that 6,3 million roubles would be enough for it. But 
Saharov said that at least 11 million roubles would be 
necessary but was not available, because the preparations in 
the Far East absorbed all funds. 
Moulin was desolate on thus learning that the completion of 
the strategic lines, on which depended the possibility, vital for 
France, of a Russian offensive against Germany at an early 
moment, was in danger of being retarded. 
"This offensive, readiness for which the Russian 
general staff virtually, even though vaguely, 
promised in 1902 and in explicit and precise terms 
in 1903 ... shall it again be adjourned ad calendas 
graecas? Happily, Saharov is the best minister of 
war from our point of view, a man with whom it is 
easy to reach a mutual understanding. But it is not 
certain that he is influential enough in the decisions 
of the Russian government to ensure the triumph of 
truth and honesty, without a new démarche by the 
French government".'" 
The cause of truth and honesty was also threatened by the 
danger of an Anglo-French conflict in consequence of the war 
between their allies. Yet there was less of a chance of a 
succesful battle against England than during the Fashoda 
crisis. The only area where the British empire could 
effectively be threatened was the Russo-Indian border. But 
Russia was not able to concentrate more than 75 000-80 000 
men there before the Orenburg-Tashkent railway was 
completed. Only then could a really dangerous attack of 
300 000-350 000 men be launched. But the railway was far 
from complete. France had spared neither demarches nor 
money; her ambassador, her chief of general staff, her minister 
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for foreign affairs had supported the Russian minister for 
foreing affairs and general staff in their battle against Witte's 
opposition. But the minister of finance had delayed the 
Orenburg-Tashkent railway; he had even transferred part of 
the money and men to the Siberian railway, and consequently 
the Central Asian railway could be completed in 1905 at the 
earliest. Thus the whole burden of a war against England had 
to be carried alone by France.160  
Moulin saw the situation in the same light as previously and 
was consistent in his calculations. But of course he was not 
quite up to date. Delcasse in Paris had seen that the eleven 
millions for the Orenburg-Tashkent and Bologoe-Sedlec 
railway were not enough to secure France's position. By no 
means could France continue to be an enemy of England when 
Russia disappeared as a counterweight to the German menace. 
Delcasse concluded that the only means of avoiding an 
entanglement with England was to enter into an entente with 
her, forgetting all ancient colonial disputes. The British 
statesmen in their turn were worried lest their alliance with 
Japan, aimed at consolidating the naval position on the Pacific 
and in China, would drag them into a war which would be 
much more difficult than the South African War, and with the 
growing menace of German naval might looming in the 
background. An Entente Cordial would remove all danger of a 
Franco-English conflict, and this was achieved in 1904. 
4.3. The Defeat of an Ally 
The Japanese crippled the Russian Pacific fleet by a surprise 
attack (27.I/9.II 1904). After that it was easy for them to 
maintain their armies in Manchuria. Port Arthur was invested 
and the Russian army thrown back in the Battle of Laojan 
(July—August). Port Arthur could not be relieved (October 
160 Moulin to war minister to MAE 12.II 1904. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S.17 
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1904) and capitulated (20.XII 1904/2.I 1905). After that the 
Russians lost the Battle of Mukden (February/March 1905). 
Their last hope was the Baltic fleet, which was sent half way 
round the world to be defeated at the Battle of Tsushima (15/ 
28.V 1905).161 
The course of the war and the subsequent revolution is too 
well known to be told here in any more detail, even though 
General Silvestre, detached by the French general staff to 
follow the Russian army, sent in plenty of interesting 
information. 
Moulin continued reporting from St. Petersburg. His 
despatches do not give any coherent picture of the Russian 
mobilization's' because it was not a coherent affair. 
"Dragomirov and Saharov blame the improvisations 
of Kuropatkin, who has collected detachments from 
various troops and has not sent the existing units to 
the Far East".163 
At first it seemed that starting the war had given rise to the 
usual national enthusiasm164 (although it is to be noted that 
Moulin discussed with officers but only observed the rank and 
file, who seemed to be "in admirably good humour"). But even 
so the war was not satisfactory from the French point of view 
because it freed the Germans from the Russian military 
menace. 
"If the effectives of the Russian garrisons on her 
western frontier have not yet been reduced (July 
1904) in spite of the Emperor William's undisguised 
incitement, at least the modern artillery has been 
taken out of Poland to be replaced with cannon of 
an old model, which has proved inadequate in the 
operations in Manchuria and which would be quite 
useless in a European war".16' 
:61 There is no end of literature concerning the war. Istorija russko-japon- 
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By the autumn of 1904 the Far Eastern army consisted of ten 
army corps and more were being sent to form at least three 
armies. Kuropatkin had been sent plenty of artillery projectiles, 
but three-fourths of them had been consumed during the first 
great Battle of Laojan; the magazines of the Warsaw military 
district were exhausted and the commanding-general there said 
that they had nothing to shoot with should the Austrians or 
Germans cross the frontier. Casualties in the Far East also 
amounted to more than expected. These were not merely battle 
casualties, but were also due to disease.166 It was also noted 
that 
"the Russian infantry tactics do not correspond to 
the demands of modern war ... Deceived by the 
success of 1812 Russia has not noticed the necessity 
of abandoning ancient errors as did other armies in 
the way shown by Napoleon. The tactics of the last 
century served well in the wars against the 
Caucasians, Turks, Turkmens — valorous enemies 
without doubt, but inferior from the tactical point of 
view.167 ... Tactics consisted only of shooting, with 
the expectation that in the end the Russians, being 
more numerous, would remain alone in Manchuria".168  
For the disorder of the Russian organization Kuropatkin was 
blamed: 
"He dismembered all great organic units in order to 
create detachments for all of his friends ... (There 
was a) continuous changing of resolutions and 
dispositions, which led to the disorganization of all 
branches of the service ..."'69 
The Russian army not only disappeared from the German 
border to the Far East. It got disorganized, it was bled white, it 
lost its material, it suffered defeat, and lost all military value in 
the end. 
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The voyage of the Baltic fleet brought nearer also the danger 
of an Anglo-Russian conflict. The British navy followed closely 
the heroes of the North Sea incident, and the Russians took 
military precautionary measures in the Transcaspian district.i70 
By French mediation the North Sea incident was smoothed 
over so as not to give the German emperor the chance of 
realizing his dream of a Russo-German alliance and forcing 
France to accept German hegemony. The Emperor William 
eagerly supported the voyage: Hapag steamers carried —
English! — coal for the Tsar's warships. And France had to 
allow them to utilize her ports or anchorages in the colonies — 
in spite of Japanese protests — in order to save the Dual 
Alliance in the face of competition from the Kaiser's gestures of 
friendship.171 
As mentioned earlier, the Entente Cordiale eliminated the 
danger of a Franco-English conflict. But France's relations 
with Japan were rather tense. And her friendship with both 
Russia and England, who had been enemies for a long time, left 
her in a "delicate" situation vis-a-vis Russia. In Russia there 
were 
"certain chauvinistic elements who might turn 
inaccessible to all sensible arguments and very 
accessible to insinuations aiming at the dissolving of 
the Franco-Russian alliance".'T 
Soon it was reported that the Russian civilians were repeating 
that 
"this is said to be a war with the objective of 
reaching an outlet for Russia to a sea free from ice, 
but in reality it is only a war for the profit of Grand 
Dukes and persons in high places, while the costs it 
causes are burdening the people, who are already 
poor enough without them".'" 
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The military tried to put on a brave face. Saharov was "not 
at all disturbed" by the North Sea incident1~4 and when Port 
Arthur fell, he said that it had stood longer than expected.15 
Like all other "serious" men in high places, he did not, after 
Mukden, admit any other solution but continuing the war — on 
the condition of Kuropatkin's dismissal176 — in spite of the fact 
that the internal situation in Russia threatened the conduct of 
the war.177 Kuropatkin was dismissed,1i8 but only beaten scraps 
of the army were left for his successor Linevi6.179 The Battle of 
Tsushima was "a day of heroism in respect of which the army, 
the navy, and the entire nation expected an explanation with a 
profound dolour".180 The explanation was, of course, the 
inability of the rusty Russian system to organize a modern war, 
an explanation which the nation in its revolutionary movement 
seemed to assume. But still the general staff persisted. The 
ninth, twelfth, nineteenth and twenty-first army corps were 
mobilized in order to be transported to the east.181 In spite of 
Roosevelt's offer of mediation and Nicholas's acceptance of it, 
Saharov persisted in his opinion that the war was to be 
continued.182 In fact, Linevic's army grew numerically very 
strong, but still unable to attack. The Japanese were also 
exhausted by their succesful operations, and thus no great 
battle ensued.183 
Moulin concluded his war-time reports by saying that the 
Russian soldier did not deserve any reproach, although the men 
174 
"Conversation avec le general Sakharoff". Moulin 5.XI 1904. EMATSH 7 N 
1476 
175 
"Impression produite dans les spheres militaires par la chute de Porth 
Arthur". Moulin 10.I 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
176 "Situation general de la guerre". Moulin 28.I 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
i7' "Courant d'opinion en faveur de la paix". Moulin 25.II 1905. EMATSH 7 N 
1477 
178 
"Sur le remplacement du General Kouropatkine". Moulin 20.III 1905. 
EMATSH 7 N 1477 
179 
"Au sujet des pertes de 1'armee de Mandchourie". Moulin 20.III 1905. 
EMATSH 7 N 1477 
"Situation general de 1'armee de Mandchourie". Moulin 4.IV 1905. 
EMATSH 7 N 1477 
180 "Opinion de l'etat-major russe sur la bataille de Tsou-shima". Moulin 2.VI 
1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
181 "Sitation de Guerre". Moulin 10.VII 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
182 "Au sujet des bruits de paix et de la continuation de la guerre". Moulin 
15.VI 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
183 
"Situation de Guerre". Moulin 1.VII 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
94 
on active service were incomparably better than the reservists, 
and the militia battalions were very feebly trained. The 
reserve officers had not been good leaders because of their 
lack of instruction. The professional officers had been 
distinguished by their self-denial, bravery, and devotion, but 
also by their lack of initiative, comprehension of the situation, 
and decision. The general backwardness of Russia had 
naturally been reflected in both the soldiers and the officers. 
The worst mistake in the conduct of operations had been the 
improvisation of the various detachments, which had ruptured 
the established organization. 
A remarkable fact about the war was the enormous 
consumption of ammunition. For instance, 138 regiments had 
consumed 1 920 730 cartridges in a battle of five days (30.IX-
4.X 1904). But the conclusion of a study of artillery, cavalry, 
and infantry action during the war showed that there had 
emerged nothing to shake the established bases of conducting 
battle. As always, rifle and cannon fire were there only for the 
purpose of sweeping the road free for the bayonet, which 
completed the bloody work.184 — This conclusion was shaken 
only by several years of slaughter in the great war in 1914-
1917. "The enormous consumption of ammunition" was also to 
cause a fresh surprise in the autumn of 1914. With the wisdom 
of hindsight it is easy to be ironical about this military 
conservatism, but the burden of tradition was not easy to 
abandon. Nor was it easy to reinvigorate the Russian system. 
4.4. Changes in Russian Government 
and Politics 
The Peace of Portsmouth was an unexpected success for Russia 
because Japan's victories had exhausted her, too. Russia lost 
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her conquests and Sakhalin, i.e. all dreams of a dominating 
position in the Pacific region. But she did not lose any of her 
own territory, the Manchurian railway remained under Russian 
control, and an indemnity to Japan was masked as a payment 
for the upkeep of Russian prisoners of war in Japan. 
Consequently, the imperialist party in Japan was not satisfied, 
and for a few years Russo-Japanese relations remained tense. 
Internal troubles, disorders, strikes, mutinies and jacqueries 
compelled the Tsar to renounce his autocracy in October 1905. 
The Duma, a legislative organ, was established in 1906. Too 
many unruly democrats were brought in by the first 
experiments, and a new electoral law which favoured the well-
to-do classes was promulgated in 1907. 
Witte had negotiated the tolerable peace at Portsmouth. Then 
he was appointed prime minister and led the suppression of the 
Moscow rebellion in December 1905 and started negotiations 
on a French loan to reconstruct Russia's finances. He was too 
much of a success for Nicholas II and was dismissed in the 
spring of 1906. For a moment it seemed possible that 
democratic elements might be recruited in the government, but 
in the end "bonapartism" was accepted as a better alternative: 
Stolypin's programme was the suppression of popular 
movements but also reforms in agriculture, industrial relations, 
and in the administration. A restricted parliamentarism was 
combined with the Tsar's autocracy. A patriotic policy 
guaranteed Stolypin the support of the Russian nationalists, as 
well as the opposition of the left and the hatred of the national 
minorities. Foreign policy, directed by Izvol'skii, aimed at 
external peace to ensure internal reforms. 
The high command of the armed forces was reorganized, too. 
The army was administered by the war ministry, led by 
General Roediger. But the general staff under General Palicyn 
was made independent, on the German model. A naval general 
staff was established, but much was left to be reformed later in 
the naval administration. A Committee of Imperial Defence 
was created under the presidency of Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaevic to unite the various military and naval offices. From 
that ensued the advantage that the Grand Duke, designated 
wartime commander-in-chief, grew acquainted with the 
planning and preparation for the war that he was expected to 
lead. But it seems that the system did not work well; the 
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services were not succesfully integrated. In 1909 the military 
command was again centred in the war ministry under 
Suhomlinov, the new minister. Nikolai Nikolaevie served 
further as a commander of the Guards and of the St. 
Petersburg military district, always as the designated 
commander-in-chief. Nicholas II nursed a secret wish of taking 
the command himself. He was persuaded to give up this dream 
in 1914, but in 1915 he dismissed his uncle and took command, 
with no propitious consequences for the dynasty or empire. 
In the summer of 1905 Germany tried to take advantage of 
Russia's weakness and break up the recent entente of France 
and England. The Kaiser visited Tangier and thereby 
demonstrated Germany's interest in Morocco. Delcasse would 
have opposed the German demands, trusting to British 
support, but the French government was scared of Germany 
and let Delcasse fall. An international conference was set up to 
disentangle the Moroccan question. 
The Kaiser used France's compliance as a proof that the time 
for concluding the continental coalition against England had 
come. Nicholas was irritated because of England's renewed 
relations with Japan and signed. But the Russian statesmen, 
Witte and Lamsdorf, explained that an alliance with Germany 
could not be reconciled with the Dual Alliance without 
France's previous concert. 
And France did not consent. Against German expectation, 
England firmly supported the French monopoly in Morocco. 
Russia, too, had to support her ally at the conference because 
she needed a giant loan to revive her finances after war and 
revolution, and only France was able to furnish the money. The 
Dual Alliance thus survived this crisis. 
In order to avoid further complications on the Asian 
confines, Russia renounced her dreams of conquest and made 
an entente with England in 1907. She gave up Tibet, left 
Afghanistan in England's sphere of interest, and consented to 
carving up Persia into zones of interest. England gave 
unwritten, uncertain promises of support in the Straits 
question. 
At the same time the rivalry with Japan was buried. And in 
1910 a hesitating first step towards a renewed imperialism in 
the Far East was taken when a Russo-Japanese agreement was 
made, which left Korea in Japan's and Mongolia in Russia's 
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sphere of interest. 
In 1907 Izvol'skii tried to soothe German susceptibilities with 
a proposal for closing the Baltic Sea against English influence.ln 
By the end of 1907 Izvol'skii had disentangled Russia from 
the mess that her Asian aspirations had led her into. The 
external peace necessary for the internal reforms seemed to be 
assured. 
4.5. Powerless Russia 
Defeat and revolution made Russia militarily powerless. When 
the Moroccan crisis was at its worst, the new Russian chief of 
general staff Palicyn declared that three years would be needed 
from the end of the war to rebuild Russia's military might in 
the west. She was not in a position to furnish any appreciable 
support in the event of a war between Germany and France. 
"Our magazines in Poland are empty, we have no 
projectiles for our cannons. If we have a conflict 
with Germany, there is nothing else to do but to 
kneel down and beg for mercy".'86 
The end of the Far Eastern war did not make things much 
easier for Russia: 
"She has to face a new military situation in the Far 
East. Her troops have to be reorganized in Asia, in 
Turkestan, in western and eastern Siberia, in order 
to be able to withstand the renewed Anglo-Japanese 
alliance . 	 Palicyn will not renounce adventurism 
in Asia nor does he concentrate on reconstituting 
the military position on the European frontier, 
where complications may appear at any moment. 
185 Pertti Luntinen, The Baltic Question 1903-1908, Suomalaisen Tiede-
akatemian toimituksia B 195, Helsinki 1975, deals with Russo-German 
relations during this time. 
186 "Situation de l'armee russe dans l'hypothese d'un conflit avec l'Allemagne". 
Moulin 27.VI 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
98 
The Council of Imperial Defence, realising the Emperor 
William's dreams, is hypnotized by Asia and seeks for a 
combination that would enable Russia to face the 
Japanese in eastern Siberia and the English on the 
borders of Afghanistan and India". 
Palicyn said to Moulin: 
"Our situation in Asia is very bad ... The Anglo-
Japanese treaty cannot leave us cold ... this treaty 
is an infamy". 
And, what was worse, Palicyn was taken in by the German 
emperor's plan of a continental coalition against the island 
naval powers: 
"William II is a man who sees the problem from a 
high and broad point of view ..." 
Moulin said that the subject was a bit frightening one for a 
mere military attaché to get involved with, but he had let 
Palicyn talk in order to learn whether Germany had proposed 
something to the Russian general staff. "Palicyn is such a wily 
Jesuit father ..."187 
The continental coalition was of course no chimaera; there 
were plenty of grounds for such a combination. The alliances of 
the First World War were in no way preordained, but were the 
result of a long series of events. The French had good reason to 
be worried about the support for a German orientation in 
conservative and military circles in Russia, where there was 
much opposition to Izvol'skii's new course. Nor was the 
Moroccan crisis the last instance when such currents seemed to 
determine the direction of Russian policy. 
A flicker of hope of a military rebirth could be seen by 
December 1905 when the Tsar had promised constitutional 
reform and the Moscow rebellion had been put down. Russian 
securities rose on the Paris market after the news of "the 
excellent conduct" of the Guards regiment in Moscow.'88 But 
this was only a flicker. Repatriating the troops from Manchuria 
took a long time. The militia battalions of the Moscow, St. 
187 Moulin to war minister 25.X 1905. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 37. DDF VIII/2 
n:o 81 
188 "Sur le loyalisme de l'armee". Moulin 27.X 1905. EMATSH 7 N 1477 
99 
Petersburg, and Kiev districts were the first to be sent home, as 
well as the Cossacks. These were needed for reasons of internal 
security. No thought was given to the western border. In 
addition, the rebellion of the Manchurian army delayed its 
repatriation and military reorganization. 
"At the moment, a detachment commanded by 
General Meller-Zakomelskii, starting from Omsk, 
has succeeded in re-establishing order on the railway 
up to Krasnojarsk and is continuing towards 
Irkutsk. Another detachment, under General 
Rennenkampf is moving in the opposite direction, 
towards Irkutsk, occupying station after station." 
Thus, at least a year was to elapse before the repatriation could 
be completed. And even then about 300 000 men were to be left 
in Siberia on a war footing.189 By the end of the year 1906 the 
number of troops stationed in Siberia was reported to be 
200 000."° 
The instruction and training of troops suffered considerably 
from policing services they had to perform. Keeping order 
absorbed a great number of detachments every day during the 
revolutionary years from 1905-1907.191 
Moulin estimated that the great mass of the Russian army 
was untouched by the mutinies and remained loyal, prepared 
to defend the established order; it would triumph over the 
forces of anarchy. In the event, for instance, of a conflict 
between the government and the Duma, the technical 
regiments might turn out to be unreliable. The engineers, the 
machine gun corps, the artillery, and the automobile companies 
had comparatively many factory workers in their ranks and 
their officers were more leftist than the mass of infantry and 
cavalry officers.192  
In fact the conflict with the Duma did not lead to civil war, 
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but there were many painful incidents. For instance, some 
detachments of the Preobrazenskii Guard refused to obey 
order: "no tradition was able to prevail against the spirit of 
indiscipline" although the emperor himself was the colonel of 
the regiment. 
The generals also blamed the influence of the grand dukes 
who had commanded the regiment and had spoiled it.19' These 
grand dukes, highly ignorant both politically and militarily, 
poorly endowed with intellect and character, constituted one of 
the most nefarious elements in the Russian army: 
"generally a disastrous race, always parasites, 
sometimes harmful parasites ... Grand Admiral 
Aleksei Aleksandrovic has wasted the navy; under 
Nikolai Nikolaevic the Elder (commander-in-chief 
1877-1878) theft achieved inordinate proportions 
and fabulous sums; Nikolai Nikolaevic the Younger 
(commander-in-chief designate) is surrounded by a 
coterie of occultists, which has a harmful effect on 
his nervous system".'94 
And Nicholas II loved to listen to bad advice, e.g. when the 
grand dukes incited him to dissolve the first Duma.19' (Of 
course, this kind of thinking appealed to an observer from 
Western Europe; from the government's point of view, there 
was no other alternative short of surrendering the power to the 
rebellious Duma). 
The critical views expressed to Moulin about the grand dukes 
were those of General Dragomirov. But it seems that the 
younger officers judged the generals in their turn equally 
severely. Natural or acquired protection and seniority was the 
basis of a succesful career in the army. Able, independent 
commanders capable of taking the initiative were deemed 
turbulent and vain, while careerists without principles but with 
a calculating self-interest and a flair for flattery were promoted 
generals because they were deemed "intelligent and tactful 
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men". There were three roads for advancement: the Guards, 
the general staff, and the court. Thus the commanders were 
schooled in modish restaurants, in the offices of the St. 
Petersburg military district, and in the anterooms of the 
Palace.'96 In 1909 Roediger criticized severely the mediocrity of 
the generals, and the ensuing reaction was all-too typical: he 
was accused of insulting the army and patriotic feelings,197 and 
he was relieved from his appointment. When, in the same year 
1909, an inquiry into corruption was ordered, "a great sorrow 
reigns in naval circles, where the number of uncorrupted 
persons is not great".198 
The officer corps was reported to be discouraged as a result 
of the defeat in the Manchurian War, but especially also 
because of a disturbed feeling about whether the incorrigibles 
and the sovereign had really learned their lesson. They were 
seen to be encrusted and imbued with prejudice. The ordinary 
people, too, were felt to be lacking in patriotism, or their 
patriotism at its best was to be considered only xenophobism. 
There were chauvinists among the officers and civil servants, 
but most people served the state only for gain for the occasions 
it provided for peculation. The best way of advancement was 
submissiveness, base flattery, and complicity. The emperor, 
who incarnated the Russian fatherland, was seen only as a 
machine for signing the lists of rewards.'99 
But as a reaction to these circumstances many officers 
started on an energetic course of self-improvement — although 
it was frowned on by the higher circles — and professional 
journals were written and read, and military questions were 
discussed by these groups.200 Although the fundamental ills of 
the Tsarist system could not be healed by a few studious 
officers, remarkable progress in the Russian army began to be 
made before the great war. Among the ordinary ranks 
revolutionary disconted abated: 
"The army corps commanders agree that the new 
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class of recruits is animated by a better spirit and is 
more docile than the previous one" 
Moulin was already reporting by the end of 1906.201  
But innumerable problems of reconstruction and mutual 
relations were to be solved before the Dual Alliance was able to 
play its intended role again. 
4.6. National Minority Problems in the 
Military Reconstruction 
The western border regions caused additional military worry 
for Russia and the Dual Alliance from 1905 onwards. During 
the revolutionary disorders and constitutional hopes of the 
autumn of 1905 there was turbulence also in Poland, and some 
talk of Polish autonomy. There was also some agitation in 
Galicia and Posen. The French military attaché was somewhat 
worried lest Germany, Austria, and Russia were to subdue an 
eventual Polish rebellion together. This complicity might give 
an additional impetus towards better relations between the 
three empires. On the other hand, if Russia was to give 
autonomy to Poland, there was the danger of a violent German 
reaction and even a risk of France getting involved in a war 
against Germany in alliance with the powerless Russia. 
Even if a war was avoided, an autonomous Poland would 
cause military problems. It was problematic whether an 
autonomous Poland would allow the conscripting the Polish 
contingent into the Russian army, whether she would consent 
to building and using the strategic railways, and whether she 
would bear the military-financial burdens hitherto imposed, 
and whether she would consent to requisitions. Russian troops 
in Poland would be even more strangers there than ever before. 
There was also the danger of such dreams of autonomy 
extending to Lithuania and the Ukraine. 
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Palicyn reassured Moulin that there was no danger. The 
general staff believed firmly that Poland would not be 
promised anything. All Polish aspirations would be 
energetically rebuffed by the Duma. Russia was one and 
indivisible.202 Palicyn also assured Moulin that the Polish 
reservists, who were to be drafted to make up the Russian 
detachments in Poland in the event of a mobilization, were 
completely dependable. Their morale would be excellent if they 
had to fight the Germans, because they had ancient quarrels 
with Prussia. They understood that Poland was prospering 
because of the Russian customs barrier against Germany. 
"The government counts absolutely on the loyalty of 
the Poles in case of a war against Germany."203 
Later on we shall see that the more recent grievances with 
Russia could not be totally ignored. 
There existed also a confused situation in the Baltic 
provinces. There were grave disorders there. With 
"a special logic the Estonian rebellious sailors had 
been transferred to disciplinary battalions which 
were sent against the insurgents in the Baltic 
provinces."'" 
From the French point of view it was extremely desirable to 
have these provinces pacified. They had for a long time been 
the object of Pan-Germanic dreams. The local Germans 
admired the Reich, they had the portrait of William hanging 
side by side with Nicholas II's picture. The discord of the local 
peasantry with the Germans eased the task of the Russian 
administration, but caused difficulties, too. Satisfying the 
poorer population implied upsetting the friends of Germany; on 
the other hand preserving the rights of the Germans meant 
leaving the population to the tender mercy of their landlords. 
This would lead to new disturbances and then to renewed 
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intrigues from the Pan-Germans. In either situation, the door 
was open for the intrigues of William II. 
Russia was left without a fleet. An insurrection in the coastal 
provinces would prevent the transport of troops for defending 
the coasts. Local autonomy would equally paralyse the 
communications and favour the enemy. Thus there existed the 
danger of a German landing and occupation of Russian 
territory, which was a grave threat to the capital and the 
communications of the army. And Russia had no means of 
forestalling the enemy.2°5 
The opposition provoked by Bobrikov's policy had arisen in 
Finland simultaneously with the Russian revolution in the 
autumn of 1905. It had taken the form of a general strike, 
which paralyzed the communications of the Russian rifle 
battalions in the Grand Duchy. To avoid an anti-Russian 
rebellion and a social revolution Prince Obolenskii, the 
governor-general, had promised the restoration of Finnish 
autonomy and an extremely democratic national representation 
(a parliament of one chamber, universal suffrage regardless of 
sex). The new Finnish Senate (government) tried to restore also 
the separate Finnish army instead of the temporary military 
tax. But naturally — in the light of what has been said above 
of Poland and the Baltic provinces — the rebellious Finns were 
not given their army. Instead, they were forced to continue 
paying the military tax, which would increase annually to 
twenty million marks by 1920. Finnish protests in this as in 
other constitutional disputes caused St. Petersburg to Russify 
the Finnish Senate and the higher administration. The lower 
administration could not be Russified because the Russian 
officials were not able to speak Finnish and the Finns would 
not learn Russian. The military authorities and the government 
were afraid of an eventual Finnish armed opposition, which 
had been thought of but was not realized. The Russian 
gendarmes cooked up stories of a gigantic secret organization, 
smuggling of weapons, and plans for a rebellious war. A third 
rifle brigade was established in Finland in 1908 to prop up the 
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Russian occupation, and plans for a military intervention were 
prepared.206 
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5. A Slow and Devious 
Reconstruction 
5.1. Cold Comfort for France 
At the beginning of 1906 Palicyn took up the question of 
continuing the annual discussions of the French and Russian 
chiefs of staff. 
Palicyn explained that he did not believe in any aggressive 
German plans against France; she only wanted to approach her 
and to detach her from England. An entente with England 
would only make France a tool of British policy, which could 
arouse no sympathy in Russia. 
And after her experience in the Japanese war, Russia was not 
able to understand why France was staking her honour on a 
mere colonial question (Morocco was to be discussed at 
Algeciras). Palicyn explained that it was not in the power of 
any Russian government to impose any kind of war on the 
Russian people. They were absolutely disgusted by such things.207 
Palicyn's intention is clear. He did not like France's entente 
with Russia's old enemy, and he was warning her that no 
Russian support might be expected if the Moroccan crisis 
resulted in war. Instead, he recommended the formation of a 
continental coalition. In fact, the army was one of the principal 
207 Moulin to war minister 27.I. 1906. EMATSH 7 N 1477. AMAE, C.P. Russie 
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107 
obstacles on Izvolskii's road to the entente of 1907 with 
England and Japan. 
Nevertheless, Palicyn wanted to continue the discussions 
with his French colleague and to clear up the problem of 
wartime communication between them. Moulin remarked that 
for France the principal question was that Russia would engage 
as many Germans as possible. "This point had not struck 
Palicyn much — there is plenty to be taught to him" was 
Moulin's comment. 
Moulin admitted that it was clear that Russia would not be 
able to give the help she had promised to give. But he 
recommended engaging in discussion, because it was important 
not to do anything which might de jure shake the Russian 
engagement. And it was important also to help Russia to 
reconstruct her army as fast as possible, so that she should not 
be able to hide behind a non possumus in case her help were 
needed. 
The military attaché calculated that Russia would need at 
least three years to organize her mobilization, troop 
concentration plans, artillery, and fortifications. If all went 
well, something might be hoped for by the spring of 1909. In 
the current year, 1906, Russia was not able to wage war even 
against Austria alone. Such a war would be possible only if 
Germany were engaged elsewhere and internal disorder 
paralysed Austria (and the Pan-Slavists had promised such a 
disorder in two to four months where necessary!) In 1907-
1908 Russia might be able to oppose Austria; or if Austria 
should be paralysed, Russia could engage some German troops, 
but she would not be able to carry the offensive into German 
territory. By this time there were five army corps with 200 000 
men still in Manchuria. Ten army corps were in position in the 
Vilna, Warsaw, and Kiev district, with an estimated theoretical 
strength of half a million men if mobilized,208 but, as Palicyn 
had remarked, lacking armaments, organization, materiel, and 
208 By this time the Russian mobilized strength was estimated to amount to 
160 000 men in the Vilna military district, i.e. II, III, and XX corps 
245 000 	 Warsaw 	 V, VI, XIV XV corps 
140 000 	 Kiev 	 XI, XII, XXI corps 
200 000 returning from Manchuria, IV, IX, X, XVI, XIX 
Moscow, Odessa, Kazan omitted as well as the Asian military districts. 
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fortifications. 
Palicyn calculated that the critical period for the Russian 
army was going to last at least three and a half years. Her 
armaments had to be modernized, but in addition the officers, 
especially the high command, had to be rejuvenated and the 
morale of the army had to be raised. 
Palicyn declared that he welcomed the chance of a discussion 
with his French colleague. But, unlike his predecessor, he was 
not going to promise something that he was not able to keep. 
— Thus the promises of Saharov were annulled. 
Palicyn was starting work on the mobilization plan, which 
was going to take one year. But already it was evident that the 
mobilization was going to last from one to four weeks longer 
than estimated previously. 
"It was a pity that he had to confess the mistakes of 
his predecessors".209 
After these unpromising preliminaries Palicyn saw his French 
colleague in April 1906. First of all they agreed that in case of 
a war the Germans would probably concentrate their principal 
effort against France, but the inverse hypothesis could not be 
totally excluded. In any case the French were going to attack 
immediately. Palicyn promised never to lose sight of the fact 
that the defeat of the German army was the principal strategic 
aim, in regard to which he would concentrate all available 
resources. But he could not fix the time or the zone of the 
Russian concentration or the consequent action, which would 
also partly be influenced by the action of the adversary. 
The Russian chief of staff was happy to be able to say that 
the army had suffered less than expected in the Manchurian 
war. At present it could be mobilized, although with a 
considerable delay. By the end of July all troops would be 
repatriated, and in a year all cadres would be reconstructed, 
their mobilization reorganized and their training started. The 
detachments would be able to fight as solid combat units, 
although they would not yet possess all the accessories that 
were necessary to make them what the Germans called 
operationsfähig. 
209 Moulin to war minister 21.II 1906. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 38 
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The chiefs of staff also reviewed the article concerning an 
eventual German attempt to conquer the German provinces of 
Austria in case of the Hapsburg empire dissolved; but they 
stated there was nothing to add to it. Apparently they were not 
worried about Francis Joseph's health any more. 
But discord arose when Palicyn asked whether he could 
count on France executing the measures agreed on in the 
previous meetings in the event of a war against England. He 
"attached a great importance to a positive answer to this 
question" — which was natural because of the anti-British 
feeling then rife in Russia. Of course he did not receive a 
positive answer, since the Franco-English entente was a fact. 
Palicyn was answered that the measures referred to could be 
executed only if ratified in a convention between the two 
governments, and no such convention had come to the 
knowledge of the French general staff.'10  
Russia's Asian problems were not touched on during this 
discussion, but in the autumn Palicyn told Moulin that many 
Russian officers thought that a new war with Japan was to be 
expected in three or four years. Japan might be supported by 
China, whose progress Russia observed with a great anxiety. 
Thus a great amount of money, men, and materials had to be 
concentrated in the Far East, which was possible if a policy of 
appeasement was pursued towards Germany. It was true that 
even more probable was a Japanese attack on French 
Indochina, which would be a more profitable conquest than the 
Russian possessions in the Far East. 
"The danger would be exceptionally great if Japan 
was given the giant loan she applying for".'11 
Moulin explained that Palicyn was probably only warning 
France against granting the loan Japan was applying for. 
It is well known that France and England withheld their 
money until Japan had consented to the 1907 entente. Thus the 
Japanese danger disappeared. 
21° "Proces-verbal de l'entretien du 3/21 avril 1906 entre les chefs d' etat-maj-
ors gen6raux des armees russe et francaise AMAE. C.P. Russie N.S. 38. 
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Moulin also prepared for the next meeting of the chiefs of 
staff. He asked Palicyn whether it might this time be possible 
to insist on a point in the convention that had not been cleared 
up in the previous meeting, i.e. fixing the approximate moment 
when Russia would be able to send her contingent into action 
with the effectives and mode of action that were envisaged in 
the protocols of 1901-1902-1903. Palicyn, "usually very 
shifty", this time very decidedly refused to promise any 
offensive against Germany in the beginning of the war. 
Palicyn explained that the Russian army had neither the 
staying-power nor the tactical training indispensable for an 
offensive. The necessary technical and material equipment also 
exceeded her financial capacity. And an attack against 
Germany presupposed an incontestable superiority on the 
Austrian front, which did not exist. Strong detachments had to 
be kept in Caucasia in case of an eventual insurrection; 
Romania had to be watched by a considerable force; and in 
Finland there was the danger of a popular rising which 
Sweden was actually fomenting. An attack with limited forces 
from Poland to East Prussia would be useless in the absence of 
support by the Baltic fleet, which did not exist any more. 
The Russo-French convention aimed at splitting the German 
army in the beginning of the war. Palicyn said that this aim 
could be attained also by a Russian threat against the Austrian 
frontier. Germany would not leave her ally in the lurch; she 
would be compelled to leave four army corps in the east. 
Of course, Moulin could no be comforted. He commented that 
in his soul of souls Palicyn would dearly love to see even these 
four corps depart to the west to fight against France. 
Nor was Palicyn quite sure about French intentions. Wasn't 
her offensive power lessened in consequence of the two-year 
service? (After the Radicals had come to power in the 
aftermath of the Dreyfus affair, they nearly destroyed the 
morale, discipline, training, and armaments of the French 
army, which they suspected of anti-republican feelings. The 
shortened two-year service was part of this policy, which 
aimed at substituting a militia for the professional army).'"  
Douglas Porch. The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871-1914. 
Cambridge University Press 1981 
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And why should the French attack at the very beginning? 
Couldn't they wait for the German attack behind their 
fortifications? Would they really attack if the Germans should 
turn to the east — hadn't they promised only to prepare for an 
immediate attack?213 
This discussion, even if "frank and free" cannot have been 
very friendly. Palicyn did not promise anything, and Austria 
again became Russia's principal enemy. 
Next summer, 1907, the meeting of Palicyn with the French 
General Ladebatt went a little better. They agreed that united 
action was a guarantee of success. Some preparations against 
Germany had already been undertaken by the Russian army. A 
few batteries which were to act on the German frontier were 
already equipped with new guns, and others were being 
similarly armed. Ammunition and other materiel was being 
supplied. A plan to increase the effectiveness of railways had 
been submitted to the Council of Ministers. The realization of 
the plan would speed up the mobilization many days. 
But there remained a time-gap between the moment the 
French and German armies were mobilized and concentrated, 
and the day the Russian contingent would be ready to march 
with sufficient force to permit of really useful results. Palicyn 
proposed that the French general staff should take this fact 
into consideration in planning for the decisive engagement 
with the enemy. He repeated his doubt as to whether it was 
really necessary to attack at once. Ladebatt only answered that 
the difference would cause difficulties for France and that he 
hoped that Russia's concentration could be speeded up.214 
(Douglas Porch is of the opinion that the French attitude of 
reckless attack was an escape forward, born out of a feeling of 
inferiority to the enemy. The German superiority in numbers, 
materiel, organization, and tactics could not be answered with 
anything else but the revolutionary élan of -92.)215 
Palicyn also explained that it was of the utmost importance 
213 Moulin to war minister 9.VII 1907. AMAE, C.P. Russie, N.S. 38. DDF XI/2 
n:o 68 
214 "Proces-verbal de l'entretien du 31/18 juillet 1907 entre les chefs d'etat-
major generaux des armees Russe et Francaise". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 
38. DDF XI12 n:o 116 
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to know the direction of the main German attack — to the west 
or the east — before deciding on the Russian troop concentra-
tions. Russia had to receive the information at the latest by the 
end of the first week. The Italian attitude was of importance, 
too. If Austria were not able to trust Italy, her threat against 
Russia would be essentially weakened, and consequently Russia 
would be able to act with more spirit against Germany. Thus 
also the problem of wartime communication between France 
and Russia was of first importance.216 
Next year, 1908, Palicyn explained to Moulin that he was 
preparing a new plan of concentration. There was to be real 
progress from the plan of 1901. The troops would be better 
divided into groups, their detrainment was to be faster, the 
Polish fortresses were to be better manned, their weapons more 
numerous, and the left bank of the Vistula was not to be 
stripped of troops as before.217 
Palicyn stated that on the fifteenth day eleven or twelve 
corps would be concentrated on the frontier, and all troops 
would be detrained on the twenty-fifth day. But still it was 
"difficult" for him to say when the troops would be 
operationsfähig: it depended on what operations were aimed 
at. An attack from the Niemen towards East Prussia could be 
launched rather soon, but there was the fortified lake district 
in front of it, and therefore no speedy result could be expected 
from this attack. An attack from the Narew to Allenstein was 
as little promising as the previous one. The only direction 
where the Germans could be seriously disturbed was from 
Warsaw in the direction of Berlin. But the Russians could not 
emerge from their bridgeheads on the Vistula before inflicting a 
serious check on the Austrian army, which was concentrated to 
attack the communications of the Russian army on the left 
bank of the Vistula. Yet it was difficult to come to grips with 
the Austrians. Because the enemy was able to concentrate 
earlier, the Russians had to be concentrated far from the 
frontier in order to be safe. If she could maintain a sufficient 
superiority over the Austrians, Russia might be content to 
216 "Proces-verbal ..."= 214 
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watch them without attacking. But this was possible only if 
Italy should engage a substantial part of Austria's forces. This 
eventuality was not certain at all. 
The Russian general staff hoped that on the tenth day they 
would have definite information of the German division of 
forces between the eastern and the western frontier. After that 
it would be possible to direct the Russian army corps to their 
areas of concentration. It was possible to start an attack 
against six to seven German corps on the fifteenth day, but its 
direction and the objective of the attack could be decided only 
after having received definite information on the German 
plans. 
Thus, even if his tone was more hopeful and forthcoming, 
Palicyn heaped up reasons for why he was not able to promise 
the early attack that the French saw as their only hope of 
success in the expected battle. To keep the discussion friendly 
Palicyn proposed that the French general staff should imagine 
they were in his position and make a plan for Russian action. 
"He would study it with great interest and present the 
objections which the French general staff had not been able to 
foresee". He had a plan for the French, too. He would let the 
Germans run into the French frontier fortresses, after which 
the French army could start its operations from its bases 
behind the fortress line. Such plans were only of academic 
interest, but they would elucidate the problems involved, 
instead of staying simply with a non possumus.218 
Palicyn next met his French colleague in September 1908. 
After Moulin's previous discussion with the Russian general 
there was not much to be said. Nevertheless the protocol drawn 
up during this meeting was an attempt to pressurize and came 
close to being an accusation against the Russians. The grave 
question of the Russian attack could not be resolved, because 
the general staffs lacked means of communication. "The French 
general staff was unable to understand" that a question that 
had been studied for so long had not been advanced in Russia. 
The French also mentioned the completing of the Bologoe-
Sedlec line in an equally demanding tone. (The line had been 
opened in 1906, but nearly half of it remained without a second 
218 = 217 
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track). They now emphatically demanded that the Russian 
government should speed up as much as possible the work on 
it.219 
From all this it is easy to conclude that Russia's weakness 
and France's position as a creditor made possible France's 
imperious behaviour and that Russia was sinking from the 
status of an ally towards semicolonial dependence.22° 
Of course, it is true that Russia needed France's financial 
and material help. But on the other hand, we have noted 
France's desperate need for Russia's military support. Too 
much must not be concluded from this protocol, either. Palicyn 
had asked for the French pressure against his own government. 
He had said to Moulin that a French demand for wireless 
telegraphy between the general staffs would help him to 
overcome the objections made by the Board of Engineers. 
"Their reasons are various, mainly all kinds of corruption", he 
confided to Moulin. He asked for a similar manifestation of 
pressure to help him to obtain appropriations for the Sedlec-
Bologoe railway. Such pressure had to be exerted against the 
Ministry of Finance, which was very reluctant to part with the 
money.221  
Palicyn's request is, after all, not very much surprising, if the 
idiosyncrasies of the imperial government are kept in mind. It 
was a symptom of the lack of cohesion in the Russian state that 
foreign military colleagues were trusted more than the 
compatriot civilian colleagues. 
A couple of years earlier Palicyn had asked the reluctant 
French for support against the English. By now Russia herself 
had concluded an entente with England. Izvol'skii wanted to 
free the military convention from its previous anti-English 
content. He asked the chiefs of staff to study the problems of an 
eventual German mobilization against England. The generals 
stated that a German mobilization, even a partial mobilization 
against a third power, was a serious danger to France and 
Russia. Consequently, the convention was to be applied "with 
2'9 "Proces-verbal de l'entretien de 24/11 septembre 1908 entre les chefs d'état-
major generaux des armees nisse et fransaise". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 39. 
DDF XI/2 n:o 455 
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all vigour", i.e. the Dual Alliance would also mobilize. And 
mobilization implied starting a war. This could be avoided only 
if Germany gave sufficient guarantees of her intentions.222 
In addition to the western frontier the Turkish danger, too, 
was kept in mind. Moulin had received the following 
information from Tiflis: the military there counted that they 
would have 250 000 Turks concentrated against them on the 
Caucasian frontier. As far as the Black Sea theatre was 
concerned, it was assumed that a military convention existed 
between Russia and Bulgaria. "A number of corps" (probably 
the seventh and eighth) were to be shipped from Odessa and 
Sevastopol to Varna. Moulin said that Palicyn had made an 
allusion to this combination. But he did not seem to have any 
faith in the alternative operation, the descent on the coast of 
the Bosphorus, "which I have always held to be rather 
chimaeric", although the general staff had been making plans 
for it for many years.223 
The peacetime garrison areas of the various army corps can be 
seen on the attached map (map 20). The next sketch was drawn 
by the military attaché according to the information he had 
received of the planned mobilization and troop concentration 
(map 21). It tallies rather well with Zaionckovskii's map (map 
22), except that the vanguard and reserve of the Warsaw and 
Vilna armies were not separated by Moulin. Of course, the 
Moscow army was not to remain in Moscow where Moulin has 
positioned it, corresponding to the situation on the eighteenth 
day. 
5.2. Russia Retreats from the West 
By 1903 the Russians had realized that if they were to 
transport an important part of their army to the Far East, 
222 "Proc2s-verbal ..." = 219 
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there would be insufficient troops left to attack Germany or 
even to meet a German attack. That was why a plan had been 
made to draw back Russian troop concentrations hundreds of 
versts. There the army could have been mobilized and 
concentrated in all security, while the Germans exhausted 
themselves in the endless approaches through Russia's western 
provinces — the strategy resembled that of the year 1812. (map 
23) The Emperor Nicholas II had supported this plan, which 
harmonized very well with the wishes of the German Kaiser. 
His army would have been able to deal with the French army 
without any threat from the east. Kuropatkin had subsequently 
succeeded in proving to the Tsar that the plan was 
incompatible with Russia's obligations under the Dual Alliance. 
It seems that the French never learned of the existence of such 
a plan. But it re-emerged after the Japanese war. 
The defeat in the Far East had shaken rather badly the 
confidence of the Russian general staff in their army. German 
superiority worried them much more than Palicyn admitted to 
Moulin or the French chiefs of staff, even if his reluctance to 
attack was clearly seen. A reform of the army organization was 
prepared by the general staff and the war ministry, and it was 
combined with a plan of retreating from the west. But before 
all this occurred, new men were appointed to the command 
posts of the army in 1909. 
The independed general staff was again made part of the 
ministry, and the Committee of Imperial Defence was 
abolished. Suhomlinov, Dragomirov's former chief of staff in 
Kiev, was appointed to the post of war minister, in overall 
command of the military establishment as Miljutin, Vannovskii, 
and Kuropatkin had been. Nikolai Nikolaevic remained 
commander of the Guards and of the St. Petersburg military 
district, resentful because of having been eclipsed by 
Suhomlinov. 
The reform of the army organization was then completed. 
The organization was much simplified by the abolition of the 
various cadres for reserve and fortress troops. The active army 
corps were henceforth also to mobilize the reserve and militia 
formations. No troops were to remain second-line or local. That 
is how the number of active divisions and army corps was 
increased, while the over-all costs for the upkeep of the army 
were reduced. A territorial system of recruiting and mobilizing 
117 
the army was adopted, i.e. the army corps were garrisoned in 
the regions where their conscripts and reservists lived. (The 
garrison areas can be seen on the attached sketch map 24). 
Thus the fifth and sixteenth army corps were moved from 
Poland to eastern Russia; a new corps, the twenty-third, was 
organized in Poland; the military district of Warsaw 
consequently lost one corps. Two further corps, the twenty-
fourth and twenty-fifth were established in Moscow and Ufa, 
on the western slope of the Urals. The third Caucasian army 
corps was garrisoned on the northern side of the mountains. 
On the Asian side of the Urals the fourth and fifth Siberian 
corps were organized. — Finland got her third rifle brigade. At 
one time the twenty-third corps was reported to have been in 
eastern Finland, but that must have been only a plan in case of 
a rebellion there.224 
The new territorial organization made possible a faster 
mobilization of the army corps. Infantry and artillery could be 
mobilized on the fourth day (reinforced corps near the frontier) 
or seventh day (not reinforced corps in the frontier districts) or 
on the tenth day (in the interior military districts). Reserve 
troops could be mobilized on the thirteenth day. Cavalry was to be 
ready between the third to seventh days and reserve cavalry 
(the second and third call-up Cossacks) between eleventh to 
sixteenth days. Great magazines were prepared in Warsaw, 
Brest, and Sedlec. Requisitions were planned from Poland.225 
The plan of 1903 was adopted as the basis of the troop 
concentration plans. It was supposed that the Germans would 
attack with great force before Russia was ready, and therefore 
troop concentrations were to be withdrawn from Poland 
towards the east. Thus the army could prepare itself with all 
necessary deliberation in the interior of the empire, protected 
by the empty frontier provinces against German surprises, and 
without any danger of being surrounded in the Polish salient. 
(map 25). Thereafter the army was to act "according to 
circumstances". — At this point of his study Zaion6kovskii 
could not help angrily blaming Suhomlinov and his chief 
224 "Modifications å l'emplacement, Septembre 1910". EMATSH 7 N 1537 
225 "Attaché militaire, Mars 1910, Renseignements sur la mobilisation". 
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planner Danilov for timidity and leaving the initiative, as well 
as many provinces, to the enemy.226 
Simultaneously with Suhomlinov's reforms a reorientation in 
Russia's foreign policy also seemed to be occurring. After his 
success in 1907 Izvol'skii had stumbled into difficulties in the 
Balkans. Austria's ambitious foreign minister Aehrenthal had 
started a forward policy southwards, speeded up by the Young 
Turk revolution during the summer of 1908 which threatened 
to disturb the status quo. Izvol'skii, painfully aware of Russia's 
inability to prevent the Austrian moves, tried to reach an 
agreement with the rival for carving up the Orient into spheres 
of interest: Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria, the Straits to 
Russia. Aehrenthal immediately annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which Austria had occupied since 1878, but did not help Russia 
to her share. France was not at all interested in seeing the 
Straits in the hands of her ally, and England wanted them 
opened for all, which was not what Russia desired — she 
wanted them for herself. At home Izvol'skii was accused of 
selling cheaply the brother Slays in the annexed provinces; and 
the Serbian chauvinists were also enraged. Izvol'skii proposed 
a conference to save appearances, but Austria demanded that 
the annexation should be accepted unconditionally, and 
Germany supported her ally with a message that could be 
regarded as an ultimatum. Roediger, the minister for war, 
declared that Russia had no capacity at all for waging war. 
Izvol'skii had to desist from further protests and Russia had to 
make Serbia abandon her demands for compensation. To the 
Russian chauvinists, this was a diplomatic Tsushima. 
Stolypin replaced the irritable Izvol'skii with the more docile 
Sazonov, and a new approach was tried in Russian foreign 
policy: if Germany was the menace, she must be appeased. The 
emperors William II and Nicholas II met at Potsdam in 1910, 
accompanied by their ministers Kiderlen-Wächter and Sazonov. 
Toasts for mutual good-will caused Kiderlen to propose 
Sazonov a treaty of non-aggression. Sazonov declined, because 
it would have annulled the Dual Alliance — which was 
Kiderlen's intention, of course. The policy of appeasement very 
nearly fell through with this refusal and the consequent news- 
226 Zaion6kovskii, Plany voiny, p. 183- 
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paper polemics. But then in August 1911 Russo-German 
relations were patched up by an agreement on the Baghdad 
railway and Persia, where the Germans had intruded into the 
Russian sphere of interest. This colonial entente could not 
replace the unrealized general treaty, but for a while Russo-
German relations were much better than they had been during 
the previous years. 
5.3. The French Are Worried 
Simultaneously with these grand political events, Russian 
plans were screened from the French view. Louis Moulin, who 
had arrived in St. Petersburg as a young captain in 1880, died 
in the autumn of 1908, after twenty-eight years' service as 
military attaché. He had been promoted major, lieutenant-
colonel, colonel, and major-general, notwithstanding the fact 
that he had no experience in the command of field troops; his 
promotions were due to his extraordinary service in Russia. He 
had succeeded in creating good relations with the Russian 
army command, and had been instrumental in the creation and 
maintenance of the military alliance of Russia with France. His 
successors, Matton (whom we have met earlier), who was 
attaché from 1908-1912, and Laguiche, who served from 
1912-1919, had a hard task in preserving Moulin's heritage. 
The quality and quantity of information was bound to fall after 
his death, and it could be built up only gradually. The situation 
was especially serious because of Suhomlinov's reforms, of 
which only rumours and indications reached Paris, as well as 
because of the supposed new course in Russian foreign policy. 
The French general staff were anxious. They remembered 
that in 1906 Palicyn had proposed the appeasement of 
Germany by Russia and France, and in 1907 he had adopted a 
purely defensive attitude in his plans for the beginning of the 
war. He had refused even to prepare for an offensive against 
Germany on the pretext of the Austrian danger. And in 1908 
the work on the Polish fortifications had ceased. 
"Either because of incapacity, lack or organization, 
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or intentionally, Russia has not taken any effective 
means of defence in Poland, where the mobilization 
is difficult and slow." 
The French generals admitted the necessity of the new system 
of mobilization: 
"At present there are too many corps on the frontier. 
The arrival of their reservists is slow and 
complicated. The corps can be attacked by the 
enemy, who will be ready much more rapidly, before 
their concentration is completed. They may be 
disorganized, and the result of the whole campaign 
may be compromised. It is much preferable to 
detrain entire mobilized units, which are equipped 
with everything they need. Therefore the corps are to 
be withdrawn into the interior. The reform will be 
completed in a year. Suhomlinov promises that the 
frontier will be guarded by a number of reinforced 
corps, which do not need reservists from the 
interior".227 
In the event of a war, it was known that Suhomlinov would 
concentrate his forces on the line Grodro-Belostok-Brest-
Kovel-Rovno, with a vanguard of two army corps in Warsaw 
(map 26). 
The French general staff was critical of this plan, because it 
did not really threaten the Germans. If the Russians were ready 
to act on the nineteenth day, they could reach the frontier of 
southern Posen after a march of two weeks only, i.e. after the 
thirtieth day — if the enemy in East Prussia and Galicia had 
been succesfully paralyzed previously — which was much too 
late to be of any help for France, whose battle in Lorraine 
would have been decided by then. The French wished that 
Russia would strengthen her covering forces in order to 
immobilize the German corps on the frontier. But in fact they 
were moving the centre of gravity of their army to the interior 
of the empire.228 
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Next year, 1910, the news were even worse. It was learned 
that Suhomlinov was abandoning and demolishing Ivangorod, 
Warsaw, and Zegrze, while the rear fortresses of Ossovec, 
Grodno, and Brest were being reinforced. And several army 
corps were being transferred to the interior. Only cavalry and a 
few rifle brigades were left at the Vistula as a vanguard. 
Suhomlinov had abandoned his previous idea of having 
Warsaw and Ivangorod as beachheads for the attack of the 
promised 700 000-800 000 men. The Russians were 
abandoning Poland to the Germans because of the threat that 
the Polish salient would be cut off at the Belostok-Brest line. 
But if the Russians retreated from Poland, the Germans would 
be left free to transfer all their troops to the west, leaving only 
two army corps to watch the frontier. 
"This idea, perhaps suggested by the Germanophile 
party, cannot be explained except by a 
momentaneous moral depression ... These changes 
are certainly going to alarm the press .. "229 
The French press did raise an alarm. Le Temps wrote: 
"We recall that the Polish fortresses were 
declassified last year (1909). That might have been 
the foreword for replacing them with new, more 
modern fortifications. This view cannot be upheld 
any longer, in the light of the transfer of the fifth 
army corps. Incontestably, it is a question of a 
general 	 retreat ... 	 They 	 have 	 abandoned 
Dragomirov's doctrines. Up to this time the Russian 
army has had the intention of attacking as promptly 
as possible. The fifteen corps of Warsaw, Vilna, and 
Kiev, supported by the Moscow and St. Petersburg 
troops, were an offensive army in the first line. This 
disposition has been criticized for several years 
because of the danger of getting surrounded. A new 
factor was the destruction of the Russian navy, 
which left the coast and St. Petersburg open to a 
landing. There was reason enough to transfer part of 
the Vilna troops closer to the capital; and from there 
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it was only a step to the general withdrawal of the 
Warsaw troops. Thus the mirage of getting enveloped 
by the Germans made Suhomlinov abandon the 
principles of his teacher. Dragomirov had said that 
the Russian offensive would make all danger of the 
army getting cut off from Russia disappear. We must 
regret that France was not informed of so 
considerable alterations in Russia's military position. 
The changes ought to have been the object of 
detailed study by the two allied staffs".230 
French ambassadors got worried, too. Barrere in Rome 
expressed doubt and anxiety: if the new Russian dispositions 
were completely defensive, how much value was left in the 
military alliance?231 Jules Cambon in Berlin thought that either 
the Russians were making concessions to the Germans, or at 
least they were repeating the tactics they had employed against 
Charles XII and Napoleon. The new dispositions indicated 
further that the antagonism to Austria, characteristic of 
Izvol'skii, was also inspiring the general staff in St. Petersburg. 
The retreat from the German border might be considered by 
Europe as a weakening of the Dual Alliance, and 
consequently a weakening of France's international position. 
Cambon stressed the need to demonstrate to the European 
public the unshaken intimacy of the allied general staffs.'" 
5.4. The Unshaken Intimacy of the 
Allied General Staffs 
A useful demonstration was the renewing of the regular 
discussions of the chiefs of general staff. The preliminaries were 
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a rehearsal of the previous discussions: generals Gerngross and 
Ladebatt declared that the first and principal aim of the allied 
armies was the defeat of the German army. A German 
mobilization would cause an immediate and simultaneous 
mobilization by the Dual Alliance, while a mobilization of the 
Austrian or Italian forces presupposed consultation before the 
allied mobilization in response. The generals agreed that 
Germany would probably leave only three to five army corps in 
the east. General Ladebatt described the French troop 
concentrations and declared formally that the French army 
would start an immediate offensive against the German army. 
General Gerngross explained that according to the new 
Russian plan of concentration the Tsar's army would fight the 
Germans with two-fifths of its strength. By their peace-time 
attitude they would give the Germans the impression that a 
serious offensive against East Prussia was to be launched 
between the fifteenth and thirtieth days — which would 
prevent Germany from denuding her eastern frontier — and on 
the twentieth day they would cross the frontier with sufficient 
force to fight victoriously against the corps which the Germans 
were probably leaving in the east. 
The generals agreed to continue their discussions annually. 
And the article of the convention forbidding either party to 
conclude a separate peace was declared to exclude equally a 
separate armistice or desisting from operations.233 
General Ladebatt seems to have been satisfied with this 
discussion. Knowing Suhomlinov's plans we must conclude 
that the Russian general shamelessly lied to his colleague. The 
French politicians were not so easily satisfied. The general staff 
was asked for more detailed information on the Russian plans: 
"What have been the results of the demarches of our 
ambassador and discussions of the chiefs of the 
general staffs? '234 
General Brun of the general staff explained to the minister for 
foreign affairs that from the Russian point of view the new 
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positioning of the troops was quite logical. It increased the 
quantity and quality of combat troops and facilitated their 
mobilization. The army was more evenly distributed on the 
territory of the empire, and it was better situated from the point 
of view of ensuring internal order. The defence of the secondary 
theatres in Finland, Caucasia, and Siberia was much better 
organized. 
It was true, Brun went on, that more than one corps had 
been taken away from the western frontier. But the remaining 
corps, with reinforced peacetime effectives, were numerous 
enough to engage great German forces on the eastern front, and 
to undertake an eventual offensive without delay. The 
mobilization of the corps in the interior had been speeded up. 
The progress made to improve the rapidity of their transport to 
the frontier, although not quite satisfactory, was nevertheless 
real. Thus the Germans would be compelled to leave an 
important part of their corps in the east, which was a relief for 
France. 
Therefore, the general concluded, even if the new disposition 
of the Russian forces had not augmented the offensive value of 
Russia, neither had it diminished it. This was on the condition 
that a spirit of offensive existed, and in this respect 
"the verbal declarations of the Russian chief of staff, 
repeated by the minister of war, have been quite 
categorical. There is no reason to doubt them at 
present".235 
Identical assurances were given by the Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolaeviö and Suhomlinov to the French ambassador Louis.236 
The fact that General Gerngross had been reluctant to 
disclose any details of the new troop concentration plan ought 
to have been ominous enough to raise some suspicion. He had 
promised to give them later, but again he delayed the 
explanation because "an important conference" was to be held 
in January 1911 where "some point will be cleared up".237 The. 
military district commanders with their chiefs of staff were 
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convening in the war ministry in order to study mobilization 
and concentration of forces as well as the proposed operations 
during the first month.)$ 
In fact, in this conference, and in another one held in 
February 1912, the Russian generals hotly opposed giving up 
large provinces without battle. They persuaded Suhomlinov 
and the general staff to push the troop concentrations forward. 
The new, more aggressive and courageous plan was thus not 
due to any direct pressure by the French, who had accepted the 
little they knew of the plan of 1910, but to pressure by the 
Russian military chiefs.739 But perhaps Suhomlinov and his 
aides — Gerngross, and then Zilinskii and Januskevic, and 
the Quartermaster General Danilev — knew that the French 
would not like their plan, and this knowledge made them 
receptive to criticism. 
The protocol of the discussion of the generals was ratified by 
the allied governments. This was necessary because the 
reservation concerning the Austrian or Italian mobilization 
represented an essential change in the convention. 
"A mobilization to support an ally presupposes a 
frontier where it is possible to give such support".240 
This wiev must reflect the aftermath of the Bosnian crisis and 
the Potsdam meeting. It may have seemed possible that 
Germany would not support Austria against Russia, and in 
that case France had no wish to get involved in a duel with 
Germany. 
In any case Russia now lost French support in the event of a 
war against Austria. For Obrucev this had been an essential 
part of the convention; Saharov had let it lapse, but Palicyn 
had tried hard to get it back. There is no indication of how 
Suhomlinov and his chiefs of staff regarded this aspect of the 
alliance. Count Kokovtsov was of the opinion that the minister 
of war was not able to think seriously about the political 
implications of his plans. 
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Soothing reports by Louis and Ladebatt did not dispel all 
anxiety in Paris on the Russian plans. The French consul in 
Warsaw sent in a report on rumours that the new disposition of 
troops proved that the Russians did not believe in their ability 
to remain in Poland if the war broke out. According to the 
consul the reason for this was the hostile attitude of the 
population: the policy of Russification conflicted with the 
aspirations of the Polish people. Louis in St. Petersburg did 
not believe the consul, he still trusted the explanations given 
by the Russian generals.241 But in the National Assembly in 
Paris strong criticism of the government was heard: the 
ministers declared that nothing had changed — but the 
Russians had drawn their troops from the frontier and 
dismantled their fortresses! The government had only answered 
that the Russians were free to do so. 
"The impression left to us is that the Russian 
alliance is, as far as the military co-operation goes, 
nothing more than a memory" ... The mission of the 
Russian army is no longer to defend their western 
frontier, their eventual enemy is certainly not 
Germany — this is the end of the military 
convention signed by Boisdeffre".242 
These doubts seemed to be well founded, for instance when 
Golos Moskvy — a rightist paper — wrote, as late as October 
1912: 
"The alliance does not oblige France to help us in 
affairs of the Orient, the Balkans included ... There 
are many facts that demonstrate to us the 
advantages of approaching our neighbour 
(Germany). The alliance with France is directed 
against Germany, therefore it has no advantage for 
us, rather it is dangerous for us".'43 
Thus, after Potsdam, there were plenty of reasons to suspect 
the Russians of schemes to approach Germany. The French 
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civilians were much more alive to the danger than the military 
chiefs, who took at face value the assurances of the Russian 
generals. But even the French military could not remain 
completely satisfied with the "verbal assurances" of their 
Russian colleagues or with the "intimacy" of the two general 
staffs. 
5.5. Colonel Janin Studies the Russian 
Army 
It seems that Matton had not been able to create the 
confidential relations with the leading circles of the Russian 
army which Moulin had succeeded in maintaining for so many 
years. Information was much more sparse and came in late. 
Diplomatic representatives and journalist rumourmongers sent 
in more news. That was why a new man, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Janin, was sent to Russia. Ostensibly he was to study in the 
Academy of the General Staff in St. Petersburg, but in fact he 
was to ferret out information on the changed Russian plans. 
The instructions given to him reveal that the French general 
staff had also begun to be apprehensive in the aftermath of the 
Potsdam meeting. 
Janin was given several hypotheses to test for an 
explanation. He was to ascertain whether the new plan was 
due to 
1. a wish to please the Germans and to show that 
Russia was her enemy only in theory 
2. a fear of an Austro-German offensive with 
superior forces before the Russian reinforcements 
had arrived from the interior 
3. difficulties in realizing the mobilization and 
concentration of troops in Poland, where 
everything had to be transported from the interior 
along with inferior and lengthy routes 
4. a desire to organize the recruiting and 
mobilization on a regional basis. 
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He had also to study how the acceleration of mobilization and, 
on the other hand, the increased distance to be travelled by the 
transports from the interior to the frontier affected the time the 
Russians would be able to start their operations; how great was 
the strength of the covering forces on the frontier; what was 
the division of the Russian forces between the Austrian and 
German frontiers; and whether changes had occurred in the 
Russian attitude towards France.24 
After a winter of study (1910-1911) Janin reported that 
Russia had, indeed, turned towards the interior, and had given 
up external adventures. A will to develop the country 
materially and morally had emerged; the wealth of central and 
eastern Russia seemed more important than the western 
confines of the empire. Troops were transferred from the 
western frontier towards the interior because of the revolution 
and jacqueries of 1905 and 1906. They might be needed also in 
case the workers' strikes grew into open conflict. 
National pride had suffered under the defeat of the Japanese 
war, Janin went on. This had caused an explosion of 
nationalist feeling among some people. A strong party wanted 
to unify Russia and assimilate other nationalities by fair means 
or foul. Therefore a series of measures had been taken 
regarding the Finns; and then there were the Poles, a 
particularly tempestuous and resistant race. One additional 
reason for the transfer of the garrisons from the west was the 
reluctance to let Russia's military expenditures be spent to the 
profit of Poland. 
Many people in Russia liked Germany more than France. 
They were also afraid that the French aversion to Tsarism 
might diminish France's determination to support Russia; 
neither did they have a high opinion of the value of the French 
army. That was why the idea of keeping strong forces near the 
western frontier was thought to be obsolete. 
The old plans for troop concentrations had been difficult to 
realize, and this might have been disastrous in the beginning of 
a war, especially if Germany had concentrated her principal 
forces against Russia and not against France. The Russians had 
adopted the most unfavourable hypothesis of having to fight 
24 Programme du LtCol Janin, septembre 1910. EMATSH 7 N 1485 
9 	 French information on ... 
	 129 
alone against Germany in the beginning of the war. They did 
not doubt eventual French support, but they wished to be 
prepared for the eventuality that it would not turn out to be as 
effective as the French had promised. Thus Russia was 
adopting the strategy of Peter I or 1812. 
Russia also had more enemies than before. Even though of 
enormous size, she was encircled. And her enormous size 
annulled the advantage of interior lines of communication. 
Japan had obtained a beachhead on the Asian continent, which 
made her eventual offensive easier and speedier. Her victory 
had nourished her avidity, and there were already secret 
Japanese agents among the Siberian natives. 
China was making military progress, and felt a profound 
hostility towards Russia. Her population was increasing. All 
this made the future sombre for Russia. 
Russian Turkestan was surrounded by Persia and Turkey, i.e. 
countries where the Russians were heartily hated. Pan-Islamic 
ideas were seeping in among the population as far as on the 
Urals and on the banks of the Volga — Turkish emissaries had 
been seen there. Turkey was especially dangerous, because she 
was Germany's tool; the Germans were at home in Turkey. 
Turkey's military might was growing, and the mobilization of 
the Turkish Erzerum corps would be accelerated when the 
Anatolian railway was completed. In the Caucasian provinces 
the vanquished Mussulmans had remained hostile to Russia, 
nor were the other peoples and religions more favourably 
disposed towards the empire. Defence on the Caucasian 
frontier was difficult. Hence an offensive was necessary, but in 
peacetime sufficient troops could not be maintained there, and 
the railway was a zig-zag which allowed only 14 trains a day. 
That was why Russia was improving her railways in Caucasia, 
as well as in the Far East, more than in the west. 
In the west Romania was hostile, a member of the Triple 
Alliance. 
Austria was profoundly hated by the Russians for reasons of 
history and of religion, and because of the Bosnian annexation, 
and indeed from all kind of suspicion. Austria favoured her 
own Poles, and might try to conquer Poland with the aid of the 
Russian Poles. Perhaps she aimed also at the Ukraine. The 
persons in governing positions in Austria were supposed to be 
hostile to Russia. 
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German might was frightening, though in fact there were 
grounds for only relatively unimportant disputes with her. 
Sweden was a small country and therefore important only as 
an auxiliary to the other enemies. But she was dangerous 
because of her influence on Finland. The years 1905 and 1906 
had only worsened the situation in the Grand Duchy. 
Thus Russia had enemies on all frontiers. She could not afford 
to wage war, and she did not want war, especially not against 
Germany, with whom she had no contradictory interests. She 
had the carcass of Poland as a shield against an attack from 
the west, and she hoped that Germany would force Austria to 
be peacefully disposed towards Russia.245 
Janin's report reflects well the suspicious, jealous outlook on 
the world which reigned in military and patriotic circles in 
Russia at that time. 
On Russian mobilization Janin reported that the territorial 
system adopted in 1910 did accelerate mobilization. The 
reservists did not need to travel so far. But it remained slow 
compared with the speed of German or French mobilization, 
and there was nothing that could be done to speed up it. The 
most important and effective means of accelerating Russian 
troop concentrations was to improve the railway network. As it 
was, there were several army corps to be transported along one 
railway line. Other problems remained, too, especially the great 
percentage of Jews and Poles in Poland, "towards whom the 
Russians feel an extreme aversion".246 
The defence of St. Petersburg remained a problem. Sweden, 
although a minor enemy, was dangerous as a vanguard for an 
attack by the Triple Alliance against the Russian capital. She 
was preparing for an invasion of Finland, where the situation 
resembled that of Caucasia. The Finns counted on Russia's 
internal or external difficulties to regain their complete 
autonomy — the press of the Grand Duchy did not conceal this 
aim — and "I have been told several times that this is an 
absolute fact". With a view to the contraband traffic, it was not 
at all unreasonable to suppose that the insurgents had light 
artillery there. That was why Finland could not be left 
unoccupied in the event of war. 
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Janin's informants stressed that St. Petersburg needed her 
garrison even in wartime. It was the site of the government, the 
residence of the emperor and his family. Prudence dictated 
leaving a strong garrison there. That was to be the Guards 
corps, with its strong ties to the sovereign and his family. 
Perhaps even more was necessary, in the light of the proximity 
of Finland and the difficulty of securing order in the immense 
city and its environment. 
There was also the danger of a German landing, because the 
capital was situated on the coast, and because Russia had no 
fleet and one could not be rebuilt very soon. It was true that 
there were rumours of fortifications to be constructed on the 
coasts of the Gulf of Finland. 
"An attempt at a landing on the Russian coast by 
the Germans may seem very improbable to us, but it 
does not follow that the Russians see the situation in 
the same light". 
The threat of enemy landing was a constant and frequent 
subject of study in the Academy of the General Staff. Even a 
small attempt on the coastal towns would produce a serious 
moral effect, and rumours sewn by the enemy augmented the 
Russian tendency to precautionary measures on the coast. 
Janin doubted whether the troops in the St. Petersburg 
military district (the Guards, the first army corps in Novgorod, 
the eighteenth in Estonia and Pskov, and twenty-second in 
Finland) could be included in the strength of the Russian army 
in respect of the western theatre of operations. In any case the 
Guards and the twenty-second corps could only be mobilized 
very slowly, because they had no reservists in the 
neighbourhood.247 
By the year 1911 the Dual Alliance did not appear to be 
worth much, then. Nor did France receive much help from her 
ally and friend during the renewed Moroccan crisis. During the 
time of the Bosnian crisis Izvol'skii had received cold comfort 
from Paris. It must have been sweet for him to react identically 
to the French government, when, in its turn, it asked for 
support in Morocco in 1911. Russian public opinion would not 
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be able to understand that a mere colonial question might be a 
casus belli, Izvol'skii said.24ß — It was with British support that 
Kiderlen's schemes in Morocco were repelled and rendered 
relatively harmless in the Congo. 
It is true the the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
reported that the Russian Foreign Office had promised to 
support France, not only diplomatically but also militarily, if 
necessary.249 Generals Dubail and Ladebatt visited St. 
Petersburg and got a promise of support from the Russian 
general staff, too. But they got also a declaration that the 
Russian army would not regain complete operational ability 
until 1913.250 It is not quite clear whether any decision had been 
made in St. Petersburg in the event that the Moroccan crisis 
had led to war. It is well known that Stolypin demanded peace 
for his reforms. During the critical month of August the treaty 
on Persia and Baghdad railway was signed between Russia and 
Germany. Thus there was no certainty of Russian help for 
France, even if the Russians declared that the agreement with 
Germany did not constitute a treaty on general policy between 
the two empires.25' 
A little later Zilinskii was reported to have said that a war 
because of Morocco would not have been popular in Russia, 
and that public opinion was not without influence in Russia; it 
had forced the government to war in 1877.252 
Janin calculated also the strength of the Russian army, its 
effect on Germany and its value for France.253 
In peacetime there were 260 000 men in the Vilna and Warsaw 
districts (Niemen-Vistula frontier 140 000, Riga-Minsk area 
70 000, Lublin-Brest area facing Austria 50 000). On the 
twenty-third day there would be 700 000 men concentrated on 
the 350 kilometres of the Niemen-Vistula frontier. The offensive 
might begin then, and contact with the Germans might be 
expected on the twenty-eighth day. If the Russians won 
preliminary successes against Austria, they would be able to 
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launch a really dangerous attack against Germany on the 
fortieth to fiftieth day. This day could be advanced if Austria 
met grave complication with Italy or in the Balkans. Thus the 
Russian action would not have any serious effect on the 
Germans before the thirtieth day. Germany needed to keep 
only three to five corps and ten to fifteen reserve divisions in 
the east.254 
Janin's calculation was based on the hypothesis that the 
Russians were to attack at the earliest moment. His 
information on the Russian troop concentrations (map 27) 
shows the Russian army corps much more to the west than in 
the previous, alarming plan (which the French had not seen, 
but heard rumours of, as pointed out earlier). It is evident that 
by the end 1911 Janin has received preliminary information on 
the plan of 1912. 
There were eight infantry divisions and seven cavalry 
divisions covering the German border. Seven infantry divisions 
and five cavalry divisions served as covering troops for the 
Austrian border. These units could be mobilized and 
concentrated on the eighth day. 
The region of St. Petersburg was defended by the Baltic 
army, which consisted of the Guards and the twenty-second 
corps with 3 reserve divisions. 
There were four armies in the north-western group against 
East Prussia, as well as four armies in the south-western group 
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against Galicia. If the Germans should attack with more than 
25 divisions, the four armies (17 corps and 17 reserve divisions) 
would defend the line Kovno-Belostok. If there should be less 
than 25 German divisions attacking, the north-west group was 
to fight with 15 corps on a line a little more forwards, one or 
two marches from the Prussian border. Novo-Georgievsk was 
to be defended by the left army consisting of 2 corps and 2-3 
reserve divisions. The south-western group was to have 10 or 
12 corps, depending on the situation on the German border. 
The active corps would be concentrated on the twenty-third 
day, except for the twenty-fifth corps from eastern Russia 
which would be concentrated on the thirtieth day. Reserve 
troops would be ready for action on the fortieth day. The south-
western group was to attack as soon as possible in order to free 
the left flank of the north-western group. The latter was to 
attack East Prussia as soon as it had the necessary superiority, 
without waiting till the twenty-third day.25, 
Thus the Russian plan now seemed to be turning out more 
satisfactorily from the French point of view. But before it was 
completed the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913 brought a new 
urgency to military planning work and to the general 
diplomatic framework of the Dual Alliance. 
5.6. The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 
Italy wanted to assert herself as a great power, but it was 
difficult to find an adversary weak enough. Even Abyssinia had 
been too strong. But by 1911 it was seen that the Young Turk 
revolution had not been able to rejuvenate Turkey, which 
continued to live in a state of disorder. While other powers 
were occupied by the Morocco crisis, the Italians attacked 
Libya. The Turks were not able to resist very well, but the 
desert nomads proved a nuisance and prevented a swift 
pacification. To conquer them Italy sent a fleet to the Aegean 
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Sea, where the Dodecanese Islands were occupied and traffic in 
the Straits disturbed. Russian grain worth millions of roubles 
rotted in South Russian ports. 
The imperial government could not afford to ignore the new 
complication. But Russia was not eager to resort to forward 
politics in the Near East yet; her own internal reforms had only 
started a few years earlier. A plan was made to defend the 
status quo in alliance with Turkey and the small Balkan states. 
A note was sent to the Porte. But the Turks had no 
confidence in the good intentions of Russia. The note made 
them suspicious instead. To pacify them Sazonov had to 
disown the note and blame everything on Carykov, the 
ambassador in Constantinople. 
In the beginning of 1912 Matton discussed the situation with 
2ilinskii, the new chief of staff. The general thought that 
something was going to happen in the Balkans in the spring. 
Perhaps Austria was to advance southwards to the Sandjak of 
Novipazar. That would be opposed by Serbia and Montenegro, 
while Bulgaria might try to conquer Macedonia. Russia would 
have to intervene. Probably a casus foederis would emerge for 
the Triple Alliance, and consequently also for the Dual Alliance 
and the Triple Entente. The result would be the European 
conflagration which had so often been predicted and so often 
adjourned; now it was to be faced. 
Matton concluded that Russia was beginning to regain her 
confidence — more so than she had wanted to admit during the 
Moroccan crisis. She would probably not submit to another 
affront like that of 1908-1909. If Germany was going to 
support Austria, the Russians hoped that France would support 
Russia. 
"It seems to me rather advantageous for France if 
the war against Germany should break out under 
these conditions". 
A Russo-Serbo-Montenegrin war against Austria would be 
popular in Russia, and, said Matton, would remain popular if it 
were transformed into a war against the Triple Alliance. Being 
the first to take to arms, Russia's moblization would be in 
advance of that of Germany and that of France. And if 
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Germany should mobilize in order to support Austria, there 
was some hope that she would send more forces to the eastern 
frontier, to the advantage of the French. 
It seemed desirable that a conflagration, if it must come, 
should come under these conditions, and before the Russian 
army was again drawn towards other directions of conquest, 
e.g. China, Japan, or Turkey, "where we are not immediately 
interested, and where consequently all the sacrifices we have 
made for Russia's military recovery would be lost for us".256 
Here we have our Machiavellian friend of 1892 at his 
schemes again, eagerly looking forward to the great 
conflagration, as did also the Russian chief of staff. — As will 
be seen, Matton's report had no influence on the course of the 
Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. But it may have had some 
importance for the consequent strengthening of the Dual 
Alliance by French efforts in the years 1912-1914. 
The St. Petersburg government had thought of the alliance of 
the Balkan states as a check on Austrian appetites. But the 
small Balkan states made their alliance against Turkey, and 
they were spurred on by Panslavist Russian envoys in the 
Balkan "capitals", in direct contradiction to the intentions and 
directives of Sazonov. Turkey's defeat in the war against Italy 
made the Balkan states confident of their success. The 
confidence was not misplaced. The Turks were very nearly 
chased out of Europe. The danger of a Bulgarian conquest of 
Constantinople caused feverish preparations for a Russian or 
an international intervention. Happily for Russia, at the last 
moment the Turks succeeded in stopping the Bulgarian 
advance. 
But the partition of Macedonia proved diffcult. Austria and 
Italy had no wish to see Serbia on the Adriatic and insisted on 
an independent Albania on the coast. Russia opposed these 
demands and supported Serbia and Montenegro. A war was 
just avoided, because Russia was too weak, and because France 
and Germany restrained their allies. Sir Edward Grey invited 
the ambassadors of the great powers to a conference which 
succeeded in adjusting the conflicting politics of the great 
powers. Albania was made independent. 
256 Matton to war ministeri 17.I 1912. EMATSH 7 N 1487 
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With Albania out of the game, there was much less booty left 
for the Balkan allies. The quarrel led to a Bulgarian attack on 
Serbia, who was then supported by Greece; then Bulgaria was 
stabbed in the back by Romania, and even Turkey reconquered 
Adrianople (Edirne) on the Bulgarian frontier. 
The result was a disaster for Russia. She had not been able to 
support her Slav proteges, the contending parties had not 
appealed to the Tsar's arbitration as they were supposed to do, 
and now a defeated Bulgaria was embittered and no longer a 
Russian satellite. Of Russian goodwill only a precarious 
remnant was left in Serbia. On the other hand, Romania 
started casting covetous eyes on Transylvania and for a while 
forgot her irredenta in Bessarabia. 
A great war had been very close. As can be seen from 
Matton's report, 2ilinskii was not especially decidedly against 
a war. Suhomlinov had proposed a mobilization against 
Austria, without thought of the German reaction. The Tsar's 
civilian ministers had nevertheless succeeded in averting the 
catastrophe. Especially had Kokovtsov, Stolypin's successor 
since 1911, been decidedly against war. 
But Sazonov was heard to say: 
"An Austrian attack into Serbia would arouse 
Russian opinion, which would be difficult for the 
government to restrain" 
and Izvol'skii explained: 
"although the Russian government has the firm 
intention of not being dragged to war, it would be 
difficult to oppose public opinion".257 
Neo-Slavist feeling had been awakened by the Balkan events. 
This augmented the national feeling which had grown in 
strength since 1905. It was difficult to ignore this opinion. Even 
if the Russian government was not a parliamentary one, it 
needed some support in order to be able to function in face of 
the opposition from the right and from the left. After the 
debacles of 1908-1909 and 1912-1913 it was difficult to 
accept a third diplomatic Tsushima without irreparable 
damage to internal stability and external prestige. 
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6. Naval Plans 
Russia was a continental power, and the Dual Alliance was 
mainly a military affair. But the naval aspect is not completely 
void of interest either, because it completes the military picture 
and sheds additional light on Russian imperialism. 
It is a pity that the documentation is not complete, the 
reports of the naval attachés being available only for the years 
1904-1913.258 
Again, the naval attachés were replaced frequently, almost 
annually. Thus they were not able to establish such confidential 
relations with their Russian colleagues as Moulin did. 
Consequently they had no naval secrets to report, comparable 
to the mobilization, concentration and operational plans of the 
army. Of course, there may not have existed any detailed plans, 
due to the different nature of naval operations compared with 
warfare on land. The Gulf of Finland seems to have been an 
exception in this respect. 
The naval policy and building programmes were publicly 
discussed and consequently have been able to be dealt with by 
numerous historians.259 
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6.1. A Naval Convention Discussed 
The military convention was concerned only with warfare on 
the continent. To complete it, a naval convention was discussed 
in 1901, evidently in connection with the strengthening of the 
alliance at Delcasse's instigation. The chiefs of the French and 
Russian naval staffs discussed their strategy in the event of a 
war against England and/or the Triple Alliance. The 
discussions had no practical consequences, but they illuminate 
very well the Russian dispositions on the eve of the Japanese 
war. 
The French admiral explained that the principal French 
naval forces were to be concentrated in the Mediterranean, 
leaving only second-class and coastal battleships for the North 
Sea. A landing in England was to be prepared, and made to 
look threatening, in order to tie up as many English troops as 
possible. The French Far East naval forces were to operate in 
the Indian Ocean. 
The Russian admiral stated that Russian coastal vessels and 
small warships were to be concentrated in the Baltic Sea, to 
take up a strictly defensive position. Eight armoured ships 
were to operate in the Black Sea, and three cruisers in the 
Mediterranean. The navy had the task of shipping one army 
corps over the Black Sea to the Bosphorus. Sixteen battleships 
and thirty-two cruisers would form the Russian Pacific 
squadron. 
Thus, once the Russian building programme was completed, 
the Russian and French fleets would complement each other 
rather well. The presence of the Russian fleet in the Far East 
would enable the French to withdraw their ships from the 
China Sea. The Russian sphere of action would be extended to 
the Malacca peninsula, and the Russians might have the use of 
some bases in French Indochina. The French cruisers in the 
Indian Ocean would prevent the English from sending 
reinforcement to their Asian colonies. A diversion by the 
Russian Black Sea fleet from the Dardanelles to the eastern 
Mediterranean would facilitate the task of the main French 
fleet in the Mediterranean and weaken the English squardon at 
Malta. France would guarantee Russian interests and security 
in the Mediterranean and prevent the English from sending 
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their army through Turkey. Because of the menace of a landing 
in England, the English in India would be left alone to face the 
Russian offensive from Central Asia over the land frontier.26o 
A couple of years later the French sketched anew Russian 
support for France: the eight Black Sea battleships were to 
convoy the transport of the Sevastopol and Odessa army corps 
over the sea to the Bosphorus at the beginning of hostilities. 
After forcing the passages, the warships would convoy the 
transports to the Gallipoli peninsula, where the troops would 
disembark, while the warships were destroying or occupying 
the fortifications on the banks of the Dardanelles. After that 
the battleships could advance to Bizerta, there to join the 
French executing French naval plans in the Mediterranean.26' 
This plan, with no difficulties anticipated, seems to have 
been wishful thinking on the part of the French admirals, a 
project without Russian signatures. Why should the Russians 
have forced the Straits only in order to support French plans? 
These naval plans were not as detailed and concrete as the 
army plans, of course, because ships are able to move and act 
with much less previous preparation than armies. Their 
interest lies in the implied dreams of imperialist grandeur. 
These schemes of naval imperialism were not without 
support among influential Russian journalists. Novoe Vremja 
sketched a Russian sea power with French support: 
"The Russo-French alliance is not necessary for 
obtaining French support against the German army, 
which Russia has no reason to be afraid of. (As 
indicated earlier, at this time Novoe Vremja 
supported the idea of a continental coalition). But 
Russia has a redoutable enemy at sea. If Russia 
wants to benefit from sea commerce, if she does not 
wish to let her peasants toil only in order to enrich 
English navigation companies, she has to ensure the 
freedom of the seas, the equality of all nations on the 
ocean passages which have not yet been divided into 
spheres of influence. That is why Alexander III 
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began to create the navy without which the 
commercial fleet, the guarantee of the welfare of 
nations, cannot exist. The Russo-French alliance 
guarantees to Russia the help of the French fleet, the 
only fleet which the English cannot blockade in its 
bases and which is able to attack the English on the 
oceans. The combined Russo-French navies might 
well be able to dispute the English title of the queen 
of the seas".262 
Later, during the Far East war, the French consul in Harkov 
reported that a committee had been formed there, under the 
protection of a grand duke and an admiral, with the aim of 
acquiring a chain of naval bases reaching from Kronstadt to 
Vladivostok, with the help of the French. On the 
Mediterranean Algiers or Crete were thought of, on the Red 
Sea Djibuti or some Arabian port was hoped for, then followed 
Madagascar and/or Sumatra on the Indian Ocean, and finally 
some Chinese or Indochinese port on the coast of the China 
Sea. The coal for these stations would be exported from the 
Donets, which explained the interest of businesmen there. The 
consul characterized the project as chimeric.263 
Of course, this plan had no practical consequences. But it is 
important as an example of the unofficial dreams that formed 
the background, the sounding board and moving force, of the 
official diplomacy and military or naval schemes described here 
and elsewhere in this study. Imperialism cannot be understood 
if only official documents are studied. The chancelleries dealt 
with only that which was deemed practical and immediately 
possible, while the patriots, chauvinists, builders of empire, 
desired much more. 
The naval discussions reflected the fact that at this time the 
Russian and French staffs saw their alliance as a guarantee 
against England, too. But by 1903 Delcasse was preparing the 
ground for the Entente Cordiale, and it is understandable that 
no naval convention was signed nor any definite plans made; 
especially in view of the threatening conflict in the Far East. 
Not all French sailors were enthusiastic about their allies: 
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"Their ships are well kept, and the internal service 
seems correct and even rigid in details. But their 
manoeuvring left much to be desired. The ships did 
not keep position, anchoring took a long time and 
nevertheless was no great success ... However, I am 
far from fearing that in a common war we should 
experience nuisances analoguous to those we felt a 
century ago from our Spanish allies 264 
Somewhat later the imperial navy proved its worth at 
Tsushima. 
6.2. The Calamitous Odyssey 
From the very beginning, there was only bad news from the Far 
East war: 
"The conduct of the Russian squadron in the naval 
battle of 10/23. VIII 1904, its subsequent inaction, 
and its ultimate destruction without battle in the 
basin of Port Arthur was bound to call forth various 
comments in the Far East, generally not very 
flattering to our ally".'265 
Then the ships collected from the Baltic ports were named the 
second and the third Pacific squadron and sent to the Far East 
under the command Admirals Rozestvenskii and Nebogatov. 
The copious correspondence of the French agents along the 
route was concerned with the supply problems of the Russians, 
who called in frequently at French ports. The further the 
armada advanced, the more nervously the French tried to keep 
up a semblance of neutrality.266  They had no wish to provoke 
the Japanese, which might bring with it the calamity of an 
264 Contre-Amiral Boutet, commander of the Mediterranean light squadron to 
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eventual British involvement. On the other hand, the Russians 
should not be cold-shouldered into German arms.267 
Afterwards it was easy to see the inevitability of the Russian 
defeat and to point to forebodings recorded before the battle: 
"All these complaints of the minor difficulties, 
impatience at the slightest obstacle, the 
discouragement on any occasion, seem to indicate 
that in the measure the squadron approaches the 
East the commanders realize the difficulty of their 
mission and search for a plausible pretext which 
would allow them to declare that it is impossible to 
proceed further".268 
But in fact there are also plenty of optimistic reports among 
the contemporary documents: 
"The Russian admiral made an excellent impression, 
he seemed energetic and frank, and apparently he 
possesses the entire confidence of his men ..."269 
"What is known of his character makes certain that 
he will seek battle, and that is all that is known of 
his plans".270 
These reports reflect also the lack of concrete naval plans, 
referred to above: 
"The Russian admiral is allowed complete freedom 
of action, no one in St. Petersburg knowing 
Rozestvenskii's plans".271 
It is true that the Russian admirals had a special reason for the 
absence of plans. The imperial navy had no naval general staff 
at that time, and the French staff had planned their voyage for 
them — the route, the ports to be called at, the logistics, the 
manoeuvres. 
The complete destruction of the fleet was a calamity, an 
unpredictable and unpleasant occurrence to the French as well 
as to the Russians themselves. 
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"The battle of Tsushima makes clear in a sinister 
and new light the lack of naval and military spirit of 
our allies ... they had the arms, they had the time 
to learn to use them ... thus their ineptitude must 
have been great and profound ... a general 
stupefaction reigns in the admiralty: 'a 
misfortune ... who could have guessed', which does 
not augur well as to the future ..."272 
Admiral Togo himself was unable to account for his complete 
and miraculous victory over "an equal and determined 
adversary" except by referring to the superhuman virtues of his 
emperor and the invisible protection of the imperial ancestors.273 
Of course, the French had no reason to exaggerate the valour 
of the Russian sailors and to rest content with a supernatural 
explanations. That there was something thoroughly wrong with 
the ally's navy was soon confirmed by a report from the Black 
Sea: "Mutiny of Knjaz Potemkin".274 
6.3. Reorganization 
The participants in the hattle of Tsushima were interrogated 
and culprits were found. But the French were hardly 
impressed: 
"the more I learn, the more evident it seems to me 
that the participants are less guilty than those who 
remained barricaded in the offices of the Admiralty; 
organization and preparation was more faulty than 
execution".275 
The Russian navy had been inferior because badly commanded 
and consequently badly trained, being "an independent and 
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273 
"Combat naval de la mer du Japon". Japan Times 14.VI 1905 (translation). 
SHM BB 7 n:o 67 a 
274 Ambassador in Constantinople to navy minister 5.VII 1905 SHM BB 7 n:o 
67 d 
275 Naval attaché to navy minister 19.V 1906. SHM BB 7 n:o 75-13 
10 — French information on ... 	 145 
fanciful Grand Duchy".246 The commander-in-chief had been the 
Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovi6, Grand Admiral of Russia, 
a dilettante who bore a great part of the responsibility for the 
deplorable state of the navy, even in financial respects.277 But 
now a responsible minister of the navy was appointed, with a 
deputy minister responsible for the administration and a chief 
of the naval general staff charged with planning, preparing and 
organizing for war.278  Later this triumvirate — which could be 
compared with the divided leadership of the army during the 
years 1905-1909, a leadership bound together only by the 
President of the Council of Imperial Defence — was 
reorganized so that all officials were put under the minister. He 
alone became answerable for the naval forces of Russia.279 
The reformers had quite a task confronting them. They had 
to overcome 
"the inertia, bad faith, jealousy, ignorance, 
incomprehension, carelessness (of the former 
administration) ... What remains of the Russian 
navy is so gangrened that if would be better if no 
trace of the ships or the personnel existed ...'"8° 
There were people who regarded the situation as being beyond 
help: 
"the navy is in a deplorable condition, even lower 
than the Ottoman navy; the moneys which ought to 
be spent on the reorganization of the navy do not 
arrive at their destination; the general staff is 
completely incapable, and with the Admiralty 
Council and Imperial Naval Cabinet (i.e. the old 
admirals and the emperor) meddling in the reform, 
the result is anarchy, impotence, squandering of 
money ... There is only one thing that could save 
our country, and that is revolution ..."281 
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The minister tried to eradicate corruption, but the French 
naval attaché was sceptical: 
"I'm afraid that this measure will not result in 
anything, because the malady is endemic in the 
public and private administration; the race ought to 
be reformed ..."282 
Gradually these sombre views were replaced by more 
optimistic reports; the improvement was undeniable, if slow. 
The Duma took a lively interest in the reform, demanding 
tangible improvement as a precondition of approving the naval 
estimates. Sometimes a constitutional crisis threatened, 
because the Duma was seen to be usurping the imperial 
prerogative of naval command.283 It was not until Admiral 
Grigorovic was appointed navy minister in 1911 that complete 
confidence was established between the naval administration 
and the Duma. After that there were no more parliamentary 
difficulties for the naval revival. 
Instead of the previous theatre commanders (e.g. Commander 
in Chief of the Fleet and Ports of the Black Sea), port 
commanders directly under the ministry were now appointed 
to take care of the administrative task in the principal naval 
bases. This made the new commanders-in-chief of the naval 
forces in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific 
able to concentrate on the operational preparation and training 
of their fleets.'" The improvement was slow, because 
innumerable officers of the old school survived in the lists, 
afraid of the pushy young men who had learned from the war.285 
The inadequacy of the old commanders emerged clearly 
during the manoeuvres of 1908, when several young admirals 
demonstrated their ability.286 They were appointed to 
responsible posts and 
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"the Baltic fleet, under the command of an energetic 
admiral, seems to be training capable personnel for 
the future navy ... officers are animated by a new 
spirit, persuaded that a serious effort must be 
made" 281  
There is a delightful whiff of racism in the French comments: 
"It is certain that the Admirals Essen and Boström, 
(Baltic and Black Sea commanders), neither of 
whom is of Russian origin, i.e. Slav, have succeeded 
in giving a shove to the natural torpor of this 
race . . "288  
Little by little serious progress was realized, discipline re-
established289 and a determined effort made "to raise the navy 
to occupy a honorable place in the line of the navies of other 
European powers ... conquering the inertia and habits dating 
from several centuries, in the gigantic effort of reconstructing a 
modern navy".29° 
The crews of the Russian ships were conscripts, who served 
for four years. The port equipages trained the conscripts, 
formed the crews for new ships, and prepared for mobilization.29' 
The numerical strength of the navy did not significantly 
grow during these years, because of the lack of ships for them 
to man.292  The illiteracy of the conscripts was a problem, 
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Sveaborg 	 1 —"— 
Caspian ports 	 1 —"— 
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especially because the navy was becoming more mechanized all 
the time and needed more non-commissioned officers and 
engineers.293 
This was a problem because of the revolutionary spirit of the 
workers, which had caused difficulties in the navy during the 
summer of 1905294 and again in 1906. The Stolypin regime 
revived the discipline of and confidence in the Russian empire. 
Nevertheless, there were new attempts at mutiny in 1912 (as 
well as strikes all over the empire, after the Lena shootings). 
The French observers did not regard these as specially 
dangerous: 
"The plan was the work of a few Apache sailors, 
exited by the revolutionaries, mainly Jews ... There 
are plenty of Jews in the Crimea, and they make the 
sailors believe that they, being better educated than 
the soldiers, are the elite of the nation, the vanguard 
of progress ... They menaced with terrible 
punishment those sailors who did not wish to join 
them ... A certain proof that their influence was not 
prevalent was the fact that the sailors who drew the 
lot to commence the rebellion denouced the 
instigators . . . "295 
This report must reflect the view prevalent in the leading 
spheres of the doomed empire: there was nothing wrong, no 
radical need of reform, with Tsarism; the malcontents were 
Jews or members of other alien minorities; centralization and 
Russification was the way to revival. — The next year was 
reported to have been more peaceful, although many dangerous 
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men remained in service because of the high percentage of 
working men among the sailors; and the civilian strikes were 
continuing.296 Discipline seemed good, but was in many cases 
only external, correct in appearances only, because many men 
were suffering from a loss of morale.297 
Of the other national minorities the navy was most closely 
concerned with the Finns, because their autonomy covered also 
the pilot and lighthouse service. The latter were put under the 
Russian navy ministry in 1912, with the consequent resignation 
of Finnish pilots and a heightened anti-Russian agitation in the 
Grand Duchy. 
"The Finnish question is one of the gravest for the 
Russian chauvinists . . ."298 
6.4. Coastal Defences 
After Tsushima the Russian navy did not amount to much for 
many years. The old battleships remained in the Black Sea, of 
course. But only a few ships were stationed in the Baltic Sea, 
for instance, to serve in the patrol to prevent the Finns from 
smuggling weapons for their supposed rebellion in 1906-1907.299 
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Tri Svjatelija 
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For several years only a few ships were added to the strength; 
they were the two pre-dreadnoughts which had been launched 
according to pre-war programmes.'°° The Baltic fleet was 
looked upon mainly as a training squadron. But in the event of 
war it might have made a few raids on the German coast to 
make the Germans divide their forces instead of concentrating 
the whole of their fleet in the North Sea.301 
For several years coastal defence depended on army units, as 
has been made clear elsewhere in this work, so that two or 
three army corps were held in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, 
weakening the concentration of forces in the principal theatre 
of war. At first the line of defence ran from Kymijoki to Narva. 
In 1909 fortifications were started at Ino, near Terijoki to the 
north of Kronstadt, and at Krasnye Gorki.302 (map 28) 
Libau was abandoned. It had been a naval base for action on 
the oceans against England and/or Japan. But its passages 
tended to silt up, and it was much too close to the German 
299 Continued 
Tsesma with 600 convicts 
Saratov with 60 convicts 
transports and school ships 
Oeakov "excessively ill-used under the efemeral command of Lieutenant 
Schmidt". 
"Quelques. renseignements sur la Marine Russe en Mer Noire". 30. V 1906. 
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border and impossible of defence landwards unless fortifications 
were constructed with a radius of 12 kilometres and at a cost 
of hundreds of millions of roubles. The ancient fort at the 
mouth of the Duna was also declassified.3°3 
However, in step with Russia's revival, the coastal defences 
on the Gulf on Finland were pushed westwards, to the line of 
Porkkala-Nargen, where powerful fortifications began to be 
built on the eve of the war (planned for completion in 1920). 
The main naval base was to be at Reval, with a supporting base 
for lighter forces at Sveaborg; Kronstadt was to remain the 
principal base for construction and major repairs. Flanking 
positions were planned in Moonsound and Åland or Hanko.304 
As far as Åland was concerned, it had to be a floating base 
because of the difficulties arising from the demilitarization of 
the Islands, decreed in the Åland Convention in Paris in 1856.3°6 
The summer manoeuvres of the Baltic fleet were always 
undertaken on the theme of the defence of the Gulf of Finland 
against superior forces, and were to prevent the enemy from 
taking possession of landing beaches. The destroyer and 
submarine flotillas, based at Helsinki and Reval, were in 
contact with observation posts, and were ready to proceed 
against the enemy. The torpedo boats practised attacks against 
armoured ships; the Finnish archipelago was an excellent 
shelter for them against pursuing cruisers."' 
Watching the coasts caused much effort, the Finnish coasts 
"surprisingly much", it was admitted to the French attaché. 
That was because the coast line of Finland was exceptionally 
broken, with innumerable passages. A further reason was the 
lack of confidence of the imperial government in the loyalty of 
the Finns. That was why the navy ministry wanted to organize 
the coastal guard so as to be free from the influence of the 
Helsinki officials. The coast was divided into sectors, with 
headquarters in Reval, Kronstadt, and Sveaborg. These 
303 
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measures were an indication of the fear of a German landing 
on the coasts, threatening the capital, and which a non-existent 
Russian navy was unable to oppose.307 
A similar organization of the coastal guard was centred at 
Sevastopol and Kertch.308 Otherwise, surprisingly little was 
reported in respect of precautions on the Black Sea. 
Apparently, the Turkish fleet was no menace comparable to the 
German one, nor could Russia be threatened so vitally on the 
Black Sea coast as it could in St. Petersburg. 
All these measures of coastal defence were intended to be 
temporary, however, for Russia could not remain satisfied with 
her impotence at sea. 
6.5. Naval Policy 
After Tsushima there was much opposition against rebuilding 
the navy. It was believed that while the land troops were vital 
for Russia, a fleet was only a secondary element, and one in 
conflict with Russian tradition: the fleet had previously existed 
only for moving troops along the coasts, with the severe 
winters restricting its usefulness. The big navy of the turn of 
the century had been a luxury for the empire, a facade of 
might.309 The French atteche felt that in many political spheres 
people were convinced of the absolute futility of constructing 
powerful battleships for Russia; the money would be better 
used for the construction of railways, thus enabling the 
exploitation of Russia's resources.310 
But the emperor demanded a powerful navy worthy of the 
great empire and its world role. The foreign office was also 
interested in an ever growing navy as a factor enhancing the 
prestige of their diplomatists. The break-up of the Russo- 
307 
"Nouvelle organisation de la surveillance des cotes". Naval attaché to navy 
minister 5.III 1910. 
308 = 307 
309 "Rapport annuel" 17.IV 1908. SHM BB 7 n:o 75 i 
300 "Rapport annuel" 8.I 1910. SHM BB 7 n:o 120 r 
153 
Austrian entente made the Black Sea fleet more important 
than earlier, while the question of keeping open the Danish 
Straits and remilitarising the Åland Islands made it important 
to make Russia's voice heard in the Baltic.311  Of course, the 
navy, with navy minister as its spokesman, demanded a 
powerful fleet of big ships, "demonstrating the vanity and 
amour-propre of the navy and the emperor", in the opinion of 
the critics. Russia did not want to be the only great power 
without Dreadnoughts.312 A League for the Restoration of the 
Navy — apparently modelled on the Flottenverein — had been 
founded in 1906 to propagate the idea of a powerful 
commercial and naval fleet. 
"Its spirit of chauvinism and patriotic pride are 
laudable, but it desires a naval development 
incommensurate with the financial possibilities of 
the country and its political needs", 
the attaché had to admit. The League was influential among 
Russian youth and especially among the naval circles and 
Duma representatives.'" 
Naval opinion was that any system other than an open sea 
fleet for the defence of the coasts was an illusion. The light 
flotillas, the fixed defences, the batteries could only be 
auxiliaries for an active fleet, but were unable to replace it. 
Any attempt to defend the coast was foredoomed without 
mastery of the sea. 
Manifold arguments were given for the great programme of 
naval rebuilding presented to the Duma. A mighty navy was 
the symbol of a great power, as Captain Mahan was preaching: 
it was not merely a question of prestige or amour-propre, but of 
concrete interests, of being heard when problems of vital 
concern to Russia were being discussed by the great powers. 
Further, though Russia was peaceful, peace was not dependent 
on Russia alone; therefore, she had to prepare for the worst. 
The Pacific and the Black Sea were not to be forgotten, but the 
mastery of the Baltic was decisive even in regard to the other 
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theatres of war, because it guaranteed Russia's political 
independence and the world peace, essential for her 
commercial, industrial, social, intellectual, and political 
development. It also ensured the dependence of the Baltic 
provinces and Finland, and was the supporting basis of 
Russia's historical interests in the East. 
Russia must not neglect the development. of her naval might 
while her neighbours were making such efforts to augment 
their naval armaments. Refusal would imply that Russia was 
continental power without maritime interests, or that she was 
unable to defend her vital interests.31' 
The pre-eminence of the Baltic fleet reflected the 
consciousness of Germany as Russia's principal enemy. The 
French naval attaché sketched the eventual use of the navy in 
some detail: Sweden was flirting with Germany and was 
clearly inimical to Russia, as was proved by the anti-Russian 
tone of that country's naval propaganda. Then there were the 
separatist tendencies in Finland since 1905. It was 
understandable if Russia was seriously concerned about the 
northern Baltic Sea. The planned Russian Baltic fleet was to 
neutralize Swedish combinations with the Germans and the 
Finns, and to immobilize part of the German fleet in the Baltic 
Sea. 
On the Black Sea Constantinople (i.e. the Straits) remained 
Russia's objective. There had been a moment during the Balkan 
wars when the conquest of the city (by the Bulgarians) had 
seemed imminent. The Russian Black Sea fleet had been 
animated with a desire to advance to the Straits,315 but then 
maintenance of the status quo had been seen to be a more 
useful objective for Russia until she was further strengthened. 
Austria being Russia's principal opponent in the south, the 
French attaché hoped that the Russian fleet would help in 
neutralizing the Austrian fleet and thus aiding the French to 
win the domination of the Mediterranean. 
The Russian role in the Pacific was much more modest than 
before the war, but the Russians had not given up their dreams. 
314 "Projet de loi sur le programme naval de la flotte Russe". Naval attaché to 
navy minister 26.III 1913. 
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It was proved by the voyage of a couple of gunboats along the 
north-east passage, and the idea of putting diesels in the new 
dreadnoughts to make possible the 18 000 sea-mile voyage 
without coaling, thus avoiding the nightmare of Ro2estvenskii.316 
The ship-building programme was presented to the Duma as 
an answer to the German menace against the Russian capital 
and in the Baltic Sea at large. But in fact grand imperialist 
dreams in the Near East and the Far East were involved in the 
naval revival. 
6.6. The Naval Convention Signed 
The Dual Alliance again began to be strengthened in 1912, and 
one part of the process was the signing of a naval convention 
between France and Russia. This was analoguous to the 
military convention, allowing for naval co-operation in case of 
war, and preparatory discussion between the naval chiefs of 
staff.'" 
These discussions shed additional light on the ideas Russian 
admirals had for the use of their future armadas. 
The first discussion was held in the summer 1912 between 
Prince Liewen and Admiral Aubert. Liewen explained that in a 
war against the Triple Alliance the first task of the Russian 
navy would be to secure the freedom of the Black Sea, in order 
to be able to transport supplies for the land operations. Losing 
mastery of the Black Sea would mean disastrous consequences 
for the outcome of the whole campaign. Russia always aimed at 
maintaining a naval superiority of one and a half times the 
Turkish fleet on the Black Sea. If the Italian and Austrian 
fleets should be immobilized by the French navy, Russia's 
prospects on the Black Sea would be good. The situation would 
be completely transformed if these enemies succeeded in 
passing the Straits with the connivance of the Turks. 
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The French admiral declared that it was the intention of the 
first French fleet to destroy or to blockade the enemy fleets in 
their Mediterranean bases. The French were going to prevent 
the Italian and Austrian fleets from concentrating their forces 
in the Ionian Sea; the enemy would not be able to reach the 
Dardanelles without being engaged in battle. 
Aubert made one reservation, however. The Anglo-French 
entente might impose some other objective on his fleet, and 
therefore he was not able to promise unconditional help in the 
case of Austro-Italian action against the Dardanelles. 
If Austria should act in concert with Turkey while Italy 
maintained an offensive against or a threatening posture 
towards France, the situation would be serious for the 
Russians, too. It would be difficult for the French to leave the 
western Mediterranean without being assured of Italian 
neutrality. But the very fact of the French fleet being 
concentrated at Bizerta might intimidate the Austrians from 
acting. 
The Russians would be able to support the French in the 
Mediterranean only after passing the Straits and having 
secured their communications by occupying the coasts of the 
passage. This presupposed complete mastery of the Black Sea. 
Thus, concentrating the French fleet at Bizerta was the 
practical measure that corresponded best to all hypotheses and 
agreed best with Russia's strategic interests. 
In the north the Russians would not be able to engage in 
active operations until 1916 or 1917, when the new battleships 
should be completed. Therefore Liewen asked for a French 
demonstration on the Swedish coast, which would distract the 
Swedes from their schemes in Finland and would thus free the 
Russian army corps immobilized in the north. This the French 
admiral was not able to promise, having agreed with the 
British to concentrate the French navy in the Mediterranean, 
while the British operated in the Channel and in the North 
Sea. 
The French attaché gathered some further information in St. 
Petersburg. It was learned that the Russians were going to 
employ their ancient cruisers and torpedo-boats to keep the 
Swedes respectful. The new battleships, when completed, 
would probably base their operations on Reval. Thus the 
Germans would have to divide their navy into two parts, one 
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against the Russians and the other against the British.318 
Prince Liewen sketched out also a plan of action should the 
Russian Baltic fleet not be engaged in the North and could be 
transferred elsewhere. The fleet would then act in the 
Mediterranean and needed a base there. Liewen asked whether 
Bizerta could be made available for the Russians. The French 
admiral was not too eager to promise this and saw some 
practical difficulties; but he did not refuse in principle. 
In the Far East the Russian and French naval forces were 
found to be too weak and too far from each other to be able to 
take part in joint offensive action.319 But "the hope of 
reconstructing the Pacific squadron remained anchored in the 
soul of Russian sailors and statesmen".'" 
Poincare proposed that the naval convention should be 
incorporated in the diplomatic alliance, as the military 
convention had been incorporated in 1899 by an exchange of 
letters between Murav'ev and Delcasse. Sazonov accepted the 
proposal, and so did the emperor. The president of the council 
of ministers Kokovtsov saw only advantage in the approval of 
the naval convention by the governments, for otherwise 
"these gentlemen (i.e. the admirals) are capable of 
reckless engagements. They talk and talk, not being 
preoccupied by financial or even diplomatic 
considerations. Now they have discussed Turkey, 
Sweden, and who knows what else. They will carry 
us too far".321  
Kokovtsov's words reflect the lack of coherent leadership in the 
"autocratic" Russian government. The principle of unified 
government, which Stolypin had tried to realize, did not work 
very well under Kokovtsov because of imperial obstruction. 
Military, naval, and diplomatic questions, being the prerogative 
of the emporor, in particular escaped Kokovtsov's control. Only 
318 
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financial considerations compelled the respective ministers to 
take into account the opinion of the minister of finance and the 
Duma. 
The naval convention was one additional fact convincing the 
Germans of the reality of the Einkreisung. The German fleet 
saluted the warship which carried Poincare, thus 
demonstrating the fact that the French and the Russians were 
unable to communicate with each other without encountering 
German might. The German fleet was able to close or to open 
the Baltic route.322 But the fact that they felt the need to 
demonstrate anything proved that 
"Germany, notwithstanding her success, her wealth, 
her power, felt a parvenue in the society of nations",323 
When the German ambassador asked for an explanation of the 
naval convention, he was told in effect that it was none of his 
business: 
"Russia and France, being allies, have the right to 
preview all eventualities on land and sea, but 
nothing has been altered in the peaceful character of 
their alliance".324 
Nicholas II was "too busy" to receive the ambassador. 
6.7. Building Programmes 
At first the Duma was reluctant to appropriate money for the 
notoriously corrupt naval administration. But as the navy was 
reformed, especially when Admiral Grigorovic was appointed 
navy minister in 1911; and as the financial situation of the 
imperial treasury improved, the estimates were increased. They 
increased at a faster rate than in other comparable powers: 
322 Ambassador in Berlin to MAE 17.VIII 1912. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 41 
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The Naval Estimates of some Principal Sea Powers 
1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 
USA 518 638 712 683 658 million 
Germany 348 424 504 542 563 580 roubles 
France 312 320 334 371 412 426 
Russia 223 255 241 245 304 349 692 325 
The technical committee of the Admiralty demanded mighty 
armoured ships of 20 000 tons as early as 1906.326  The German 
firm Blohm & Voss was left out of account through French 
protests, and the ships were planned by the Italian constructor 
Admiral Cuniberti, father of the dreadnought idea. They were 
built in Russia by Russian workmen and with Russian 
materials.327  The ships were much more expensive for Russia 
than for the other powers because of the feeble productivity of 
Russian labour and the dependence on foreign parts and 
expertise.328 They were also very slow in building, because the 
technical committee kept modifying the plans, and because of 
Russian sloth, lack of energy, numerous church holidays, and 
general inefficiency, as well as continuous corruption.329 
In the year 1909 four dreadnoughts of 23 000 tons were laid 
down .in the Baltic (the "Gangut"-class) and in 1911 three 
similar battleships (of 22 800 tons) for the Black Sea as an 
answer to the Turkish naval programme.330 These plans 
presupposed enlarging the building slips and docks in St. 
Petersburg, Kronstadt, Sevastopol, and Nikolaev. Also a 
floating base for Åland was ordered, to consist of seven 
transports for various purposes.331  In 1912 Admiral Grigorovie 
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succeeded in obtaining the sanction of the Duma for four 
battlecruisers of 32 000 tons (the "Borodino"-class), with light 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.332 This "small 
programme" was to be completed by 1917. It was only a first 
step towards the mighty Russian fleet, as its very name 
suggests,333  but in 1917 the empire would already have had "a 
respectable embryo fleet".334 
The "grand programme" was presented and accepted in 
1913-1914. By 1924 the Baltic fleet was to consist of two 
squadrons of battleships and a division of battlecruisers, 24 
dreadnoughts in all. By 1930 there was to be 24 
superdreadnoughts of 31 000-34 000 tons, and twelve 
dreadnoughts in reserve squadrons, in all 36 big ships. Four 
ships were to be launched annually, battleships and 
battlecruisers alternatingly. The battle squadrons were to be 
332 
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18 torpedo-boats 
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accompanied by 28 light cruisers, 116 destroyers, and 39 
submarines.335 
The programme for the Black Sea was not as closely 
detailed; it was only decided that the Black Sea fleet was to be 
one and a half times stronger than all other Black Sea fleets 
put together.336  The Balkan wars and Turkey's intention to have - 
dreadnoughts built in England caused some anxiety in Russia, 
because her ships could not be constructed with equal speed. 
Hence it was proposed to buy the Turkish and even Brazilian 
ships then being built in England. Nothing came of the scheme.337 
(The ships served eventually with the Grand Fleet in 1914-
1918). Only six cruisers of 8000 tons were intended for the 
Pacific, plus gunboats for the Amur river flotilla. 
By the end of 1913 the Ganguts and the Borodinos were 
under construction,338 the work proceeding "painfully slowly". 
335 Projected Russian fleet in 1924 
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8 battle cruisers + "Rurik" in reserve 
16 light cruisers + 3 in reserve 
90 torpedo boats 
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8-12 light cruisers in reserve 
78-80 destroyers 
36-45 destroyers in reserve 
24-27 submarines 
12-15 submarines in reserve 
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The cruisers and destroyers were hardly laid down, the main 
effort being concentrated on the big ships. Only a couple of 
cruisers, a few destroyers and submarines were launched and 
entered into service before the war. The first Ganguts were 
completed in 1914 but the Borodinos never. 
Thus the "grand imperial navy" remained mainly on paper, 
and its main importance lies in the illustration it provided of 
Russia's imperial plans and hopes. The giant ships were 
designed to show the cross of St. Andreas in the distant oceans, 
they would probably not have been appropriate to the confined 
waters of the Baltic Sea, not to speak of the Gulf of Finland. 
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7. Preparing for the Great War 
7.1. The Dual Alliance Revitalized 
In August 1911 Generals 2ilinskii and Dubail had discussed 
the military convention at the usual annual meeting. The 
Russian chief of staff had tried to reassure his colleague that 
Russian support for France was certain, that the emperor was 
not going back on his word.340 But much anxiety was caused by 
Potsdam, by the Moroccan crisis, and by the Balkan events, 
and new exertions were needed before the Dual Alliance was 
definitely repaired. 
As a reaction to German behaviour in the Moroccan crisis a 
national revival was felt in France from 1911 onwards. 
Poincare, an Alsatian, was made prime minister and then 
president of the republic. Delcasse was appointed navy 
minister and then ambassador to St. Petersburg. The army got 
a competent leader in Joffre, and the three-year service law of 
1913 increased its effectives by a third. 
Poincare visited Russia in the spring of 1912. He had with 
him a paper sketching the outline of the military situation as 
the French general staff saw it, to be used as a guide for his 
discussions with the Russians. The generals wrote that the 
Germans were well aware of the difficulties the Russians faced 
in making an offensive. They also knew that they had no hope 
340 "Proces-verbal de l'entretien du 18/31 aoüt 1911 entre les chefs de l'etat-
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of decisive results from a German attack on Russia. The 
Germans had learned of the French decision to attack the 
Rhine with all their available forces immediately after the 
declaration of war. They had probably calculated the political 
and military consequences of the first battle, i.e. the attitude of 
Belgium, England, and Italy. It was absolutely against German 
military doctrine to disperse their forces. That is why they had 
decided to attack France first and in full force. It was a fact 
that they were only leaving on their eastern frontier a minimal 
force, incapable of taking the offensive. 
The information received indicated that Russia was 
preparing for a battle against both Germany and Austria 
simultaneously. But Russia was an ally of France. It was in the 
interest of both countries to fight the principal enemy with 
united strength, in order not to get beaten separately, one after 
the other. France was not able to choose the moment of battle; 
she had to fight immediately and with full force. Consequently 
it was of primordial importance for Russia to act simultaneusly 
with France. Even operations of secondary importance could be 
decisive on condition that they were immediate. 
Of course, Russia had her problems: the size of the empire, 
its sparse communications, the form of the Polish salient. But 
the offensive need not be very powerful at the start. 
Dragomirov had been of the opinion that Russia had to act 
immediately whatever the dangers and material results. It was 
of the utmost importance to make the Germans believe in the 
seriousness of the attack and thereby to compel them to divide 
their forces at the beginning of the war. Even preparations that 
made an immediate Russian attack seem probable might suf-
fice for this result."' 
These arguments were not new. What was new was the 
urgency with which they were presented. Of course, Poincare 
was not able to move the Russian colossus at once, on his first 
visit. But these arguments were repeated on every occasion and 
little by little they had their effect, in time for the great war — 
or, of course, one might say that they had their effect in 
making the great war break out. 
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Joffre and Zilinskii, the chiefs of the general staffs, took up 
the discussion of the technical details. First of all they agreed 
that the term "defensive war" in the convention did not imply 
a war to be waged defensively. On the contrary, it was 
absolutely necessary to attack vigorously, and as 
simultaneously as possible. As always, the defeat of the 
German army was stated to be the principal aim of the 
alliance. The German mobilization was to be followed by an 
instantaneous and simultaneous mobilization in France and in 
Russia without further consultation; but such a consultation 
would be necessary before an Austrian or Italian mobilization 
was answered by a French and Russian mobilization. 
Joffre insisted that it was the German intention to attack 
France first, leaving only a minimum of forces in the east. 
Germany had the greatest interest in being able to fight France 
first, and only then Russia. The allies had to prevent this by a 
simultaneous attack from two directions. The French general 
staff had left only a minimum of troops to guard the Alpine 
passages — Italy was at this time engaged in a war with 
Turkey — and concentrated the mass of their army on the 
German frontier. Its numbers surpassed the 1,300,000 men 
promised in 1892. The French railways were being improved in 
order to win an advantage of one or two days over the German 
troop concentrations. 
Zilinskii accepted all this, but then he remarked that Austria 
had remarkably improved her military ability and perfected her 
railways with an obvious offensive intention. Russia could not 
afford to expose herself to defeat in the Austrian theatre of 
war. The moral effect would be disastrous. She had to leave a 
considerable part of her forces on the souther front. And then, 
while Sweden had earlier adopted an attitude of wait and see 
in order to join the winning party at a favourable moment, she 
had lately been incited by Germany and would probably march 
against Russia with the Germans. That was why Russia had to 
keep in Finland and in St. Petersburg considerably more troops 
than had been deemed necessary earlier. The construction of 
railways in Asia Minor also allowed the Turks to accelerate 
their mobilization and troop concentration. Consequently 
Russia had to maintain large garrison on her Turkish borders. 
But after repeating these old arguments against 
concentrating all forces on the German front, Zilinskii went on 
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to say that the Russian general staff had resolutely decided to 
attack Germany with at least 800,000 men. And the offensive 
was to be felt by the Germans after the fifteenth day. 
Joffre remarked that the German defeat would dispel all 
concern about Swedish or Turkish action, and he again 
stressed the need to concentrate all efforts against the principal 
enemy. He also emphasized the necessity to improve the 
Russian strategic railways so as to accelerate troop 
concentration. He approved of the plan to put the centre of 
gravity of the Russian armies close to Warsaw, which would 
allow an attack towards Allenstein if the Germans were 
deployed in East Prussia, or an operation on the left bank of 
the Vistula if the enemy was in the region of Thorn-Posen.'}2 
Of course, Zilinskii's promise did not mean that 800,000 men 
were to attack on the fifteenth day — the attack was only to be 
felt by the Germans after the fifteenth day. And, as will be 
recounted later, there was plenty to wish for and to revise in 
the plans for troop concentration and railway construction 
before the French could be satisfied. The emphasis on the 
Austrian, Turkish, and Swedish danger remained in spite of all 
French efforts to dispel Russian apprehensions by the argument 
that the first battle would solve all difficulties. 
But 2ilinskii had agreed on the importance of simultaneous 
action against Germany. The Dual Alliance had thus returned 
to the harmony of Obrucev's and Boisdeffre's days. This was no 
one-sided victory of the French over the Russians. 
Concentrating against the principal enemy made military sense 
to the Russian generals, too. 
7.2. The Problem of Wartime 
Communication Between the Allies 
From the very beginning of the alliance the problem of wartime 
communication between France and Russia had been discussed. 
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It was obviously important for information on the German 
army and German war plans to be exchanged between the 
allies. It was especially important for the Russians to be able to 
know at the earliest moment whether the principal German 
offensive was to be directed against France or Russia. 
Various means of communication were proposed: pigeons, 
emissaries, agents in neutral countries, and the telegraph cable. 
But the problem was that Germany and her allies were 
situated between Russia and France, and the flanking neutrals, 
Sweden-Norway, Denmark, Greece, and Turkey, were more or 
less under German influence, or anyway unable to resist 
German pressure, in the opinion of the Russian generals.343 
Experiments were made with . pigeons, on the line 
Karlskrona—Libau and Karlskrona—Copenhagen. Only 8 
pigeons out of 65 arrived at the destination. It was concluded 
that over the long sea stretches only pigeons of strong muscle 
could be trusted. A pigeon station was planned in Esbjerg and 
a Russian consulate was to be established there to act as a 
cover. The cost of the total line from Libau to Dunkirk was 
estimated at 500 000 francs. But the ultimate outcome of these 
experiments and discussions was that communication by 
pigeon-post was found to be unsatisfactory.'" 
A cable link was then envisaged. A plan for a special cable 
from France by the western side of England to Archangel was 
studied.345 By 1901 opinion leaned in favour of an alternative 
plan of a cable being layed from Bizerta to Sevastopol. There 
was to be a cable station at Ergasteria (Greece), and if England 
remained neutral in the war, the cable would be safe. But 
continuing the cable through the Straits was highly 
problematical. And English neutrality was by no means certain 
at this time. Other means had to be found.346 
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An aerial connection was proposed; aerostations (equipped 
with dirigible balloons?) were to be constructed. This proposal 
does not seem to have resulted in anything.347 
The key to the solution of the problem lay in the 
development of wireless telegraphy. At the meeting of the 
chiefs of staff in 1907 it was suggested that wireless links might 
be set up from French North Africa to Minsk, Novo-Georgievsk, 
and Sevastopol.348  At the meeting in 1909 the lack of a wireless 
telegraphy was discussed anew. The French spoke strongly as 
Palicyn had wanted in this as well as in the railway question 
mentioned earlier. "The French general staff was unable to 
understand" that a problem discussed two years previously had 
not been advanced to the arrangement of the details for the 
installation of wireless stations. "The French general staff 
expects the realization of these requests which they had 
repeated many times, with an impatience which is more than 
legitimate"; they "demand emphatically that the Russian 
government speed up the solution as much as possible".349 
The wireless stations were then built and by 1912-1913 
communication was functioning satisfactorily. Daily wireless 
contact was held between Paris—Bobruisk and Bizerta—
Sevastopol. The Eiffel Tower—Sveaborg link was experimented 
with and it was found that the Sveaborg station had to be 
made more powerful. New powerful stations were being built 
on the Black Sea coast. Wireless stations in Montenegro and 
Norway were discussed, but came to nothing. 
By this time England was no longer a potential enemy. Her 
cables could be used for communication in case of war. The 
telegraph connection was to run from Paris through England to 
America, Australia, and Zanzibar, or through South Africa to 
Zanzibar and from there to Odessa. The British had suggested 
a line through Bombay and Teheran to Russia, but the Russians 
insisted on Odessa. The document does not indicate how the 
Turkish area was to be cleared.35o 
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Correspondence through emissaries was organized, too. 
Messages were to be sent by telegraphy to London and from 
there to the Scandinavian countries, from which officer 
emissaries were to carry them to Russia.351  
Thus it was not until the years 1912-1913 that the Russians 
could be confident in knowing whether the Germans were 
attacking France by the time the Russians were to start their 
own promised offensive against Germany. 
7.3. The Russian Army in 1912 
Colonel Matton was replaced by General Laguiche in 1912, 
because Germany was represented by a general in St. 
Petersburg. Laguiche did not know Russian, but he was aided 
by Captain Wehrlin who did. In addition a horde of young 
captains were commanded to Russia to study in the military 
academy, to visit the military districts, or to observe the 
manoeuvres. They sent in batches of information to Paris 
during the years 1912-1914. 
The numerical strength of the Russian army was impressive. 
The Numerical Strength of the Russian army in 1912 
active troops 	 1 230 000 	 men 
reserve 	 3 675 000 
militia, trained 	 828 000 
Cossack I 	 60 000 
Cossack II 	 50 000 
Cossack III 	 53 000 
Cossack reserve 	 53 000 
militia I, untrained 	 3 345 000 
militia II, untrained 	 5 016 000 
	
352 
The effectives in active service in 1913 
service class of 1910 	 436 000 	 men 
1911 	 423 000 
1912 	 435 000 
352 = 350 
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in all 	 1 303 000 
of whom in the 
navy 	 42 000 
frontier guards 	 56 000 
thus left in the army 	 1 286 000 
of whom in Asia 	 240 000 
	
353 
Of the annual class of 1 200 000 men Russia thus conscripted 
rather fewer than 450 000 recruits for the three years of active 
service in the infantry or artillery, for the four years in other 
army branches, or the five years in the navy. Volunteer 
students could be trained as reserve officers. After the active 
period the men served 7 years in the first reserve and the 7-8 
years in the second reserve and finally 5 years in the militia. 
Sailors did five years of reserve service only. The Cossacks 
went through one preparatory year, four years in active units, 
eight years on leave of absence, five years in the reserve, and 
finally ten years in the militia. 
The peacetime infantry units were kept at half the wartime 
strength. Infantry units had to mobilize themselves if war broke 
out, and in addition they had to mobilize their supply 
formations and reserve units. The covering troops on the 
western border were up to three-fifths or three-quarters of their 
combat strength, and mobilized only themselves in the event of 
war. After the reform of 1910 the rule of accepting only 25 % of 
local national minorities referred solely to the peacetime 
strength. 
The four youngest reserve classes (of about 400 000 men each) 
were enough to make up the active army at mobilization. The 
rest were left for the reserve divisions. 
When mobilization occurred, the telegram would be seen by 
the reservists on the second day at the latest. After that the 
men would gather at their collection points, and from there 
they would be transported to their units. Infantry and artillery 
would be mobilized between third-ninth day (exceptionally by 
the fifteenth day), reserve troops between the ninth-fifteenth 
day (exceptionally by the twenty-eighth day). 
The railway transport from Moscow to Brest took three to 
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five days, from Kazan to Warsaw eight days. One army corps 
needed 128-142 trains, and while one double line carried 32 
trains a day, the corps would occupy the line for four days, and 
much more where the line was a single-track one, allowing 
8-16 trains only. Because there were too few lines leading to 
the western frontier, several corps had to use one line. Thus the 
concentration would take from three to four weeks.354 
The Russian infantry amounted to 1260 battalions of 800 
rifles. They were organized in 70 divisions and 17 rifle brigades 
of 16 or 8 battalions. The cavalry consisted of 877 squadrons 
and sotnias of 128 sabres, organized in 24 divisions and 8 
brigades. There were 640 batteries of eight or six guns in the 
artillery. The various services were united in army corps 
consisting usually of two infantry divisions, sometimes with an 
additional rifle brigade; a cavalry division; two artillery 
brigades or 12 field batteries and a few heavy guns; and a 
sapper battalion. 
An example of the battle strength of a Russian army corps 
24 squadrons 
32 battalions 
12 field batteries 
3 heavy batteries 
1 sapper battalion  
3,072 sabres 
25,600 rifles 
96 cannons 
12 mortars 
72 machine guns 
24 cannons 
There were 27 army corps in European Russia, three corps in 
Caucasia, two in Turkestan, and five in Siberia. Each army 
corps was to mobilize itself an in addition a division of first 
and a division of second reserve. 
An army consisted of 3-5 corps, with one brigade of heavy 
artillery, one pontoon battalion, railway battalion(s), a wireless 
company, a balloon detachment and a squadron of gendarmes. 
These grand units did not exist in peacetime. The army staffs 
were to be formed out of the military district staffs during the 
mobilization. 
Local brigades and commandants were charged with the task 
of keeping an eye on the recruits and reservists. The militia 
formed 20 mixed divisions on mobilization (4 regiments, 1 
354 Capitaine Wehrlin; "Les caracteristiques de 1'armee Russe 1912". EMATSH 
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artillery group, 1 cavalry regiment, 1 sapper company) from the 
first call-up and 20 divisions from the second call-up. 
In addition there were 54 000 frontier guards. They served 
under the command of the ministry of finance, which was 
charged with the customs and frontier establishment. The 
guards in Manchuria were organized militarily, their numbers 
equalling that of an army corps.355 
ass Note sur l'action militaire de la Russie en Europe, 
AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 41 
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cavalry brigade 
The strength of the active Russian army in 1912 
Effectives in Russian 
battalion 
rifle regiment 
infantry regiment 
squadron 
cavalry regiment 
battery 
artillery group 
artillery brigade 
infantry division 
rifle brigade 
cavalry division  
army units 
800 rifles 
1,600 rifles 
3,200 rifles 
4 machine guns 
128 sabres 
768 
8 cannons 
24 
48  
2 battalions 
4 battalions 
6 squadrons 
3 batteries 
6 batteries 
4 regiments 
4 rifle regiments 
24 squadrons or sotnias 
3 cavalry regiments and 
1 Cossack regiment 
2 regiments 
in Europe 
Caucasia 
Siberia 
Europe 
Caucasia 
Turkestan 
Europe 
Caucasia 
Turkestan 
Siberia 
Kronstadt 
Vladivostok 
European 
frontiers  
	
53 	 divisions (47 infantry 3 Guards 3 Grenad) 
6 
11 
	
9 	 rifle brigades 
2 
6 
	
19 	 cavalry divisions (incl. 2 Cossack div.) 
	
4 	 cavalry brigades 
	
4 	 cavalry divisions (incl. 3 Cossack div.) 
	
1 	 cavalry division 
	
2 	 Cossack brigades 
	
2 	 Cossack brigades 
	
449 	 field batteries 
	
53 	 horse batteries 
	
46 	 mountain batteries 
	
71 	 mortar batteries 
	
21 	 heavy batteries 
	
6 	 fortress artillery battalions 
12 
38 
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The troops were armed with the 7.62 mm rifle of the 1891 
model and the light cannon of 76.2 mm. The cavalry fought 
with sabre and carabine, the Cossacks had their lance. A 
novelty was the machine gun. In the Manchurian war they had 
nominally had one company of eight machine guns for each 
division or brigade, and six machine guns for each cavalry 
regiment; in practice all units had not received these new 
weapons. By 1906 nominal strength was 4 machine guns for 
each regiment, and from 1911 onwards one company for each 
regiment.356 This was much less than the Germans had when 
the war began. 
Another novelty, in respect of which the experience of the 
Far East war had proved useful, was the adoption of a uniform 
in protective colouring. One such was being adopted by most 
armies, but the French could not understand it: 
"Evidently, the soldier is not visible, but when all 
3" Continued 
Caucasia 	 5 	 fortress artillery battalions 
Turkestan 	 1 
	
39 	 sapper battalions 
	
9 	 pontoon battalions 
	
16 	 balloon detachments 
	
13 	 railway battalions 
	
7 	 wireless companies 
	
4 	 siege detachments 
	
17 	 fortress sapper companies 
	
16 	 mine companies 
	
13 	 telegraphy companies 
	
11 	 pigeon stations 
The military districts 
in Europe 	 St. Petersburg 
Vilna 
Warsaw 
Kiev 
Odessa 
Moscow 
Kazan 	 27 army corps 
Caucasia 	 3 
Turkestan 	 2 
in Siberia 	 Omsk 	 1 division 	 16 batls. 
Irkutsk 	 II corps 	 32 
III 	 32 
Amur 	 I 	 32 in Nikolaevsk 
IV 	 32 Vladivostok 
V 	 32 Habarovsk 
5 army corps 
356 "Mitrailleuses'. 9. II 1912. EMATSH 7 N 1539 
174 
armies have adopted it, there are bound to occur 
innumerable and demoralizing mistakes. It seems 
better not to proceed too fast in this direction ..."35; 
There was something untraditional and unmilitary in the drab 
dress. And it is true that the French poilus were easily 
distinguished by the German machine gunners in August 1914. 
Of course, enough Russians were killed in spite of their 
protective colouring. 
A totally new branch of military service was aviation. By 
March 1912 there were 7 balloon companies in European 
Russia, 1 in Caucasia, and 4 in Siberia. Great dirigible balloons 
were being constructed in 1912 and 1913. There were aviation 
schools in Hatsina and Sevastopol, and aviation companies of 7 
squadrons each in St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Sevastopol. Each 
squadron consisted of eight aeroplanes, and more were being 
constructed. Three factories in St. Petersburg were building 
Nieuport-, Farman-, Hanriot-, and Voisin-types. Combined 
manoeuvres had taken place with aeroplanes and ships, 
although without decisive results.358 Sikorsky had constructed-
his giant "Ilja Muromec". This grandfather of all strategic 
bombers carried 1000 kg of bombs but flew only 75 km/h.359 
The general impression received by the French observers was 
that 
"the Russian army seems, in its present state, able to 
fight succesfully against its eventual enemies. The 
Russian soldier is first class, tough, well trained, 
disciplined, and devoted. The immense majority of 
the army is animated by an excellent spirit ... It 
could be among the first armies of the world if it 
were able to take all advantage of the excellent 
elements it has. But the natural unconcern of the 
Slav charachter has let bad habits seep into the 
army. There is much good will to regain the distance 
lost in the war of 1904-1905, but it is frustrated by 
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the absence of method, useless employment of men 
and resources ..."36° 
Perhaps the observers, guests of the army, were too polite to 
report on the widespread misuse of alcohol which seems to 
have been one of the worst failings of the officer corps.36' 
Many problems remained. "The high command is being 
rejuvenated", ran the French report, but the new commanders 
came from the old schools, the Guards and the general staff. 
The staff officers were "intelligent and diligent men, but with 
little experiment of troop command, office workers rather than 
field officers". Regimental officers were often without orders, 
they lacked initiative, and went by regulations and habits.362 
The immense number of men withdrawn from training into 
the supply services was also noted: hardly 10 % of the 
effectives appeared on the training ground. The fighting troops 
had to give up men for many essential services — the 
secretariat, the medical services, the upkeep of armament and 
equipment as well as of the barracks.363 
Much work was being done to create a clear doctrine of war 
for the whole of the Russian army, and inspiration was sought 
in German and French ideas: 
"They have not enough confidence in themselves. 
They are inclined to have an exaggerated idea of the 
value of the German army, which they are too eager 
to copy. Thereby their morale suffers and they tend 
to assume a defensive attitude .. ."364  
It is no wonder that the main defect of Russia's military might, 
her incapacity to wage a prolonged war, due to industrial and 
social backwardness, was not noted by the observers. A long 
war was not exptected by anyone. The experiences of the USA 
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in the Civil War years of 1861-1865 or Russia in 1904-1905 
were not taken in account, because these were non-European 
wars. The lightning Prussian wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870-
1871 were the relevant models. The observes, French staff 
officers, had recieved no training in economic warfare or 
observing social phenomena, of course. They prepared for the 
one great battle at the opening of the war. 
They did notice the threat to discipline caused by the 
revolutionary epidemic. In their opinion it especially 
contaminated the technical services. They reported on the 
naval mutinies of 1912, (p. 149) and commented: 
"In spite of the official silence, and affirmations in 
the press that the crews are completely calm, there 
are serious reasons for apprehension ..."365 
But these disorders in the fleet and in some engineer units 
"must not be given more importance than they 
deserve. They were due to particular reasons, mainly 
to the social origins of the rebels, most of whom are 
factory workers."' 
It seems that even workers were held to be outsiders, like Jews, 
whose malcontent was not to be taken as a proof that there 
was something thoroughly wrong with Russia. 
7.4. The Problem of the Nationalities 
Still Unresolved 
The national minorities of Russia — Poles, the various Finnish 
tribes, Letts, Tartars, Jews, Germans, Armenians, Persians, 
Gypsies, Greeks, etc. etc. — consisted more than 30 % of the 
population. The French observers seem to have come to the 
conclusion that the national minorities caused more problems 
to Russian army than did the revolutionaries. 
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"The result of this ethnic diversity is that Russia, in 
spite of her strong political organization, lacks 
unity ... The Russian race proper — the Great 
Russians, the White Russians, and the Little 
Russians or Ukrainians — which forms two-thirds of 
the population, is thus encircled by a cordon of other 
nationalities, sometimes loyal or indifferent, but 
sometimes hostile or even dangerous". 
That was the reason for the rule that all units must consist at 
least three-quarters of Russians, and the remaining quarter 
must not be all composed of the same minority race; and that 
the natives of a border region must serve their time far from 
their province of origin. Thus military service was intended as 
an instrument for Russifying the various elements. 
The Poles were always a problem. Regiments in the Polish 
salient consisted nearly exclusively of Russians. There were few 
Poles and no Jews. But the greater part of the reservists to be 
called up in the event of a mobilization were Poles. The officers 
of these units were apprehensive, and asked themselves 
whether the Russian core was strong enough to absorb the 
Polish contingent of up to 80 reservists per company. After the 
reform of 1905 a Russo-Polish detente had seemed possible, but 
the favourable attitude (of the Poles or Russians? or both?) did 
not last long. "At present we (the Poles) live under a regime of 
perpetual tracasserie". The Russians for their part "don't 
express any sympathy towards their Polish subjects". The 
Poles regarded the Russian army as wretched and had a low 
opinion of the Russians from the point of view of morals, 
corruption etc., "but they are blinded by hate, having nothing 
to envy the Russians in this respect".": 
There were Austrian and German Poles in the enemy armies, 
and the enemy itself, Austria or Germany, was not antipathetic 
to the Poles. "During the Bosnian crisis they would have 
greeted the Austrians with an open heart". Germany did not 
enjoy so great a sympathy in Poland, but she was admired 
because of her might and commercial and military prestige. 
The sympathy of the Jews was without reserve on the side of 
Germany. The Russians and sometimes also the Poles had a 
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profound contempt for them, but they could not live without 
the Jews, because without them the country could not be run. 
"Certainly the influence of this element is not to be 
despised because of the embarrasments of all kinds 
that it may create for the Russians. I have heard 
from a reliable source that in case of a war certain 
railway lines would be destroyed by the Jews". 
A glimpse of the conditions the Jews had to live in can be seen 
in this description of Poland as a theatre of war: 
"Only the dwellings of the Christian population can 
be counted on (for billeting and feeding the troops), 
because the houses of the Jews are so crowded and 
so filthy, and their food is so miserable, even in the 
great cities, that quartering troops in the Jewish 
sections is absolutely impossible".368 
French commentators were well aware, too, that the situation 
in Finland was a cause for serious concern. The Finns were still 
not Russified by national service. 
"The population of Finland, although forming part 
of the Russian empire, according to the 1809 peace 
treaty of Fredrikshamn, does not perform any 
military service, paying instead the contribution of 
the 'military millions' to the Russian treasury",369 
It was decided to transfer two parishes on the Russian border 
from the administration of the Grand Duchy to the 
Government of St. Petersburg because they were in the district 
of the new coastal fortifications. This caused an uproar in the 
Finnish opinion. The French observer commented: 
"It is of no importance to us who is right, but the 
fact is that because of two parishes this country is in 
a state of intensive agitation, and in the event of a 
war should need two army corps to maintain her in 
submission. A friend of mine, a general, who had 
visited Abo, said to me that his Swedish friends had 
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to accompany him on his walk to avoid his being 
insulted by the Finns. This is an example of the 
sentiments of this population, which is renowned for 
its brutal obstinacy". 
Of course, the Russian government had no intention of 
considering the restitution of Finnish autonomy, and the whole 
of the Viipuri government was decided to be put under direct 
Russian administration. Thus the situation remained 
precarious. Colonel Janin continues: 
"The agitation seems unlikely to calm down, on the 
contrary. It is the Finnish blood that is to be let first, 
said a well-connected general of the Guards".37° 
The Finnish question, as we have seen, was linked up in the 
Russian mind with the Swedish threat. 
7.5. A Catalogue of Enemies 
Sweden was afraid of a Muscovite offensive to the northern 
Atlantic. That is why the Swedish army was modernized, the 
northern border of the country fortified at Boden, and the navy 
strengthened, with a national subscription because the 
government and the Riksdag were not generous enough. The 
Russification of Finland was seen as the first step in Russia's 
march to the Atlantic.37' 
From the St. Petersburg horizon these Swedish preparations 
seemed in turn an indication of offensive intentions. The 
Russians knew that Denmark and Norway were not able to 
defend themselves against German pressure. Germany was 
known to be dreaming of a northern Germanic union, which 
would give her twelve million new subjects of a superior race, 
the Norwegian fjords, the Baltic Straits, and Swedish military 
strength. Denmark and Norway had only about 60 000 men 
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each in their armed forces, but the Swedish army consisted of 
six active divisions or 120 000 men with additional local units 
for defence. 
It was believed that the Swedish army was going to invade 
Finland while the mass of the Russian army was engaged 
elsewhere, thereby creating a diversion in the north and 
menacing the Russian capital. Germany was known to have 
promised the restitution of Finland to Sweden at the end of the 
war.372 
"The Russian government does not ignore the fact 
that an alleged secret treaty exists between Sweden 
and Germany." 
That was one of the reasons for reinforcing the Russian Baltic 
fleet.' It was also the reason why Russia would dearly have 
loved to ignore the prohibition of 1856, which prevented her 
from occupying or fortifying the Åland Islands against a 
Swedish attack or as a base for Russian operations. But 
Swedish and British prostests had forced Russia to give up her 
attempt in 1907 to occupy the islands under the pretext of 
watching the revolutionary smuggling of weapons on the Baltic 
Sea. 
The northern menace was one of the main reasons for 
constructing the fortifications on the coasts of the Gulf of 
Finland mentioned earlier, as well as for several naval plans. 
Swedish animosity gave credence to the wildest reports of the 
supposed Finnish rebellion. The worst consequence of the 
northern menace was the fact that Russia had to keep 
considerable body of active forces in the vicinity of St. 
Petersburg, away from the decisive battle-point of the principal 
front. 
Turkey was held to be a German instrument. Her intervention 
in a Russo-German war was probable. Her enmity, with the 
unreliability of the Caucasian populations, bound the two 
Caucasian corps to the Caucasian frontier. But it was hoped 
that the third Caucasian corps from the northern slope of the 
Caucasus would be transported to the principal theatre of war. 
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The active corps from the Black Sea coast, the expeditionary 
force, were also given tasks on the Austrian front. The ghost of 
the expedition was kept up with second-rate units.34 
The Russian army in Transcaspia consisted of two army 
corps, 44 infantry battalions in all. In addition there was a 
native army of 30 000 men in the Bukhara protectorate. The 
local peoples endured docilely the Russian domination, but 
they could not be left without surveillance by at least 20 000 
men. Consequently there remained about 60 000 men free for 
active operations. The French observer learned that the 
Transcaspian army was still dreaming of an offensive towards 
the Afghan and Indian borders, animated by the old animosity 
against England. But the local schemes were of no consequence 
in the years 1912-1914, because the entente of 1907 had 
eliminated the possibility of a Russo-English conflict in Central 
Asia. 
Of the old dreams of Asian conquest only Persia still had 
some relevance. Since 1897 there had been a Russian-officered 
Cossack brigade in the Shah's country. It consisted of two 
regiments of four squadrons each, and one field battery and 
two horse batteries of four cannons eachs. The Russians had 
opposed the revolutionary movement in Persia which had since 
1906 tried to replace the corrupt Shah by either modern 
democratic or ancient religious forms of government. The 
political process was too confused to be discussed here, but the 
Russians had succeeded in preventing any kind of order being 
established in northern Persia. The French major continues his 
report: 
"The Russo-Japanese war was seen by the Persians 
as certain proof of the weakness of their once 
powerful neighbour. To the estimation, mixed with 
fear, which Russia had inspired up to that time, had 
been added a feeling of contemptuous pity; the 
powerful barbarians turned out to be feeble and poor 
barbarians ... (The Persians) much preferred the 
English to the Russians who constantly hurt the 
polite people which the Persians are with their rude 
374 "Emploi des troupes actives Russes en cas de guerre. Etude faite en Octo-
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manners. In addition, the Russians are poor while 
the English are rich".35  
Another observer confirmed these impressions: 
"General Ljakov's (commander of the Cossack 
brigade) role in the bombardment of the Mejlis had 
provoked indignation in Tabriz, and the role of the 
Russian consul exasperates the people. Already 
abhorred by the Turks, the Russians are making 
themselves abhorred in Persia. Their situation in 
Caucasia is already very difficult because of the local 
opposition to them, and now they are creating new 
difficulties for themselves in Persia".376 
Central Asia was destined to remain on the outer confines of 
the approaching European conflict. These reports are of 
interest mainly as an illustration of Asian currents of thought, 
which had relevance only to a more distant future. 
Earlier mentioned has been the Russian opinion that Finnish 
blood would be the first to be let. But (this same Guards 
general continued) the next blood to be let would be Austrian. 
One of the young captains commanded to Russia reported that 
the Habsburg monarchy was apparently the hereditary enemy, 
much more hated than Germany. Germany provoked antipathy 
and suspicion, but also admiration. France was regarded with 
an undeniable sympathy, and her financial support to Russia 
was one of the reasons for it. But a certain susceptibility also 
remained, since France had left Russia in the lurch in 1905. 
Little sympathy and little confidence was felt towards England, 
in spite of the recent entente. Political relations with Japan 
were good since the peace and subsequent treaties had been 
signed. But rancour remained because of defeat; no hate, but a 
desire to avenge the received affront. Romania enjoyed a little 
sympathy but not much confidence. 
The officers on the German frontier admired the clean, 
ordered towns behind the border, "so different from their own". 
But they also knew the German pride, Deutschland über alles, 
375 "La Russie et la Gde Bretagne en Asie Centrale", by H. de Bouillaue de 
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heartily detested the Prussians and hoped for a war to beat the 
Germans and to attack Berlin.378 
Of course, the good captain had not conducted a modern 
opinion poll. He had received his impressions from the officers' 
mess and staff officers, and thus his report reflects only a part 
of Russian opinion. However, Austria and Germany were 
generally regarded as Russia's principal enemies. 
7.6. Planning the Russian Troop 
Concentration in 1912 
The Schlieffen Plan was naturally made and kept secret. Its 
main lines were, however, well known and caused among the 
French the desperate need to ensure Russian pressure in the 
east to ease the German superiority on the French frontier. 
It was known that the Germans had also studied the 
possibility of an attack eastwards in the beginning of the war. 
They calculated that they could start the offensive on the 
eighteenth day, and that by the thirty-fifth day they could have 
advanced to the line Kiev-Vilna. But the Russians were 
expected to retreat to the interior of their empire. German 
calculations showed that by the forty-fifth day no decision 
would have been reached, while in the meantime the French 
would be attacking in the west. Thus the mass of German 
troops would have to be transferred to the west. Bearing all 
this in mind the Germans came to the conclusion that they 
would have to abandon any plan of an initial offensive towards 
the east. The eastern border was to be fortified instead, and 
this would retard the Russian advance until the French army 
was crushed and the Germans then free to attack over the 
Vistula.38  
This was the plan that the French and the Russians had to 
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render void by combining their efforts. 
In 1912 Russia disposed of 27 army corps in Europe and 28 
reserve divisions, of which 20 were for field employment.379 
Next year Joffre was told that there were 28 army corps 
available (the third Caucasian corps included) and 37 reserve 
divisions, of which 22 were free for field employment (the rest 
were necessary for keeping order in the interior and for 
garrisoning fortresses). The Russian infantry numbered 952 
active battalions and 592 reserve battalions.380 The Baltic forces 
in the vicinity of capital consisted of two or three corps, about 
128 battalions.381  
Thus there were 43 infantry divisions and 18.5 cavalry 
divisions available against the Germans and 39 infantry 
divisions with 20 cavalry divisions against the Austrians.382  But 
that assignment of forces was going to vary according to the 
strength that the Germans directed against Russia. If they 
should come with more than 25 divisions, Russia was going to 
oppose them with 17 army corps, which left 9 corps against 
Austria. 
The assignment Russian armies and army corps in the event of a strong 
German attack 
against Germany 816 battalions 
in the Vilna district IV army: XVIII, XVI, XXIV corps 
I army: XX, III, II, I, IV 
II army: VI, XV, XIX, XIII 
Warsaw district III army: XXIII corps 
V army: Grenadiers, V, XVII, XXV 
against Austria 504 battalions 
in southern Poland 	 XIV corps 
Volynia 	 X, IX, XI, XXI 
Podolia 	 XII, VII, Cauc III (Variant: VIII) 
Bessarabia 	 VIII (Variant: reserve divisions only) 
If the German threat was weaker, more corps could be 
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concentrated on the Austrian frontier and only thirteen corps 
left on the German frontier. 
The assignment of Russian army corps in the event of weak German menace 
Austrian frontier 632 battalions 
in southern Poland 	 XIV, XIX, XXIII, XVII, XXV corps 
Volynia 	 XI, IX, X, XXI 
Podolia 	 XII, VII, Cauc. III, perhaps VIII 
Bessarabia 	 VIII or reserve divisions 
German frontier 688 battalions 
IV army XVIII, XVI, XXIV corps 
I army XX, III, II, I, IV 
II army VI, XV, XIII 
III army Grenadiers, V 
383 
The Baltic army consisted of the Guards and the twenty-second 
army corps. 
The actual details of the assignment of the corps between the 
armies and fronts varied in the successive troop concentration 
plans, but the plan of 1912 gives the general idea which 
remained constant. 
An even more urgent problem than the assignment of forces 
between the German and Austrian fronts was the speed with 
which these forces could be concentrated for action. 
Forces available according to the plan of 1912 
cavalry 
divisions 
infantry 
divisions 
cavalry 
reserve 
divisions 
infantry 
reserve 
divisions 
8th day 12.5 13.5 
12th 17.5 28.5 
15th 18.5 38.5 
20th 18.5 46.5 2 
23rd 19.5 48.5 2 5.5 
26th 19.5 51.5 8.5 13 
36th 20.5 54.5 18 20 
384 
The table above gives the figures for the year 1912. Next year 
the troops were reckoned in corps. 
383 "Composition detaillee des armees 1912". EMATSH 7 N 1538 
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Forces available according to the plan of 1913 
I 	 II 
6th day 	 VI, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XI, XII, II, III 	 9 corps 
8th 	 IX (part), IX, XX, VIII 
10th 	 IX (rest) 
12th 	 X, XXI, VII, Grenadiers, XIII, I, XVIII 
14th 	 V, XVII, XXV 	 11 corps 
16th 	 XVI, XXIV, Cauc III 
19th 	 Sib I—V, Turkest I—II 
20th 	 21 corps 
23rd 	 23 corps in 
all 
not transported: Guards, XXII 	 385 	 386 
There is a great different in the two tables from 1913. No 
essential improvement in the speed of mobilization and 
concentration was reported from 1912 to 1913. Therefore it 
seems that the dates in the left-hand column do not include the 
time (three to fifteen days) necessary for mobilization before the 
concentration transports could be started. This conclusion is 
supported by a report giving a third variation of the plan. 
III 
15th day: frontier zone corps mobilized, 8-9 corps facing Prussia 
20th day: 11 corps facing Prussia, 9 corps facing Austria, 4 corps a Brest 
prepared to join either group 
26th day: the greatest part of the reserve divisions detrained, only the most 
faraway active units remain in the rear 	
387 
The gravest problem remained constant: 
"the relative slowness of the Russian troop 
concentration delays the moment when Russia will 
be able to take a resolute offensive." 
The slowness was due to the extent of the empire, and the 
inefficiency of the Russian railways.388 
Five or six days were necessary for the mobilization of the 
railways, i.e. to transform them from civilian to military use; 
385 "La mobilisation russe. Juillet 1913". EMATSH 7 N 1538 
386 "Emploi des troupes actives Russes en cas de guerre. Etude faite en octobre-
november 1911, fevrier 1913". EMATSH 7 N 1538 
387 "Note sur l'action militaire de la Russie en Europe. Aoüt 1912 — Mars 
1913". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 41 
388 = 387 
187 
and even after that a quarter of their capacity had to be left for 
civilian transport needs. Thus a double line with a block 
system allowed 36 military trains a day (out of a total of 48), 
and a line without the block system allowed 18-30 trains a 
day, a single line 8-14 trains.389 
There were eight lines from the interior to the frontier: 
1. St. Petersburg-Riga-Kovno 	 1 track 14 trains 
2. St. Petersburg-Warsaw 	 2 tracks 32 
3. Bologoe-Sedlec-Warsaw 	 2 tracks 32 
4. Moscow-Brest-Sedlec-Warsaw 	 2 tracks 32 
5. Orel-Briansk-Gomel-Jabinka 	 1-2 
6. Poltava-Kovel 	 1 
7. Kursk-Kiev-Kovel 	 2 
8. Odessa-Proskurov 	 2 	 390 
(map 29) 
An army corps needed about 130 trains, and thus it occupied 
the line for several days. Because there were only the eight 
lines, one line had to carry several army corps. (graph 30). 
Unavoidably, this delayed their arrival at the frontier. The 
progress of troop concentrations can be seen in the attached 
sketch-maps (maps 31-34). In the first three maps (31-33) the 
number of the army corps and their strength in battalions is 
given on the various days of troop concentration. In the fourth 
map (34) the different armies and their strength in corps is 
given. The group of four corps at Brest is waiting for definite 
information of German strength before joining either the 
defence on the Prussian front or the attack towards Austria. 
The attack is to reach the line Przemysl-Lemberg and Thorn-
Allenstein-Königsberg by the thirty-fifth day. 
During the first weeks a defensive attitude was to be adopted 
in Poland (the twenty-third and fifteenth corps can be seen 
retreating eastwards from map 31 to map 33) combined with a 
cautious advance against the corner of East Prussia and 
Galicia to prevent the enemy from cutting the Polish salient, "a 
389 "La mobilisation russe. Juillet 1913". EMATSH 7 N 1538 
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threat that dominates Russian planning, however improbable 
such an attempt seems to us (French)". The Russian general 
staff had promised to start action after the fifteenth day with 
the 8-9 corps then available against East Prussia, and on the 
twentieth day with 9 corps against Austria. The Warsaw 
concentration was too weak to allow the French any hope of 
Russian action on the western bank of the Vistula. After 
completing their troop concentration the Russians could start a 
more energetic offensive concentrically on the two fronts. The 
moment of starting this offensive was variously reported to be 
on the twenty-third, twenty-fifth, or thirtieth day.39' 
The Bulgarian military attaché, who knew the Russians well, 
supposed that the Russians would have their troop 
concentrations completed on the 17th day, but his English 
colleague did not believe him: 
"I don't think he has made sufficient allowance in 
his calculations for the stupidity and want of 
business capacity of the military and railway staffs, 
and for the fact that entrainment and detrainment 
are never practiced".392 
There were five army corps in the Warsaw military district in 
peacetime, i.e. 80 000 rifles and 23 000 sabres. A surprise initial 
attack by these troops was looked at but found impossible. 
Only three divisions of infantry (out of ten) and three and a 
half cavalry divisions (out of seven and a half) were 
immediately available for operations, because the fortifications 
in Warsaw, Novogeorgevi6, Zegrze, Lom2a, Belostok, and Brest 
had to be manned, and also the Austrian border guarded. (With 
the reform of 1910 there were no longer any cadre formations 
of fortress troops, and thus the active troops had to garrison 
the fortifications until reserve troops arrived). A surprise 
attack with small troops on East Prussia was difficult because 
of the lakes and broken country. An attack in the direction of 
Berlin with all available troops would have led to an inevitable 
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disaster, because if the frontier were stripped of all guards, the 
Germans would be left free to attack from East Prussia 
Belostok and the Austrians to attack Brest from Przemysl, thus 
cutting Poland and its army off from the rest of Russia. 
Nor could the Russians think of leaving the Poles unguarded, 
because they were under the influence of Austrian propaganda. 
Leaving them alone would immediately provoke a revolt in 
Poland. Mobilizing the corps in Poland would also take its 
time, which made an immediate attack problematical. Or, if the 
corps were to be kept in constant wartime strength their 
number must be cut down, "which would diminish the value of 
the Alliance". Stationing them more eastward, in order to 
speed up their mobilization, would prolong the time necessary 
for the march to the frontier. 
It seems that this study was initiated by the French, and the 
questions were answered by the Russians, with a negative 
result at every point. The conclusion was that Russia was not 
able to think of a sudden attack against Germany without 
exposing herself to the danger of a disaster.'93 
7.7. Efforts to Improve the Plan 
This fact left matters as they were set out in the plans of the 
Russian general staff. This was not very satisfactory for the 
French. They remarked that the Russian armies facing 
Germany were not able to support each other because their 
frontier was of "immense length", 350 kilometres from Kovno 
via Grodno to Warsaw. 
"Under these conditions the conduct of united 
offensive operations will certainly be most difficult. 
It is even permissible to wonder whether a German 
army, even inferior in strength but well concentrated 
in good time, could succeed in breaking the long 
cordon of Russian armies with a vigorous attack". 
asa 
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Viewed from hindsight this apprehension seems prophetic. It is 
true that the French supposed that the attack would come from 
Thorn towards Warsaw, simultaneously with an Austrian 
attack from Przemysl on Brest. The French hoped that the 
Russians would concentrate their army more compactly in the 
region of Warsaw, from there to take the offensive against 
Allenstein, or against the left flank of the Austrians in the 
south, or towards Berlin, according to how the situation was 
shaping. 
"But whichever plan is adopted, it is the main 
interest to reduce the duration of the concentration 
which is much too long, because the Russian offensive 
cannot begin before the twentythird day." 
The problem had remained unchanged since the days of 
Boisdeffre: 
"The military value of the alliance lies, above all, in 
the possibility of a simultaneous attack from the east 
and from the west. But this ideal is far from being 
realized. The Russians are in fact much slower than 
the French armies." 
The solution lay always in improving the Russian railways: 
"Couldn't the Russian staff make an effort analogous 
to that of the French general staff, which has won an 
advantage of one or two days over the Germans, 
thanks to ameliorations in their railway network."'" 
The French general staff consequently made a programme of 
improvements for the Russian railway network (map 35): 
1. lines I and V to be doubled, a gain of four days 
2. line III to be quadrupled from Sedlec to Warsaw 
3. line V to be quadrupled from Jabinka to Brest 
This was to allow the concentration of the mass of the Russian 
armies closer to Warsaw. With a view on an eventual offensive 
on the left bank, the lines from Warsaw to Thorn and Cracow 
were to be widened (from their European gauge of 1.44 m to 
the Russian gauge of 1.52 m). The Russians were also studying 
394 
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on their own initiative the possibility of constructing some 
additional lines.395 
At their meeting in July 1912 Joffre and 2ilinskii also 
discussed in some detail the development of Russian railways 
with a view to accelerating Russian troops concentration. 
2ilinskii explained that the railways owned by the state were 
being improved in proportion to the availability of funds. The 
state had no direct influence on the private railways. The lines 
from Warsaw to Cracow and Thorn had been purchased by the 
state only to enable them to be transformed from the European 
gauge to the Russian one. He admitted that it might be 
preferable to move the centre of gravity of his troop 
concentration southwards to Warsaw—Ivangorod in order to 
operate from there towards Allenstein or Posen, according to 
where the Germans were to be found.396 
At the request of the French minister of war397 Poincare took 
the notes of the French general staff with him on his visit to 
Russia in August 1912 and discussed them with Sazonov and 
the emperor. Sazonov promised his support for the French 
railway-demands in the council of ministers and with the 
emperor. Nicholas II found the question "interesting having 
discussed the question with M. Delcasse earlier". He promised 
not to lose the question from sight.398 
The Dual Alliance, especially in its military aspect, appeared 
to be strengthened by the appointment of Delcasse to the 
embassy in St. Petersburg. "It cannot be said that his 
appointment has been greeted with satisfaction here" a French 
envoy reported from Germany,'" and in the entente camp "it is 
an event of first importance and has produced a most 
favourable impression. "400 
Delcasse kept reminding the Russians of the railway 
programme and reported that "the Russians are working 
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diligently": they had even proposed the additional lines from 
Rjazan via Tula-Rovno-Bielsk to Warsaw. The emperor and the 
council of ministers approved the railway programme of the 
chiefs of staff in March 1913 and the additional lines in the 
summer of 1913. Delcasse acknowledged the good will of the 
Russians, but added that the French were always able to add 
their "useful word" in case of necessity, when authorizing the 
annual loan emissions on the Paris exchange.401 By the summer 
of 1913 General Joffre, too, was well satisfied with the progress 
of the Russian railway programme sketched at the previous 
meeting.4°3 
Delcasse's reference to the eventual "useful word" relates to 
the principal reason for the defect of the Russian railway 
system — lack of money. France had supplied funds for 
financing Russia's economy since the days of Alexander III.400 
Now a loan was arranged with special reference to the railway 
programme and to the strengthening of the Russian army. 
Russia was to obtain annually 400-500 million roubles to 
reactivate railway construction everywhere in the empire, on 
condition that the strategic railways mentioned in the protocol 
of 1912 were started immediately. Kokovtsov, being the 
minister of finance as well as prime minister, seemed to accept 
the condition "with pleasure" and was even gratified: he 
explained that there was no other source for the development 
of the Russian railways, which was of prime importance for the 
Russian economy then in full growth. The French financial 
agent reported that "there is something really fromidable 
preparing in Russia".4°4 
Joffre and 2ilinskii met again in August 1913 and read 
through and approved the military convention and the various 
explanations and additions which had been made to it during 
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the meetings of the general staff chiefs. The principle was 
confirmed that a simultaneous and immediate mobilization by 
the allies was to follow any act of war by Germany. The new 
German plan of 1913 reduced the time the Allies had for their 
mobilization and consequently allowed Germany more time to 
deal with France without a Russian threat from the east. 
At previous meetings Zilinskii had promised an offensive 
starting from the fifteenth day. Now he made a definite promise 
to this effect. 
The two generals were of a single mind that it was of prime 
necessity to reach a decisive success as soon as possible. A 
defeat of the French armies at the beginning would allow the 
Germans to transfer part of their armies to the east and defeat 
Russia in her turn. On the other hand a French success would 
facilitate the Russian operations, because then the transfer of 
the German armies to the east would be impossible. Therefore 
it was of importance, declared Joffre, for the French to have 
numerical superiority over the German forces in the west. This 
would be possible if the Germans were compelled to guard 
their eastern frontier with great force. It would be best of all if 
the Russian troops in the Warsaw military district would 
already constitute a threat to the Germans in peacetime. 
Zilinskii answered that a new army corps was being organized 
in Warsaw in the new Russian programme. 
Joffre again remarked that it was useless to leave a 
considerable part of the Russian forces against Sweden and 
Turkey; he 
"estimated that the defeat of Germany would 
facilitate the subsequent Russian operations against 
other enemy powers. The German defeat had to be 
pursued at the very beginning of the operations at 
any price". 
But in this respect Joffre could not make the Russians change 
their plans. 
Joffre then explained that the French troop concentrations 
would be completed on the tenth day, and that on the following 
day he was going to start the French offensive with nearly the 
whole of the French army, one hundred thousand men more 
than had been promised in the convention. Zilinskii answered 
that he would have 800 000 men concentrated on the German 
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border by the fifteenth day and would start their advance 
immediately after that day. The thrust was to be in the 
direction of the East Prussia or Posen and Berlin according to 
where the Germans were concentrated.405 
Nicholas II gave his word to Joffre: 
"You can have an absolute confidence in me ... You 
can count on me and my army".406 
Zilinskii came in for criticism later for his "rash" promise, 
when the promised offensive ended in disaster. But it can be 
seen from the preceding account that his promise was not rash; 
it was based on his plans for troop concentration and 
mobilization. On the fifteenth day at least 8-9 army corps 
were to be concentrated on the Prussian frontier (p. 187). The 
disastrous result in 1914 was due to utter incompetence in the 
execution of the plan; but even so the offensive was dangerous 
to the Germans and had its importance in the outcome of the 
battle of the Marne. The agreement of Joffre and Zilinskii 
simply made military sense, once the theory of an unavoidable 
war and of a single decisive battle at the very beginning of 
hostilities was accepted. Of course, neither Joffre's nor 
Zilinskii's plans were relevant to a long war of attrition, which 
no responsible military leader expected. 
The generals also reviewed the railway programme (map 36) 
and found that the line Orel—Warsaw had been double-
tracked, Jabinka—Brest four-tracked. Instead of further 
improving the Sedlec—Bologoe line the Russians had planned 
a new line from Rjazan and Tula to Warsaw. New desiderata 
were then listed: 
1. doubling the line Penza—Smolensk 
2. doubling the line Poltava—Kiev—Kovel 
3. doubling the line Rovno—Sarny—Luninec—Baranoviei 
The importance of having the Russian gauge on the lines to the 
west of the Vistula was again emphasized, as well as having 
crossings over the river. The generals also now stressed that it 
405 
"Proces-verbal des entretiens du mois Aoüt 1913 entre les chefs d'état-
major des armees francaise et russe". AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 42. DDF VIII/ 
3 n:o 79 
406 Ambassador in St. Petersburg to MAE 21.VIII 1913. AMAE, C.P. Russie 
N.S. 42 
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was vital to have more rolling stock, especially more powerful 
locomotives.407 
The new lines were included in the preconditions of the loan 
which Russia was negotiating with French financial experts. 
Kokovtsov was a bit "surprised", i.e. reluctant, because earlier 
the generals had mentioned only some short lines, and now 
they demanded the construction in a few years of 5330 
kilometres of new lines. An equal length of commercial lines 
was conceded or projected, in all about 11 000 kilometres 
absorbing about 2 500 000 000 francs during the following five 
or six years. But it was agreed that Russia was to receive 500 
million francs annually from France, on condition that the 
strategic lines were to be built in four years. The discussions 
took the rest of the year (1913), while the Russians tried to 
avoid too definite promises and Kokovtsov also tried to 
substitute more economically useful lines for some of the 
military line, but these details are not very relevant here.408 
Captain Wehrlin calculated that this programme was going 
to give Russia seven lines to the frontier between Kovel and 
Belostok, of which four lines would continue over the Vistula; 
and three or four continuous lines from the Volga and Caucasia 
to the western frontier.409 Some of the commercial lines were 
also useful from the military point of view. 
7.8. The Grand Programme for 
Increasing the Russian Army 
Another desideratum of the French was an increase in the 
strength of the Russian army. There was no quarrel with the 
Russian general staff in this respect. The Russian government 
407 = 405 
408 Ambassador in St. Petersburg to MAE 27.IX 1913, 28.X 1913, 31.XII 1913, 
11.I 1914. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 42 
409 Wehrlin to war minister 20.XII 1913/2.I 1914. EMATSH 7 N 1540, AMAE 
C.P. Russie N.S. 42 
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and the Duma were also well disposed towards the demands of 
defence, even if Kokovtsov quarrelled with Suhomlinov about 
the haphazard use of the appropriations. A grand programme 
was compiled for increasing the army in the years 1913-1917. 
The Duma adopted a programme for increasing the annual 
number of conscripts from 450 000 (1913) to 585 000 in 1917. 
This would raise the effectives of the peace-time army from 
1 280 000 to 1 700 000 in 1917.410 
The increase in numbers implied new formations, too. The 
number of army corps was to increased from 27 to 33 (in 
Europe). The first in order was the twenty-sixth corps in 
Warsaw, for which horses, guns, and material was already 
being collected by the time of Joffre's visit in August 1913.411  
The twenty-seventh for Kiev was due sometime in 1915 or 
1916. Twenty-six new cavalry regiments were planned — 2 in 
1914, 6 in 1915, 9 in 1916 and 9 in 1917.412  The artillery of each 
corps was to be reorganized. Instead of twelve batteries of eight 
cannons each there were to be eighteen six-gun batteries. The 
result would be an increase from 96 to 108 cannons for each 
corps. Heavy artillery was to be increased, too. New 
detachments were to be established to man the Polish 
fortresses. Turkestan was to receive six new battalions, and 
Vladivostok a new division of 16 battalions.413 
The outbreak of war in August 1914 prevented Russia from 
realizing this vast programme. Of course, one of the reasons for 
the fact that Germany was not absolutely resolute in defending 
peace during the July crisis was the knowledge that Russia 
would be sure to gain this additional strength in the future, 
and that it was in 1914 if ever that Germany had a chance of 
winning a war on two fronts. 
Of the great programme only one army corps in Warsaw and 
one rifle brigade for the twenty-second corps in Finland was 
410 
"Augmentation de l'effectif de l'armee russe". Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
to MAE 6.VI 1914. EMATSH 7 N 1480 
411 Delcasse to MAE 12.VIII 1913. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 42 
412 
"Note sur les projets de renforcement de l'Armee Russe". Laguiche to war 
minister 24.III 1914. EMATSH 7 N 1478 
413 
"Note sur les projets d'augmentation de l'Arme e Russe, Juillet 1913". 
EMATSH 7 N 1535 
"Note sur les projets d'augmentation de l'armee russe, 24.11I 1914". 
EMATSH 7 N 1535 
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established by the time war broke out.414 
The Guards and the first and/or the eighteenth corps had 
been earmarked for guarding the capital and the Baltic coast 
during the first days of the war. The new brigade in Finland 
freed one division in the St. Petersburg district, and 
consequently it was possible to transport one of the army corps 
from there to the frontier.415  This information of the French 
military attaché's was not entirely free from contradiction: the 
Guards corps was not seen among the corps marching to the 
front (maps 31-33), but both the first and the eighteenth were 
there. Perhaps the earlier information was still valid: these 
corps were to march to the front, but only after it was seen that 
the menace of a German or a Swedish landing was not 
materializing. In fact also the twenty-second corps was 
transferred to the western front when the Finns did not revolt 
and Sweden did not attempt a landing in Finland in August 
1914. 
A new plan of troop concentration was being prepared for 
the autumn of 1914, but the war broke out before it came into 
operation. Thus the Russian army began fighting with the 
strength and according to the plans which the French knew 
from the years 1912 and 1913.416 
The strength of the Russian army in Europe on the eve of the great war 
infantry 	 55 divisions 
	
9 brigades 	 952 battalions 
reserve 	 37 divisions 	 592 battalions 
cavalry 	 20 divisions 
4 brigades 
	
3 regiments 	 560 squadrons 
reserve 
	 15 divisions 	 524 squadrons or sotnias 
artillery 
	 361 field batteries 
56 mortar batteries 
42 horse batteries 
10 heavy batteries 
reserve 	 198 field batteries 
36 mortar batteries 
17 horse batteries 
414 Zalon6kovskil, Plany vofny p. 93 
415 
"Creation de la 4eme Bde de tirailleurs de Finlande". Laguiche to war 
minister 26.IV/9.V 1915. EMATSH 7 N 1478 "Modification dans la reparti-
tion des troupes". Laguiche to war minister 23.V/5.VI 1913. EMATSH 7 N 
1478 
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These troops were organized in the Guards corps, the 
Grenadier corps, and the twenty-five army corps plus one corps 
forming in Warsaw. In addition there were three corps in 
Caucasia, two corps in Turkestan, and five corps in Siberia. As 
always, each army corps consisted of two infantry divisions, 
one or two calvary divisions, two artillery brigades and one 
mortar group, one sapper battalion, and some of the corps one 
rifle brigade. The twenty-second corps in Finland consisted of 
four rifle brigades.41  
Numerically and materially the army was tolerably prepared 
for the first battle, equal to the Austrian army and not totally 
hopeless in comparison with the Germans. No thought had 
been given to the possibility of a long war. The offensive to 
East Prussia was partly improvised because Suhomlinov had 
razed magazines and fortifications in Poland in preparation for 
his plan of 1910, which was subsequently annulled.418 
Some slight personal defects in the higher echelons of the 
army were noticed, e.g. "Suhomlinov does not think about 
anything else but the skirts of his wife"419 or "Januskevie has 
been appointed chief of staff, which makes a bad impression 
because he has little experience of commanding troops".42° 
Kokovtsov was replaced by the ancient Goremykin by the end 
of January 1914, and there were rumours of Sazonov's dismissal.421  
With the wisdom of hindsight it is possible to understand that 
these were symptoms of grave defects, of the disease that 
defeated the Russian army and killed the Russian empire after 
a few years of battle. But the further story lies outside the 
framework of this exposition. 
However, it may be added for comparison that at the moment 
of Russia's maximum effort in 1917 she had mobilized 15 or 16 
million men. After the casualties — a couple of million killed, 
more than one million crippled, an unknown number of 
wounded, a couple of million prisoners of war, a number of 
deserters; and a few million men in depots and supply service 
415 Zaionekovskii. Plany voiny p. 320 
417 
"Notice complete sur l'armee Russe" s.d. EMATSH 7 N 1536 
418 Zaionekovskii, Plany voiny p. 300 
419 Laguiche to General Dupont 22.VI/5.VII 1913. EMATSH 7 N 1478 
420 Laguiche to General Dupont 29.III/11.IV 1914. EMATSH 7 N 1478 
421 Laguiche to General Dupont 30.I/12.II 1914. EMATSH 7 N 1478 
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— enough combatants remained to form 202 infantry divisions 
and 50 calvary divisions, united in twelve armies.422 
422 "Renseignements demandes pour l'etablissement d'un tableau comparatif de 
l'effort de mobilisation et des pertes des grandes puissances belligerants 28.I 
1919". EMATSH 7 N 1538 
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8. Conclusion 
The French military attachés were able to acquire much 
information on the Russian army. The picture drawn on the 
basis of their material is complete enough in military and 
political questions, even though they were unable to perceive 
social and economic aspects. The widest and most detailed 
view was given by Moulin. Then, during Matton's time, the 
Russian wish to hid their intention of ignoring the French 
alliance obscured the picture. With the revival of the alliance 
the quality of information also improved. 
The French aim in the military alliance remained constant. 
Germany was to be compelled to fight simultaneously on two 
fronts to save France from defeat by superior German forces, 
and eventually to render possible the reconquest of her lost 
provinces and the retrieval of her leading political role in 
Europe. England was taken into account as a potential enemy 
in 1898 but disappeared from that role in 1904. 
In the beginning the Russian general staff hoped that the 
Dual Alliance would relieve them of the German menace and 
leave them free for the fight with Austria, the principal rival in 
the Oriental question. But they never dared to leave the 
German frontier without strong defences, and little by little 
Germany took over the role of principal enemy. This was 
perhaps partially due to French insistence, but mainly to the 
incessant growth of German might and ambition. A reversal of 
alliances seemed possible by the turn of the century because of 
the Russian adventure in the Far East and the possibility of the 
dissolution of the Habsburg empire. Later Suhomlinov planned 
to replace troop concentrations in Poland with a defensive 
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position in White Russia. But already in 1909 Germany was 
seen to be supporting Austrian schemes in the Balkans, and by 
1914 Germany's own plans in Turkey and Constantinople were 
definitely revealed. Delcasse said to Nicholas II that the road 
via Vienna to Constantinople was, appearances not-
withstanding, not a straight one. "Yes, I know" the emperor 
said, "it goes through Berlin".423 
Germany was not to be allowed to fight and conquer each in 
turn France and Russia. By 1913 the French and Russian 
general staffs had agreed on the principle of a simultaneous 
attack from the west and from the east against Germany. 
To make possible the realization of this plan France financed 
Russian armaments and railway programmes, and the French 
generals were never reticent in expressing their wishes. But the 
Russian army was not dominated by French generals. Military 
logic led the French and the Russian generals to uniform 
conclusions once the premise of the one decisive battle in the 
beginning of the expected war was adopted. Sometimes the 
generals schemed together against the Russian civilian 
government, especially the minister of finance. 
Of course, the opposition of the minister of finance was not 
due to any arbitrary obstructionism. It reflected the fact of 
Russian underdevelopment, the fact that Russia was not 
financially or materially able to arm all her potential 
manpower or to construct communications comparable to those 
of western Europe. 
From the reports of the French military attaché a picture 
emerges of an unrelenting endeavour to develop the Russian 
armed forces. But the historian has the advantage of seeing 
also the formidable structural impediments to this. He can 
observe and put together the innumerable comments on the 
waste of the soldiers' time, the officers' lack of energy and 
interest, of the incompetence of the decrepit generals, of the 
lack of system and order, of the corruption of the 
administration. These "expressions of the Slav soul" can be 
taken as symptoms of the rottenness of the social and political 
system of the Old Russia. 
The system nearly collapsed in 1905. For years the armed 
423 Delcasse to M AE 29.I 1914. AMAE, C.P. Russie N.S. 42 
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forces were occupied in restoring order, neglecting their 
professional tasks. Revolutionary agitation was reported in 
some army and naval units, too, even afterwards. These facts 
were, however, soon forgotten or ignored. The inability to see 
defects in itself and to reform itself must have been one of the 
mortal defects of the Tsarist system. 
Another structural problem in the Russian empire was the 
national question. In the era of nationalism there emerged two 
contradictory currents. The Russians attempted to build a 
unified national state — the apparent strength of such a system 
was demonstrated in the bitterly admired neighbour Germany. 
But simultaneously the various peoples of the empire were 
infected by a national consciousness of their own; only the 
backward tribes of inner and eastern Russia continued to be 
assimilated. The Poles, a historical nation, had not been 
satisfied with a mere autonomy; twice, in 1830 and 1863, they 
had violently shown their feelings. The subsequent policy of 
incompetent integration had made them completely 
irreconcilable. A policy of brutal segregation hade made the 
Jewish population equally irreconcilable. In the Baltic 
provinces the barons, Russia's most conscientious 
administrators, were suspected of German sympathies. Their 
self-government was whittled down with the support of the 
local Letts and Estonians. But these peoples then started 
developing their own instead of a Russian nationality. In 
Finland there had been a Swedo-Finnish quarrel, but it 
subsided and was replaced by opposition to the Russian policy 
of uniting the Grand Duchy to the central parts of the empire. 
In Caucasia the various small tribes were hardly pacified, and 
the Armenians did not know whether the Russians or the Turks 
ought to be hated more. The Muslim population in Caucasia as 
well as in Turkmenistan could be suspected of anticolonial pan-
Islamic feelings. 
Thus Finns and some Caucasians had to be relieved of all 
military service. Polish and Jewish recruits caused problems in 
planning the mobilization. Several army corps had to be kept 
out of the initial principal battle to watch the potential rebels. 
The result of all Russian efforts to unite these peoples by force 
was the separation of the border regions in 1917 when there 
was no more force left. The Bolsheviks had quite a task to 
reconquer the empire. Of course, allowing local nationalism 
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free rein might have resulted in separatism, too. 
The Russian commanders and the general staff were not 
satisfied simply to serve in their country's defence; they 
sketched far-reaching programmes of conquest. Their 
imperialist dreams reached out towards Galicia and the 
Turkish Straits and further on over all the Balkans and to a 
naval position on the Mediterranean. In Persia they tried to 
build a dominating position and to reach the Persian Gulf and 
the Indian Ocean. The pressure on the Indian and Afghan 
borders seems to have been mainly a means of blackmailing 
England to concessions in the Near East, but some ideas of 
conquest were cherished among the army chiefs in Transcaspia. 
The Far East schemes were fostered mainly by the court and 
naval circles, but were not totally alien to the general staff, 
either. The plan of a landing on the Bosphorus, accepted by all 
in the 1880's, was still there in the naval plans of 1912 but had 
disappeared from the army planning. The core of the 
expeditionary force was re-allocated to tasks on the main 
battle front, and only the Caucasian district continued 
preparations for a battle with the Turks. 
These plans were reflections of dreams that existed even 
outside the military, among the "patriotic" circles of the civil 
population. The generals were not able to make their plans 
part of Russia's official foreign policy; neither the government 
nor the foreign office were tools of the military or the 
chauvinists. The professional diplomatists were able to perceive 
that all attempts to realize such dreams would be rendered 
suicidal by the reactions of other powers. But the suicide was 
often very close, even before the catastrophe of 1914. 
The attitude of the military towards the neighbouring 
countries was not always in line with the current reality. They 
regarded Japan as a dangerous enemy, or they took Italy's 
membership in the Triple Alliance at face value long after the 
diplomatic ententes had removed all danger of a Japanese 
attack or any chance of an Italian corps fighting against Russia 
or France. The generals had a tendency to regard nations as 
either enemies or friends, without nuances. The admirals did not 
understand that a naval demonstration on the Swedish coast could 
make an enemy out of a pro-German neutral; it is well known that 
Admiral v. Essen was at the last moment prevented from 
provoking the Swedes in this way in August 1914. 
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The war plans were made for the eventuality of a war against 
Austria and Germany. Fortifications were constructed, 
railways were built, manoeuvres held according to these plans. 
All this must have had some importance in the development of 
the general attitude towards these neighbours, working against 
any real attempt to reach an entente with them. And the 
neighbouring states knew of the Franco-Russian preparations 
and of the military-patriotic schemes of conquest. They would 
not have been able to trust any proposal for an entente if one 
had been made. A war was thought to unavoidable, and 
preparations for it made it inevitable. 
The theory built around the idea of a decisive battle to be 
fought and won at the first moment of the war gave enormous 
signifance to speed in mobilization. The obsession with the n-th 
day emerges constantly from the preceding account. It explains 
the impatience with which the military watched the attempt at 
conciliation during the July crisis of 1914S27 and why they 
wrenched the decision from the diplomatists. In this aspect 
there is a complete symmetry between the Franco-Russian and 
the Austro-German camps. It is not possible to judge one or the 
other party guilty or not guilty of the war, whatever the 
sequence of their decisions or despatches might be. The 
European political and military culture was guilty of the great 
war. 
Appointing individual guilt is, of course, a political or 
propagandist question, not a historical problem. If we were 
concerned with the Kriegsschuldfrage, we could make much of 
the aggressive plans of the Russian general staff or of Matton's 
or Moulin's letters. Perhaps it is significant that the editors of 
the French collection of diplomatic documents have not 
published Matton's letters, for instance. But even so no sensible 
historian could regard the French or the Russians of being 
innocent of involvement in the lead-up to the great war, any 
more than other nations. These officers would have felt hurt if 
they had been accused of a lack of warlike disposition. In the 
nineteenth century war was a romantic test of manly virtue, for 
424 L.C.F. Turner, The Russian Mobilisation in 1914, in The War Plans of the 
Great Powers, 1880-1914, ed. by M. Kennedy. London 1979. p. 252-266, 
discusses the last phase of the Russian military planning in detail. 
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seriously-thinking people; only some of the idealistically-
minded saw it as an abominable crime against humanity. It 
was legitimate to defend national honour, power, influence, 
interest. If the devious schemes of the enemy made a war 
inevitable, it was one's right and duty even to start that war if 
conditions proved favourable for victory, conquest, weakening 
the enemy, or other positive result. 
Nobody prepared for a world war. The preparations were for 
a short war, for the one battle, which would disentagle the 
problems that had worried the diplomats for decades. It is 
another story how this cheerful dash turned into the nightmare 
of 1914-1918 and/or 1914-1945. 
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Map 2. Planned troop concentrations, 1882 
("Historique de la concentration russe de 1882 a 1902, 
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Map 14. Planned troop concentrations, 1900 
("Historique de la concentration russe de 1882 å 1902. 
Croquis IX: Concentration russe en 1900". EMATSH 7 N 
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Map 16. Planned troop concentrations, 1902. 
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Map 18. "Map drawn by Pendezec", 1903. 
("Rapport du General Pendezec, Aoüt 1903". AMAE 
C.P. Russie N.S. 36) 
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Map 20. The garrison areas of the Russian army before the 
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227 
0.  
N battalions' ~ 
~ 
i Grodno 
11 ~  
O 
/ 
a~alions 
G F3e lesto;< ; 	 /_ \ 	 ~\ 
N ovoaPorgievsk 	 \ 
Warsaw' 	 Brest \ \ 
172 b 
	
\\ 
battalions 
	
O 	
\ 
211 bt \ IiQns 
Ivangorod  
 ~~ 
corps • 
.(1 
ros 
/ \ 
96 battalions 
9 AUstria n 
cor
~ ~ 
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Map 24. The garrison areas of the Russian army after the reform 
of 1910 
("L'armee russe. Conference developpee par M. le 
Lieutenant Schlattery. Association des officiers subalter-
nes de l'Ecole d'Instruction d'Infanterie de l'Ecole Milit-
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Map 25. Planned troop concentrations, 1910, according to Zaion- 
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Map 26. Planned troop concentrations, 1910, according to the 
information given to the French military attaché 
("Pieces pretes 1910". EMATSH 7 N 1537) 
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Map 28. Planned defence of the approaches to St. Petersburg 
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Map 29. The eight railway lines available for the concentration of 
the Russian army 
("Carte de Chemins de fer russes en 1913. Circonscrip-
tions Militaires". EMATSH 7 N 1537) 
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Graph 30. Graph of the utilization of the railway lines by the 
army corps arriving from the interior of the empire 
("Emploi des troupes actives Russes en cas de guerre. 
Etude fait en Octobre-Novembre 1911, Fevrier 1913". 
EMATSH 7 N 1538) 
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Map 31. The progress of the Russian troop concentrations I: the 
eighth day. 
("Frontiere Occidentale de la Russie, 8eme jour". 
EMATSH 7 N 1538) 
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Map 32. The progress of the Russian troop concentrations II: the 
fifteenth-eighteenth day. First contact with the enemy 
on the fifteenth day. 
("Frontiere Occidentale de la Russie, 15me jour, 18me 
jour". EMATSH 7 N 1538) 
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Map 33. The progress of the Russian troop concentrations III: the 
twentieth day 
("Frontiere Occidentale de la Russia, 20me jour". 
EMATSH 7 N 1538) 
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Map 34. The progress of the Russian troop concentrations IV: the 
twenty-third day, offensive begins. 
("Croquis schematique de la Concentration Russe le 23e jour. Etude du 2e Bureau de 1'Etat Major de l'armee. 
Aoüt 1912". EMATSH 7 N 1535) 
240 	 15 
Map 35. Railway improvements demanded by the chiefs of staff 
in 1912 
("Developpement des lignes demandees. Decembre 
1913". Wehrlin to war minister 20.XII 1913/2.I 1914. 
EMATSH 7 N 1540) 
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167 184 194 201 
Gerngross, General 124-126 
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75 97 119 136 141 155-157 168 204 
Turkish troops in Armenia 44, in Me- 
sopotamia 46 
Turkmen(s) 23 92  
Turks 92 136 156 183 203-204 
Ufa 118 
Ukraine 25 103 130 
Ukrainians 178 
ultimatum, German in 1909 119 
Upper Silesia 72 
Urals 118 130 
USA 65 160 176 
Ust-Dvinsk 62n 
Vannovskii, Colonel 87-88 
Vannovskii, General 17 47-48 54 117 
Varna 45 
Vienna 73 202 
Viikovicki 37 
Vilna 21 24 28 31 34 36-37 66 108 
122 133 174 184-185 
Vincennes 7 9 
Vindava 27 
Vistula 17 35 38 66 80-81 113 122 
133 167 184 189 195-196 
Vladikavkas 55 
Vladimir, Grand Duke 24 49 
Vladivostok 54 62 82-83 88 142 148n 
173-174 197 
Voisin 175 
Volga 130 196 
Volynia 80 185-186 
Voronin, military attaché 70 73 
Vyborg (Viipuri) 62n 64 180 
war, aims 15 16, of attrition 195, Bal- 
kan 24 135 155 182, Civil 177, Euro- 
pean 91 136, Franco-Austrian 24, 
Franco-German 18, great 52 138, 
inevitable 205 206, Serbo-Bulgarian 
1886 11, South-African 58 75 85, 
Turkish-Italian 137, on two fronts 
197, prolonged 196, World 9 206 
Warsaw 21 28 31-32 34-35 37-38 
41 49 61 62n 66 92 108 113 118 
121-122 127 133 167 172 174 185 
188 189-197 
Wehrlin, Captain 170 191 
Western Europe 101 202 
western Balkans 42 
western frontier 196 
western provinces 126 129 
western Siberia 98 
White Russians 178 202 
William II 13 38 48 69 72-74 91 97 
99 104-105 117 119 
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wireless telegraphy 115 169 
Witte 42 50-51 56 82-84 90 96-97 
workers 100 149-150 160 177 
Yalu 86 
Yellow Peril 74 
Young Turk revolution 119 135 
Zaionekovskii, A.M. 7-8 24 35 69 
116 118  
Zaizanski 63n 
Zakataly 62n 
Zanzibar 13 169 
Zegrie 62n 122 189 
2ilinskii, General 126 133 136 138 
164 166 169 192-195 
Åland Islands 152 154 160 181 
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